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Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the Convention on Nuclear Safety which was 
adopted on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The Convention was 
ratified on 5 January 1996, and it came into force in Finland on 24 October 1996. This 
report is the Finnish National Report for the Fifth Review Meeting in April 2011.
There are two nuclear power plants operating in Finland: the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. 
The Loviisa plant comprises of two VVER units (Russian type pressurised water reactors), 
operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy, and the Olkiluoto plant two BWR units (boiling 
water reactors), operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj. In addition, a new nuclear power 
plant unit is being constructed at the Olkiluoto site (PWR). At both sites there are interim 
storages for spent fuel as well as final repositories for medium and low level radioactive 
wastes. Furthermore, Triga Mark II research reactor is operated in Espoo by the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland.
In this report, latest development in the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
is described. Major safety reviews and plant modernisations are explained, including 
safety assessment methods and key results. Safety performance of the Finnish nuclear 
power plants is also presented by using representative indicators. Finnish regulatory 
practices in licensing, provision of regulatory guidance, safety assessment, inspection and 
enforcement are also covered including some performance indicators. Major developments 
in Finland since the Fourth Review Meeting are as follows: amendment of the nuclear 
energy legislation in 2008, updating of safety guides, periodic safety review carried out 
at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2007–2009, continued construction of the new 
nuclear power plant unit, Olkiluoto 3, and assessment of the three Decision-in-Principle 
applications for constructing new nuclear power plants as well as two Decision-in-Principle 
applications for expanding the capacity of the future disposal facility for spent fuel.
In the report, the implementation of each of the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention is 
separately evaluated. Based on the evaluation, the following features stressing Finnish 
safety management practices in the field of nuclear safety can be concluded:
•	 During the recent years Finnish legislation and regulatory guidance have been further 
developed and the work is still going on taking into account international guidance such 
as IAEA standards and WENRA (Western European Regulators’ Association) reference 
levels for existing reactors and safety objectives for new reactors. No deviation from 
the convention obligations has been identified in the Finnish regulatory infrastructure 
including nuclear and radiation regulations.
•	 The licensees have shown good safety performance and rigorous safety management 
practices in carrying out their safety related responsibilities in the operation and 
modernisation of existing NPP’s. During recent years, only minor operational events 
have taken place and no major safety problems have appeared. The licensees’ practices 
are considered to comply with the Convention obligations.
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•	 Safety assessment is a continuous process and living probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) practices are effectively used for the further development of safety. Periodic 
safety review of the Loviisa plant was carried out in 2005–2007 in connection with 
the operating licence renewal, and the periodic safety review of the Olkiluoto plant 
was carried out in 2007–2009. Methods for qualification of non-destructive testing and 
management of ageing have been developed further for responding to the needs of 
continuous safety improvement.
•	 The resources of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) are adequate 
to fulfil the needs for independent regulation, and have been increased to meet the 
needs to oversee the construction of the new plant in Finland. The regulatory guidance 
and practices have been further developed. The Technical Research Centre of Finland 
organisation, VTT, supports effectively the regulatory body in the safety assessment 
work providing safety analysis capabilities and tools e.g. via the national research 
programmes, and performing safety analyses.
The Fourth Review Meeting in 2008 identified some challenges and recorded some planned 
measures to improve safety in Finland. These issues are included and responded in this 
fifth national report of Finland. These items were (in brackets the Articles, in which the 
issues are addressed):
•	 ageing management of reactors in operation; renewal of I&C systems, reactor pressure 
vessel material embrittlement and use of risk-informed methods to further develop the 
plant safety (see Articles 14 and 18)
•	 maintaining competence and responding to the growing needs for professional staff (see 
Articles 8 and 11)
•	 restructuring, streamlining and updating the safety regulations, and developing risk 
informed regulation (see Articles 7 and 14)
•	 further enhancing the operating experience feedback processes (see Article 19)
•	 responding to increased demand for timely and effective communication to public (see 
Articles 8, 16, and 17)
•	 increased attention to information security issues (see Article 8)
•	 qualification of non-destructive testing (see Article 14)
•	 ensuring reliability of digital I&C, verification & validation (see Article 18)
•	 completing the PRA, e.g. the inclusion of fire events under shut down and low power 
conditions for Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs (see Article 14).
Still some of these issues require further development to enhance safety, i.e., including 
provision for plant ageing, reliability of digital I&C and risk informed regulation as well 
as management of competence taking into account the retirement. Other important issues 
cover new technologies, security arrangements and the growing need for new research and 
development programmes. These are generic issues that require international attention in 
all countries using nuclear energy.
Based on the amended Finnish nuclear energy legislation in 2008, the existing regulatory 
guidance system (YVL Guides) is being restructured. The goal is to have new regulatory 
guides published before the end of 2011. This task is highly prioritised because of new 
nuclear power plant projects in Finland.
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The expected lifetime of the existing nuclear power plants requires renewal of systems 
and components and modernisation of technologies. The regulation of the existing nuclear 
power plants emphasises the management of ageing and the quality of plant operations. 
The I&C and other systems at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants are undergoing and 
planning modernisation, and extra care is needed to ensure operational safety during 
this work. In its regulatory inspections, STUK emphasises the importance of meticulous 
planning and controlled implementation of changes.
Security arrangements in the use of nuclear power also call for efficient supervision. The 
procedures, preparations and information exchange related to antiterrorism activities 
need to be enhanced worldwide. In Finland, the need for strengthened security has been 
addressed in the amended legislation and regulatory guidance. IAEA’s International 
Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission was carried out in Finland in 2009. 
STUK has also increased its resources in the security area and its co-operation with other 
authorities.
The retirement of large age groups in Finland will affect public administration and 
industry throughout, including STUK and utilities. The plans for new construction 
and mentioned challenges and activities require additional manpower and efforts from 
the nuclear power companies and regulatory body as well as from technical support 
organisations. Thus, ensuring an adequate national supply of experts in nuclear science 
and technology and ensuring high quality research infrastructure are continuous 
challenges in Finland. The Ministry of Employment and the Economy is organising a new 
infrastructure working group which should start operating in fall 2010. Ageing manpower 
and organisations optimised for operation and control of current nuclear facilities require 
also continuous focus on resource management, education and training programmes and 
knowledge management. STUK’s resources are developed in such a way that the key tasks 
in radiation and nuclear safety can be taken care of at all times. Both STUK and utilities 
have recruited new experts. Education and training programmes have been developed 
for newcomers at STUK as well as on national level to all organisations (such as utilities, 
waste management company and research organisations).
Due to the increasing interest in nuclear power in Finland, communication and 
information sharing on nuclear and radiation safety will become an increasingly important 
success factor for STUK and licensees. Regulatory processes and decisions have to be clear 
and understandable to general public. Interactions with media are important since media 
plays an important role in communication.
In conclusion, Finland has implemented the obligations of the Convention and also the 
objectives of the Convention are complied with. Safety improvements have been annually 
implemented at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants since their commissioning. Regulatory 
guidance have been further developed and the work is still going on taking into account 
safety research and advances in science and technology as well as the operating and 
construction experiences. There exists no urgent need for additional improvements to 
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Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety which was adopt-
ed on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference. The Convention was ratified on 5 
January 1996, and it came into force in Finland 
on 24 October 1996. This report is the Finnish 
National Report for the Fifth Review Meeting in 
April 2011.
In Chapter 2 of this report, the measures relat-
ed to each of the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention 
are separately evaluated. The evaluation is based 
on the Finnish legislation and regulations as well 
as on the situation at the Finnish nuclear power 
plants. The reference is made to the IAEA Safety 
Requirements and other safety standards as ap-
propriate. IAEA’s Information Circular 572, Rev. 3, 
1 Introduction
28 September 2009, was used as a guideline for the 
context of the report.
In the report, latest safety reviews and plant 
modernisations are explained in detail including 
safety assessment methods and key results. Safety 
performance of Finnish nuclear power plants is 
also presented by using representative indicators. 
Finnish regulatory practices in licensing, provision 
of regulatory guidance, safety assessment, inspec-
tion and enforcement are also covered in detail.
The fifth National Report is aimed to be a 
stand-alone document and does not require famil-
iarisation with the earlier reports. The fulfilment 
of the obligations of the Convention is described 
in general and the latest development since the 
Fourth Review Meeting is specifically described.
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2 Compliance with Articles 6 to 19 
– Article-by-article review
Article 6. Existing nuclear installations
Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that the safety of 
nuclear installations existing at the time 
the Convention enters into force for that 
Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as pos-
sible. When necessary in the context of this 
Convention, the Contracting Party shall en-
sure that all reasonably practicable improve-
ments are made as a matter of urgency to 
upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. 
If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans 
should be implemented to shut down the nu-
clear installation as soon as practically possi-
ble. The timing of the shut-down may take into 
account the whole energy context and possible 
alternatives as well as the social, environmen-
tal and economic impact.
In Finland, there are two nuclear power plants: 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The Loviisa plant 
comprises of two VVER units that are operated 
by Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum), and the 
Olkiluoto plant comprises of two BWR units that 
are operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO). 
TVO has also a Construction Licence for the 
new plant unit of nominal reactor thermal power 
4300 MW at the Olkiluoto site (Olkiluoto 3). At 
both sites there are fresh and spent fuel storage 
facilities, and facilities for storage and treatment 
of low and medium level radioactive wastes. Other 
existing nuclear installations in Finland are the fi-
nal disposal facilities for low and medium level ra-
dioactive waste at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa plant 
sites. The disposal facility at Olkiluoto was taken 
into operation in 1992 and at Loviisa in 1998.
For taking care of the spent fuel final disposal, 
a joint company Posiva Oy has been established 
by Fortum and TVO. Research, development and 
planning work for spent fuel disposal is in progress 
and the disposal facility is envisaged to be opera-
tional in 2020. The repository is planned to be con-
structed in the vicinity of the Olkiluoto NPP site. 
To confirm the suitability of the site, construction 
of an underground rock characterisation facility 
was commenced in 2004. Finnish Parliament en-
dorsed in 2001 a Decision–in–Principle made by 
the Government for the implementation of Finnish 
Disposal Facility to the Olkiluoto site.
Finland observes the principles of the 
Convention, when applicable, also in other uses 
of nuclear energy than nuclear power plants, e.g. 
in the use of a research reactor. In Finland, there 
is one TRIGA Mark II research reactor (250 kW) 
situated in Espoo. The reactor was taken into op-
eration in 1962 and it is operated by the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT).
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment 
and enhancement approach is presented in the 
nuclear legislation. Nuclear Energy Act states that 
the safety of nuclear energy use shall be maintained 
at as high a level as practically possible. For the 
further development of safety, measures shall be 
implemented that can be considered justified con-
sidering operating experience and safety research 
and advances in science and technology. The im-
plementation of safety improvements has been a 
continuing process at both Finnish nuclear power 
plants since their commissioning and there ex-
ists no urgent need to upgrade the safety of these 
plants in the context of the Convention.
Loviisa NPP units 1 and 2
The Loviisa nuclear power plant units were con-
nected to the electrical network in February 8, 
1977 (Loviisa 1) and November 4, 1980 (Loviisa 2). 
The nominal thermal power of both of the Loviisa 
units is 1500 MW (109% as compared to the origi-
nal 1375 MW). The increase of the power level was 
implemented and licensed in 1998.
The latest overall safety review of the Loviisa 
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plant took place in 2005–2007 in connection of 
the relicensing of the operation of the plant. The 
Loviisa plant was reaching its original design age 
in 2007–2010, but the technical and economical 
lifetime of the plant is estimated to be at least 50 
years according to the current knowledge of the 
plant ageing. Based on the application, Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) carried out 
a comprehensive review of the safety of the Loviisa 
plant. The review was completed in July 2007 
when STUK provided the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy (former Ministry of Trade and 
Industry) with its statement on the safety of the 
plant. The Finnish Government granted in July 
2007 to Fortum new Operating Licences for unit 1 
until the end of 2027 and for unit 2 until the end 
of 2030. The length of the Operating Licences cor-
responds to the current goal for the plant’s lifetime, 
which is 50 years. Two periodic safety reviews (by 
the end of the year 2015 and 2023) are to be car-
ried out by the licensee as a licence condition.
Due to consistent plant improvements, the safe-
ty level of the plant has been increased as shown 
by the probabilistic risk assessment (see Article 
14). For continued safe operation, plant improve-
ment projects are still necessary. The largest on-
going improvement is the complete renewal of 
the plant I&C system, which is scheduled to be 
completed by 2014. Plant lifetime management 
includes credible procedures for following the plant 
ageing. The conditions of components which are 
practically impossible to be replaced by new ones 
(pressure vessel, steam generators, etc.) are moni-
tored most actively.
One specific issue with Loviisa plant units is 
the risk of reactor pressure vessel brittle fracture. 
Several modifications have been made at the both 
units to reduce the risk. Fortum stated during the 
latest operating licence renewal process that the 
brittle fracture risk can be managed until the end 
of the 50 years plant lifetime. The use of the reactor 
pressure vessel at the Loviisa unit 1 is licensed until 
the outage 2012 and at the Loviisa unit 2 until the 
outage 2010. The permit renewal of the reactor pres-
sure vessels required Fortum to update the safety 
analyses. The application to extend the operation of 
the pressure vessel at the Loviisa unit 2 until the 
end of 2030, i.e., to the end of the plant unit’s operat-
ing licence, is presently at STUK’s review.
The large plant modernisation projects carried 
out at the Loviisa nuclear power plant and STUK’s 
safety reviews are described in more detail in 
Annex 2. During recent years, only minor opera-
tional events have taken place and no major safety 
issues have appeared (see also Article 19).
In addition to the regulatory oversight and safe-
ty assessment, there have been independent safety 
reviews conducted by international organisations 
such as IAEA and WANO (World Association of 
Nuclear Operators). IAEA OSART (Operational 
Safety Review Team) missions have been organ-
ised at Loviisa power plant in November 1990 and 
March 2007. The WANO peer reviews have been 
carried out at the Loviisa nuclear power plant at 
the beginning of 2001 and in March 2010.Figure 1. Loviisa nuclear power plant.
In 2008, the gross production of Loviisa 1 was 
3850 GWh and the load factor was 86.0%. The 
annual refuelling and maintenance outage lasted 
50 days. The gross production of Loviisa 2 was 
4210 GWh, the load factor 93.9% and the length 
of the refuelling and maintenance outage was 22 
days. The annual collective radiation doses were 
1.13 manSv and 0.43 manSv for Loviisa 1 and 
Loviisa 2 respectively.
In 2009, Loviisa 1 produced 4290 GWh (gross), 
the load factor was 96.0% and the refuelling and 
maintenance outage lasted 17 days. In 2009 the 
gross production of Loviisa 2 was 4260 GWh, the 
load factor was 95.4%, and the refuelling and 
maintenance outage lasted 18 days. The collec-
tive radiation doses in 2009 were 0.42 manSv for 
Loviisa 1 and 0.34 manSv for Loviisa 2.
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Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2
The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units were 
connected to the electrical network in September 
2, 1978 (Olkiluoto 1) and February 18, 1980 
(Olkiluoto 2). The nominal thermal power of both 
Olkiluoto units is 2500 MW, which was licensed in 
1998. The new power level is 115.7% as compared 
to the earlier nominal power 2160 MW licensed in 
1983. The original power level of both units was 
2000 MW. The Operating Licences of the units are 
valid until the end of 2018.
The latest periodic safety review (PSR) of the 
Olkiluoto plant took place in 2007–2009. Regulatory 
Guide YVL 1.1 specifies the contents of the PSR. 
For a separate periodic safety review without oper-
ating licence renewal, STUK shall be provided with 
similar safety-related reports as in applying for 
the operating licence or operating licence renewal. 
The PSR documentation was submitted to STUK 
for approval at the end of 2008 as required in the 
operating licence condition.
STUK made a decision concerning the PSR in 
October 2009. The decision included also STUK’s 
safety assessment which provided a summary of 
the reviews, inspections and continuous oversight 
carried out by STUK. Based on the assessment, 
STUK considered that the Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plant units 1 and 2 meet the set safety re-
quirements for operational nuclear power plants. 
Substantial modernisations have been carried out 
at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
since their commissioning to improve safety. This 
is in line with the principle of continuous im-
provement of safety provided in Section 7 a of the 
Nuclear Energy Act. The safety of the plant will 
be further improved during the current operat-
ing licence period. Based on the periodic safety 
review, TVO submitted to STUK action plans for 
the observed points requiring improvement. STUK 
included also some additional requirements in 
the decision relating to the periodic safety review. 
These had to do among with among aother things 
systematic assessment and development of the 
diversity principle, including investigation of pos-
sibilities for residual heat removal independent 
of seawater, and plant modifications to improve 
safety in situations involving spurious opening of 
the turbine bypass valves.
As the result of the PSR, the physical protec-
tion of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was not 
yet considered to be completely in compliance with 
the requirements of Government Decree 734/2008, 
which came into force in December 2008. Further 
requirements concerning this issue based also 
on the principle of continuous improvement were 
included in the decision relating to the periodic 
safety review.
The large plant modernisation projects car-
ried out at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant and 
STUK’s safety reviews are described in more detail 
in Annex 2. During recent years, only minor opera-
tional events have taken place and no major safety 
issues have appeared (see also Article 19).
In addition to the regulatory safety assess-
ment, there have been independent safety reviews 
Figure 2. Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units 1 and 2.
In 2008, net production at Olkiluoto 1 was 7221 
GWh and the load factor 93.7%. The annual re-
fuelling and maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 1 
lasted 18 days. The net production of Olkiluoto 2 
was 6997 GWh and the load factor was 96.9%. 
The annual refuelling and maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto 2 lasted 17 days. The collective radiation 
doses in 2008 were 0.73 manSv for Olkiluoto 1 
and 0.21 manSv for Olkiluoto 2.
In 2009, net production at Olkiluoto 1 was 
7296 GWh and the load factor was 97.0%. The 
annual refuelling and maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto 1 lasted 8 days. The net production of 
Olkiluoto 2 was 7156 GWh and the load factor was 
95.1%. The annual refuelling and maintenance 
outage of Olkiluoto 2 lasted 16 days. The collec-
tive radiation doses in 2009 were 0.40 manSv for 
Olkiluoto 1 and 0.79 manSv for Olkiluoto 2.
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conducted by international organisations. IAEA 
OSART mission has been organised at Olkiluoto 
in March 1986. The WANO peer reviews have been 
carried out at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant at 
the end of 1999 and during the year 2006. A follow-
up for the last WANO peer review was carried out 
in August 2009.
Olkiluoto NPP unit 3
Construction Licence application for the fifth nu-
clear power plant unit in Finland on the Olkiluoto 
site was submitted by TVO to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (predecessor of the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy) in January 
2004. The new unit, Olkiluoto 3 is a 1600 MWe 
European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR), the 
design of which is based on the French N4 and 
German Konvoi type PWR’s. A turn key deliv-
ery is provided by the Consortium Areva NP and 
Siemens. The technical requirements for Olki-
luoto 3 unit were specified by using the European 
Utility Requirements (EUR) document as a refer-
ence. TVO’s specifications complemented the EUR 
mainly in those points where Finnish require-
ments are more stringent. STUK gave its state-
ment in January 2005 on nuclear safety based on 
the review of the licensing documentation and the 
Government issued the Construction Licence in 
February 2005. 
Construction work is going on and next li-
censing step is the Operating Licence. Operating 
Licence is needed prior to loading nuclear fuel into 
the reactor core. Commercial operation is expected 
to be started in 2013. IAEA has agreed to carry out 
a pre-OSART (Operational Safety Review Team) 
mission to Olkiluoto NPP in late 2011 or 2012.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 6.
Figure 3. Olkiluoto NPP unit 3 in construction phase.
14
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Article 7. Legislative and 
regulatory framework
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish 
and maintain a legislative and regulatory 
framework to govern the safety of nuclear 
installations.
2. The legislative and regulatory framework 
shall provide for:
i. the establishment of applicable nation-
al safety requirements and regulations;
ii. a system of licensing with regard to nu-
clear installations and the prohibition 
of the operation of a nuclear installa-
tion without a licence;
iii. a system of regulatory inspection and 
assessment of nuclear installations to 
ascertain compliance with applicable 
regulations and the terms of licences;
iv. the enforcement of applicable regu-
lations and of the terms of licences, 
including suspension, modification or 
revocation.
Legislative and regulatory framework
The current nuclear energy legislation in Finland 
(see Annex 1) is based on the Nuclear Energy Act 
originally from 1987. The Act has been amended 17 
times during the years it has been in force: most 
changes are minor and originate from changes to 
other Finnish legislation. Nuclear energy legisla-
tion was updated and reformed in 2008 to cor-
respond to current level of safety requirements 
and the new Finnish Constitution which came into 
force in 2000. Together with a supporting Nuclear 
Energy Decree originally from 1988, the scope of 
this legislation covers e.g.
•	 the construction and operation of nuclear fa-
cilities; nuclear facilities refer to facilities for 
producing nuclear energy, including research 
reactors, facilities for extensive disposal of nu-
clear wastes, and facilities used for extensive 
fabrication, production, use, handling or storage 
of nuclear materials or nuclear wastes
•	 the possession, fabrication, production, transfer, 
handling, use, storage, transport, export and 
import of nuclear materials and nuclear wastes 
as well as the export and import of ores and ore 
concentrates containing uranium or thorium.
The current radiation protection legislation is 
based on the Radiation Act and Decree, both of 
which are from 1991 and take into account the 
ICRP Publication 60 (1990 Recommendations of 
the International Commission on Radiological Pro-
tection). Section 2, General principles, and Chapter 
9, Radiation work, of the Act are applied to the use 
of nuclear energy.
Based on the Nuclear Energy Act, the Govern-
ment issued in 2008 the following regulations:
•	 Government Decree on the Safety of Nuclear 
Power Plants (733/2008)
•	 Government Decree on the Security in the Use 
of Nuclear Energy (734/2008)
•	 Government Decree on Emergency Response 
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(735/2008)
•	 Government Decree on the Safety of Disposal of 
Nuclear Waste (736/2008).
The Decrees 733/2008 and 735/2008 are applied 
to a nuclear power plant which is defined to be a 
nuclear facility equipped with a nuclear reactor 
for the purpose of electricity or heat production or 
a complex consisting of nuclear power plant units 
and other related nuclear facilities located on the 
same plant site. The regulations are also applied 
to other nuclear facilities to the extent applicable. 
Decree 734/2008 is applied to all use of Nuclear 
Energy, i.e., it covers all nuclear facilities and ac-
tivities.
The main reason for the 2008 amendment of the 
legislation was the need to include the basic safety 
requirements in the Nuclear Energy Act. Based 
on the rules of constitutionality all requirements 
having principal nature were transferred from the 
Decrees to the Act. One of the main principles of 
Finnish Constitution is, that all regulations affect-
ing individual’s rights have to be issued at the level 
of law. Also a need was recognised to move some 
current safety requirements from the level of regu-
latory guides to the Decrees in order to emphasise 
the essential safety significance of them.
Finland is a Member State of the European 
Union. The Nuclear Safety Directive (Council 
Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 estab-
lishing a Community framework for the nuclear 
safety of nuclear installations) may affect Finnish 
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nuclear legislation. Also, international peer reviews 
concerning physical protection and waste manage-
ment, both carried out during the year 2009, may 
demand amendments to legislation. All these pos-
sible affects are currently under consideration.
Some other minor amendments were also made 
in nuclear and radiation legislation to reflect 
changes of other legislation (labour safety, criminal 
code). Amendments in other national legislation 
have not caused essential changes to the regula-
tory control of NPPs nor to the safety requirements 
set for them.
At the same time with the international negotia-
tions to update the Paris and Brussels Conventions 
on Nuclear Liability also the Finnish Nuclear 
Liability Act was reviewed by a special govern-
mental committee already in 2002. The financial 
provisions to cover the possible harms of a nuclear 
accident have been arranged according to the Paris 
and Brussels Conventions. A remarkable increase 
in the sum available for compensation of nuclear 
damages is expected in the future since interna-
tional negotiations about the revision of the Paris/
Brussels agreements on nuclear liability were suc-
cessfully completed in 2004. In addition to the 
revised agreements, Finland has decided to enact 
unlimited licensee liability by law. This means, 
that insurance coverage will be required for a mini-
mum amount of EUR 700 million and the liability 
of Finnish operators shall be unlimited in cases 
where nuclear damage has occurred in Finland 
and the third tier of the Brussels Supplementary 
Convention (providing cover up to EUR 1500 mil-
lion) has been exhausted. The revised law will also 
have some other improvements, like extending the 
claiming period up to 30 years for victims of nu-
clear accidents. The law amendment (2005) has not 
taken effect yet. It will enter into force at a later 
date as determined by government decree. The 
entering into force of the amending act will take 
place as the 2004 Protocols amending the Paris 
and Brussels Conventions will enter into force. In 
Finland, the finishing off the international ratifica-
tion process of the convention amendments with-
out any undue delay is considered to be extremely 
important.
Provision of regulatory guidance
According to Section 7 r of the Nuclear Energy Act, 
STUK shall specify detailed safety requirements 
concerning the implementation of safety level in 
accordance with the Act. These guides are called 
YVL Guides. STUK shall specify the safety re-
quirements it sets in accordance with the safety 
sectors involved in the use of nuclear energy, and 
publish them as part of the regulations issued by 
the STUK.
The safety requirements of STUK are binding 
on the licensee, while preserving the licensee’s 
right to propose an alternative procedure or solu-
tion to that provided for in the regulations. If the li-
censee can convincingly demonstrate that the pro-
posed procedure or solution will implement safety 
level in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, 
STUK may approve this procedure or solution.
The procedure to apply new guides to existing 
nuclear facilities is such that the publication of 
an YVL Guide does not, as such, alter any previ-
ous decisions made by STUK. After having heard 
those concerned, STUK makes a separate decision 
on how a new or revised YVL Guide applies to 
operating nuclear power plants, or to those under 
construction, and to licensee’s operational activi-
ties as well as to other nuclear facilities related to 
nuclear waste management and disposal and to the 
research reactor. To new nuclear facilities, however, 
the guides apply as such.
Nowadays the most important references con-
sidered in rulemaking are the IAEA safety stand-
ards and WENRA (Western European Nuclear 
Regulators’ Association) reference levels. Other 
sources of safety information are worldwide co-
operation with other countries using nuclear en-
ergy, e.g. MDEP (Multinational Design Evaluation 
Programme), VVER Forum and OECD/NEA. The 
Finnish policy is to participate in the international 
discussion on developing safety standards and 
adopt or adapt the new safety requirements into 
national regulations. At the moment STUK has 
a set of about 70 regulatory guides in force (see 
Annex 1). The regulatory guides have been con-
tinuously re-evaluated for updating.
After amending the nuclear energy legislation 
in 2008, also the revision of the existing YVL guide 
16
STUK-B 120 Article 7 – lexislAtive And regulAtory frAmework
system has been commenced. The main objectives 
of this effort are the following:
•	 to restructure the guide system better to reflect 
the various areas of safety; at the same time to 
limit the total number of guides and need for 
cross-referencing between the guides
•	 to compile requirements concerning related 
safety issues to the same guide making it easier 
to use by the licensees and other stakeholders; 
also they will be coupled to the stage of licens-
ing process
•	 to rewrite the separate requirements in such 
a way that each requirement will have its own 
number, be short and clearly stating who-what-
when shall be doing something; requirements 
are expressed in shall-format, descriptive text 
is provided only when necessary
•	 when considering the requirements, special at-
tention is paid for the opportunities to limit un-
necessary prescriptiveness
•	 to update the contents of the regulatory guides, 
especially with the lessons learnt from the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 project.
A Safety manage-
ment of a nuclear 
facility
B Plant and system 
design
C Radiation safety 
of a nuclear facility 
and environment
D Nuclear materials 
and waste
E Structures and 
equipment of a 
nuclear facility
A.1 Regulatory control 
of the safe use of 
nuclear energy
B.1 Design of the 
safety systems of a 
nuclear facility
C.1 Structural 
radiation safety of a 
nuclear facility
D.1 Regulatory control 
of nuclear non-prolif-
eration 
E.1 Manufacture and 
use of nuclear fuel
A.2 Siting of a nuclear 
facility
B.2 Classification of 
systems, structures 
and equipment of a 
nuclear facility
C.2 Radiation protec-
tion and dose control 
of the personnel of a 
nuclear facility
D.2 Transport of 
nuclear materials and 
waste
E.2 Construction 
plan of the mechani-
cal components and 
structures of a nuclear 
facility
A.3 Management 
systems of a nuclear 
facility
B.3 Safety assess-
ment of a NPP
C.3 Control and 
measuring of radioac-
tive releases to the 
environmental of a 
nuclear facility
D.3 Handling of spent 
nuclear fuel
E.3 Regulatory control 
of the mechanical 
components and 
structures of a nuclear 
facility
A.4 Organisation and 
personnel of a nuclear 
facility
B.4 Nuclear fuel and 
reactor
C.4 Radiological 
control of the environ-
ment of a nuclear 
facility
D.4 Handling of low- 
and intermediate-level 
waste and decommis-
sioning of a nuclear 
facility
E.4 Verification of 
strength of pres-
sure equipment of a 
nuclear facility
A.5 Construction of 
a NPP
B.5 Reactor coolant 
circuit of a NPP
C.5 Emergency 
preparedness arrange-
ments of a NPP
D.5 Final disposal of 
nuclear waste
E.5 In-service inspec-
tions of the mechani-
cal components and 
structures of a nuclear 
facility
A.6 Operation and 
accident management 
of a NPP
B.6 Containment of 
a NPP
E.6 Buildings and 
structures of a nuclear 
facility
A.7 Risk management 
of a NPP
B.7 Preparing for the 
internal and external 
threats to a nuclear 
facility
E.7 Electrical and 
I&C equipment of a 
nuclear facility
A.8 Ageing manage-
ment of a nuclear 
facility
B.8 Fire protection of 
a nuclear facility
E.8 Oversight of 
inspection organisa-
tions
A.9 Reporting on the 
operation of a nuclear 
facility
A.10 Operating experi-
ence feedback of a 
nuclear facility
A.11 Security arrange-
ments of a nuclear 
facility
Collected definitions of YVL-guides: a part of the regulations, but a separate document.
Figure 4. The re-structured system of regulatory YVL Guides.
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STUK has set an internal time schedule for this 
revision effort in such a way that all guides of the 
new system will be prepared at least to the level 
of a final draft before the end of 2010 and, that all 
restructured and updated guides will be published 
before the end of 2011. Considering the WENRA 
reference levels published in 2007 and 2008, the 
Finnish policy is to include all of them in the re-
vised regulatory guide system. This is confirmed 
already during the work through a systematic ap-
proach to earmark all the reference levels to cer-
tain guides.
System of licensing
The licensing process is defined in the legislation. 
The construction and operation of a nuclear facil-
ity is not allowed without a licence. The licences 
are granted by the Government. The conditions for 
granting a licence are prescribed in the Nuclear 
Energy Act.
Before a Construction Licence for a nuclear 
power plant, nuclear waste disposal facility, or 
other significant nuclear facility can be applied, a 
Decision-in-Principle by the Government is needed. 
A condition for granting the Decision-in-Principle 
is that the operation of the facility in question is in 
line with the overall good of society. The municipal-
ity of the intended site of the nuclear facility has to 
be in favour of constructing the facility. There shall 
also be sufficient prerequisites for constructing 
the facility according to the Nuclear Energy Act: 
the use of nuclear energy shall be safe; it shall not 
cause injury to people, or damage to the environ-
ment or property.
The coming into force of the Decision-in-
Principle further requires that it will be con-
firmed by the simple majority of the Parliament. 
The Parliament can not make any changes to the 
Decision; it can only approve it or reject it as it is. 
The parties involved in the Decision-in-Principle 
process and their tasks are described in Figure 
5. In Decision-in-Principle phase STUK prepares 
a statement on safety and preliminary safety as-
sessment concerning the applicant, the proposed 
plant designs and plant sites. STUK asks also a 
statement e.g. from the Advisory Commission on 
Nuclear Safety.
For the Construction and Operating Licence 
application, the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy asks STUK’s statement on safety. 
Construction and Operating Licence documents to 
be submitted to STUK for approval in this phase 
are defined in Sections 35 and 36 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. STUK asks also a statement e.g. 
from the Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety. 
After receiving all statements for the Construction 
and Operating Licence, the Government will make 
its decision.
In accordance with Section 108 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, the different phases of construction 
of a nuclear facility may be begun only after STUK 
has, on the basis of the Construction Licence docu-
ments and other detailed plans and documents it 
requires, verified in respect of each phase that the 
safety-related factors and safety regulations have 
been given sufficient consideration.
Review of the detailed design of structures and 
equipment can be begun after STUK has found 
that the system-level design data of the system 
concerned are sufficient and acceptable. This as-
sessment may take place as part of the review of 
the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report or sepa-
rate system-specific descriptions, which are subse-
quently added to the Final Safety Analysis Report.
In accordance with Section 109 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, STUK oversees the construction of 
the facility in detail. The purpose is to ensure that 
the safety and quality requirements, regulations 
for pressure equipment and approved plans are 
Decision-in-Principle procedure was applied 
during the period November 2000 – May 2002 
when Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) applied a 
Decision-in-Principle for the fifth NPP unit in 
Finland and the Government approved it and the 
Parliament confirmed the approval. The procedure 
was also applied when application for spent fuel 
repository was confirmed by the Parliament in 
2001 and also in connection with accepting the 
Decision-in-Principle for expanding the capacity 
of spent fuel disposal facility to cover the spent fuel 
from the fifth reactor in May 2002. The Decision-
in-Principle procedure was also applied during 
the period April 2008 – July 2010 when three ap-
plications for new nuclear power plants and two 
applications for expanding the planned capacity of 
the future spent fuel repository in Olkiluoto were 
handled by the Government and the Parliament 
(see Article 14).
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complied with and that the nuclear facility is con-
structed in other respects in accordance with the 
regulations. In particular, the oversight is aimed to 
verify that working methods ensuring high quality 
are employed for the construction.
Before loading fuel into the reactor, an Operating 
Licence is needed. The Operating Licences are 
granted for a limited period of time. This period 
has been at the beginning of Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
NPP operations five years and then about ten 
years. The periodic re-licensing has allowed good 
opportunities for a comprehensive, periodic safety 
review. Current operating licences of the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto units are valid for about 20 years, 
but periodic safety reviews (PRS) are required as a 
condition of continued operation in the licences.
System of regulatory inspection 
and assessment
The legislation provides the regulatory control sys-
tem for the use of nuclear energy. According to 
the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK is responsible for 
the regulatory oversight of the safety of the use 
of nuclear energy. The rights and responsibilities 
of STUK are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
Safety review and assessment as well as inspection 
activities are covered by the regulatory oversight.
Oversight during operation
STUK’s oversight during plant operation includes 
periodic inspection programme, continuous over-
sight performed by STUK’s resident inspectores, 
regular reporting and reporting of events and over-
Parliament:
Confirms Decision in Principle
Government:
Makes licensing decisions





• Decision in Principle
• Construction Licence
• Operating Licence



















Statement on safety 
Agreement on site in
Decision in Principle 
(veto right)
Opinions, statements
Figure 5. Licensing of nuclear facilities in Finland.
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sight performed at the plant site during main-
tenance outages. STUK’s periodic inspection pro-
gramme is focused on the licensee’s main working 
processes and covers the most relevant areas of 
nuclear power plant safety. Inspection programme 
has been modified during the years. Latest major 
renewal was in 1998 and since then the inspection 
programme has been slightly modified. Each year 
STUK defines the programme for the next year  in-
cluding additional inspections as needed. In addi-
tion to the periodic inspection programmes, STUK 
conducts ad-hoc inspections if seen necessary.
The objective of the inspection programme is to 
assess the safety level at the plants as well as safe-
ty management. Possible problems at the plants 
and in procedures of the operating organisations 
are to be recognised. STUK has put special em-
phasis on the management of the entire inspection 
programme, including the timely conduct, resource 
allocation and accurate reporting of results.
In the event review, first the safety significance 
of the event is evaluated based on the information 
given by the operator and STUK’s resident inspec-
tors. Later operational experience is reported to 
STUK as an event report, which STUK evalu-
ates and may require additional information or 
actions. STUK maintains internal database for 
events which disseminates operating experiences 
and provides easy access to operational event re-
ports. STUK may assign own investigation team 
for events deemed to have special importance, 
especially when the licensee’s organisation has 
not been performing as planned and expected. It is 
also possible to nominate an investigation team to 
investigate a number of events together in order to 
look for possible generic issues associated with the 
events. These inspections are usually conducted 
by a leadership of the STUK’s event investiga-
tion manager, and an investigation team includes 
normally 3–5 experts from STUK or from external 
organisations nominated on case-by-case basis.
Numbers of operational events are followed 
through STUK’s plant performance indicator sys-
tem. Risk significance of operational events is fol-
lowed by PRA based indicators.
STUK’s oversight and safety assessment 
concerning plant modifications is described in 
Article 14.
Oversight during construction
In accordance with Section 109 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, STUK oversees the construction 
of the facility in detail. Oversight consists of in-
spections within the frame of the Construction 
Inspection Programme and inspections on manu-
facturing and construction of systems, structures 
and components important to safety. In addition, 
STUK has four resident inspectors overseeing the 
construction, installations and commissioning work 
at the Olkiluoto site. Licensee reports regularly 
about the progress of the construction.
To oversee the licensee’s performance in 
a construction project, STUK has established a 
Construction Inspection Programme. The purpose 
of the programme is to verify that the perform-
ance and organisation of the licensee ensure high-
quality construction and implementation in ac-
cordance with the approved designs while com-
plying with the regulations and official decisions. 
The Construction Inspection Programme is divided 
into two main levels: the upper level assesses the 
licensee’s general operations to manage the con-
struction, such as safety management and cul-
ture, organisation, corrective actions programme, 
the licensee’s expertise and use of expertise and 
project quality management. The next level, known 
as the operation level, assesses e.g. project qual-
ity assurance, training of the operating personnel, 
utilisation of the PRA, radiation safety, and licen-
see’s review and assessment process for system, 
structure and component-specific design reviews 
and inspections in the various fields of technology. 
Furthermore, the emergency response arrange-
ments during construction, physical protection, fire 
protection and nuclear waste treatment are sub-
jects of the Construction Inspection Programme 
as far as the scope STUK considers necessary. In 
addition to the above-mentioned inspections, of 
which the licensee is informed in advance, STUK 
carries out inspections without prior notice at its 
discretion.
STUK performs inspections on manufacturing 
and construction of buildings, concrete and steel 
structures, and components as specified in YVL 
Guides. Inspections are determined when STUK 
reviews component or structure specific imple-
mentation plans. Inspections are defined either 
as hold or witness points. Licensee is responsible 
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for inviting STUK to perform the inspection at a 
right time. Goal of the inspections is to verify that 
manufacturer, vendor and licensee have performed 
their duties as expected and that QC results of 
manufacturing and construction are acceptable. In 
addition, STUK performs inspections on installa-
tion and commissioning of systems, structures and 
components. The safety class of systems, structures 
and components is taken into account when deter-
mining the scope of inspections. On the licensee’s 
application, STUK may approve separate inspec-
tion organisations to carry out specified regulatory 
control duties.
Enforcement
The Nuclear Energy Act defines the enforcement 
system and rules for suspension, modification or 
revocation of a licence. The enforcement system in-
cludes provisions for executive assistance if needed 
and for sanctions in case the law is violated. The 
enforcement tools and procedures of the regulator 
are considered to fully meet the needs.
In practice, the enforcement tools include: oral 
notice or written request for action by the inspec-
tor, and written notice or order for actions by 
STUK. Actions can include shutting down the 
plant operation immediately or decrease of reac-
tor power and for unlimited time. Legally stronger 
instruments would be 1) setting a conditional im-
position of a fine, 2) threatening with interruption 
or limiting the operation and, 3) threatening that 
STUK enforces the neglected action to be made at 
the licensee’s expense.
The repertoire of these tools together with some 
practical examples for implementing them has 
been presented in an internal policy document as 
part of STUK’s Quality System.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 7.
Article 8. Regulatory body
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or 
designate a regulatory body entrusted with 
the implementation of the legislative and 
regulatory framework referred to in Article 
7, and provided with adequate authority, 
competence and financial and human re-
sources to fulfil its assigned responsibili-
ties.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure an effective sepa-
ration between the functions of the regula-
tory body and those of any other body or or-
ganization concerned with the promotion 
or utilization of nuclear energy.
STUK in the regulatory framework
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the over-
all authority in the field of nuclear energy is the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. The 
Ministry prepares matters concerning nuclear 
energy to the Government for decision-making. 
Among other duties, the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy is responsible for the formulation 
of a national energy policy.
The mission of the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) is ‘to protect people, so-
ciety, environment, and future generations from 
harmful effects of radiation’. STUK is an inde-
pendent governmental organisation for the regu-
latory control of radiation and nuclear safety. 
STUK is administratively under the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health. Interfaces to ministries 
and governmental organisations are described in 
Figure 6. It is emphasised that the regulatory con-
trol of the safe use of radiation and nuclear energy 
is independently carried out by STUK. No Ministry 
can take for its decision-making a matter that has 
been defined by law to be on the responsibility 
of STUK. STUK has no responsibilities or duties 
which would be in conflict with regulatory control. 
STUK’s Advisory Committee was established in 
March 2008. Advisory Committee helps STUK to 
develop its functions as a regulatory, research and 
expert organisation in such a way that the activi-
ties are in balance with the society’s expectations 
and the needs of the citizens. Advisory Committee 
can also make assessments of the STUK’s actions 
and give recommendations to STUK.
The current Act on STUK was given in 1983 
and the Decree in 1997. According to the Decree, 
STUK has the following duties:
•	 regulatory	oversight	of	safety	of	the	use	of	nu-
clear energy, emergency preparedness, security 
and nuclear materials





STUK – Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority
Independent  regulatory and research organisation.
Ministry of 
Social Affairs and 
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Ministry of the Interior
Rescue and protection duties in 
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Security and physical protection.
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Nuclear safety in neighbour countries.











Figure 6. Co-operation and interfaces between STUK and Ministries and other organisations.
•	monitoring	of	the	radiation	situation	in	Finland,	
and maintaining of preparedness for abnormal 
radiation situations
•	maintaining	national	metrological	standards	in	
its field of activity
•	 research	and	development	work	 for	enhancing	
radiation and nuclear safety
•	 informing	 on	 radiation	 and	 nuclear	 safety	 is-





in the field, and issuing general guides concern-
ing radiation and nuclear safety
•	 participating	 in	 international	 co-operation	 in	
the field, and taking care of international con-
trol, contact or reporting activities as enacted or 
defined.
STUK has the legal authority to carry out regula-
tory oversight. The responsibilities and rights of 
STUK, as regards the regulation of the use of nu-
clear energy, are provided in the Nuclear Energy 
Act. They cover the safety review and assessment 
of licence applications, and the regulatory over-
sight of the construction, operation and decommis-
sioning of a nuclear facility. The regulatory over-
sight of nuclear power plants is described in detail 
in the Guide YVL 1.1. STUK has e.g. legal rights to 
require modifications to nuclear power plants, to 
limit the power of plants and to require shutdown 
of a plant when necessary for safety reasons, as 
described in Article 7.
STUK does not grant any construction or op-
erating licences for nuclear facilities. However, in 
practice no such licence would be issued without 
STUK’s statement where the fulfilment of the 
safety regulations is confirmed as described in 
Article 7.
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An Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety 
has been established in 1998 by a Decree. This 
Commission gives advice to STUK on important 
safety issues and regulations. The Commission 
also gives its statements on licence applications. 
The Commission has now two international com-
mittees, one for reactor safety and one for waste 
safety issues. In addition, an Advisory Committee 
on Radiation Safety has been established for advis-
ing the Ministry for Health and Social Affairs. The 
members of the Advisory Commission on Nuclear 
Safety and the Advisory Committee on Radiation 
Safety are nominated by the Government.
To assist STUK’s work in nuclear security, an 
Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security was es-
tablished in 2009. The members of the committee 
come from the various Finnish authorities, and the 
nuclear licencees also have their representatives. 
The duties of the committee include the assess-
ment of the threats in the nuclear field as well as 
consultation to STUK in important security issues. 
The committee also aims to follow and promote 
both the international and internal co-operation in 
the field of nuclear security.
STUK is responsible for informing the public 
and media on radiation and nuclear safety. STUK 
aims to communicate proactively, openly, timely 
and understandably. A prerequisite for success-
ful communication is that STUK is known among 
media and general public and the information 
given by STUK is generally regarded as truthful. 
Communication is based on best available informa-
tion. STUK’s web site is an important tool in com-
munication. It is important that the web pages are 
professionally edited and updated regularly. The 
information on web pages must be easy to find and 
understandable. Internal communication provides 
the personnel information about STUK’s activities 
and supports its capability in participating in the 
external communication.
STUK’s operations have been assessed by a 
peer review. Full-scope IRRT mission (IAEA’s 
International Regulatory Review Team) was car-
ried out in 2000 and a follow-up mission in 2003. 
IRRS mission (IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service) has been agreed with the IAEA to 
be carried out in October 2012.
Finance and resources of STUK
The organisational structure and the responsibili-
ties within STUK are described in the Management 
System of STUK. Also processes for regulatory 
oversight and other activities of STUK are present-
ed in the Management System. The organisation of 
STUK is described in the Figure 7.
STUK receives about 34% of its financial re-
sources through the government budget. However, 
the costs of regulatory oversight are charged in full 
to the licensees. The model of financing the regula-
tory work is called net-budgeting model and it has 
been applied since 2000. In this model the licensees 
pay the regulatory oversight fees directly to STUK. 
In 2009, the costs of the regulatory oversight of 
nuclear safety were 16 million €.
STUK has adequate resources to fulfil its re-
sponsibilities. The net-budgeting model makes it 
possible to increase for example personnel resourc-
es based on needs in a flexible way.
At the end of 2009, number of staff in the de-
partment of Nuclear Reactor Regulation was 106. 
DG’s office (9) Nuclear Waste and Materials Regulation (27)
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (106)
Public  
Communication (4) Radiation Practices Regulation (42)
Emergency  
Preparedness (4) Research and Environmental Surveillance (89)
Expert Services (7) Non-ionising Radiation (10)
Administration, Internal Services and Information Management  (57)
Figure 7. Organisation of STUK. Figures indicate the number of staff in the organisational unit. The total number 
of staff at the end of 2009 was 355.
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Number of staff at NRR
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Figure 8. Number of personnel in the department of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The number of staff has increased by 11 since the 
time of the fourth review meeting. The expertise 
of STUK covers all the essential areas needed 
in the oversight of the use of nuclear energy. 
As needed STUK orders independent analyses, 
review and assessment from technical support 
organisations to complement its own review and 
assessment work. The main technical support or-
ganisation of STUK is the Technical Research 
Centre of Finland (VTT), but also Aalto University 
(former Helsinki University of Technology) and 
Lappeenranta University (LUT) of Technology are 
important. Also international technical support or-
ganisations and experts have been used, especially 
to support review and inspection activities related 
to Olkiluoto unit 3.
New personnel have been recruited since 2003 
mainly for the safety review and assessment and 
inspection activities related to the Olkiluoto unit 3. 
The number of personnel in the department of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation over the period of 
2001–2009 is shown in Figure 8. The resources 
used for the oversight of existing nuclear power 
plants (Loviisa units 1 and 2 and Olkiluoto units 
1 and 2), Olkiluoto unit 3 which is under con-
struction and new plant projects (Loviisa unit 3, 
Olkiluoto unit 4 and Fennovoima’s unit 1) are 
shown in Figure 9. Annual volume of the oversight 
of the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction has been in-
creasing every year about 35 person years for the 
Olkiluoto 3. Starting from year 2003, inspection 
organisations have been performing construction 
inspections in lower safety classes.
STUK has also increased the number of person-
nel in the area of plant security. In 2009, a separate 
unit for security with three experts was founded in 
the department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  
Full time equivalents on oversight (person years)
 LO1/LO2     LO3  OL1/OL2 OL3 OL4 FV1










Figure 9. The resources used for the regulatory oversight in full time equivalents.
The updating of regulatory guides on security 
arrangements is included in the ongoing rule-
making activity. IAEA’s International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission was 
carried out in Finland in 2009. In addition to this 
effort to strengthen the regulatory control of plant 
security arrangements, STUK has also systemati-
cally audited and improved its own internal infor-
mation security. I.a. the reliability and protection 
of data connections between STUK’s site personnel 
and STUK headquarters have been audited by 
third party experts and the e-mail traffic to and 
from the licensees has been encrypted. When pur-
chasing the office data equipment as well as lap-
tops for the inspectors the information security is 
given full attention. The whole personnel at STUK 
took part in the information security training 
course in 2009.
24
STUK-B 120 Article 8 – regulAtory body
Ensuring competence
The management of STUK highlights the need for 
competent workforce. STUK has adopted a compe-
tence management system and nuclear safety and 
regulatory competencies are also emphasised in 
STUK’s strategy. Implementation of the strategy 
is reflected into the annual training programmes, 
on the job training and new recruitments. The na-
tional nuclear safety and waste management re-
search programmes have an important role in the 
competence building of all essential organisations 
involved in nuclear energy. These research pro-
grammes have two roles: for the first ensuring the 
availability of experts and for the second ensur-
ing the on-line transfer of the research results to 
the organisations participating to the steering of 
the programmes and fostering the expertise. STUK 
has an important role in the steering of these pro-
grammes.
Most of the professional staff of STUK con-
ducting safety assessments and inspections has a 
degree of university level. The average experience 
of the staff is about 15 years in the nuclear field. 
The competence analysis is carried out on regular 
basis and the results are used as the basis for the 
training programmes and the new recruitments. 
The training programme includes internal courses 
as well as courses organised by external organisa-
tions. On an average 5 % of the annual working 
hours has been used to enhance the competence.
An induction programme is set up at STUK 
for all new recruited inspectors. In addition to 
administrative issues, the induction programme 
includes familiarisation with legislation, regula-
tory guidance and regulatory oversight practices. 
Programme is tailored to each new inspector and 
followed by the manager.
STUK has participated in the preparation and 
execution of a basic professional training course 
on nuclear safety with other Finnish organisations 
in the field. The first 6-week course commenced 
in September 2003 and the 8th basic professional 
training course will commence in autumn 2010. 
At the moment, about 400 newcomers and junior 
experts, of whom more than 60 have been from 
STUK, have participated in these courses. The 
content and structure of the course has been en-
hanced according to the feedback received from the 
participants.
In Finland, VTT is the largest research organi-
sation in the field of nuclear energy. At VTT, about 
200 experts are working in the field of nuclear 
energy, half of them full-time. The total volume of 
the nuclear energy research in the year 2009 was 
over 50 million € (of the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy estimate). This figure includes 
also research made by GTK (Geological Survey 
of Finland), LUT (Lappeenranta University of 
Technology) and Aalto University (former Helsinki 
University of Technology, HUT).
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2003 to 
ensure funding for a long term nuclear safety and 
nuclear waste management research in Finland. 
Money is collected annually from the licence hold-
ers to a special fund. Regarding nuclear safety re-
search the amount of money is proportional to the 
actual thermal power of the licensed power plants 
or the thermal power presented in the Decision-
in-Principle. For the nuclear waste research, the 
annual funding payments are proportional to the 
current fund holdings for the future waste man-
agement activities.
The research projects are selected so that they 
support and develop the competences in nuclear 
safety and to create preparedness for the regula-
tor to be able to respond on emerging and urgent 
safety issues. The key topics of the recent nuclear 
safety research programme (SAFIR2010) are the 
behaviour of reactor, the properties of containment 
and the ageing management of nuclear power 
plants. There are also research projects in the 
field of the assessment of the safety culture of an 
organisation. The amount of money collected from 
the licensees in year 2009 was about 3 million € for 
nuclear safety research. The research projects have 
also additional funding from other sources. The to-
tal volume of the programme in 2010 is 7 million €. 
The research programme SAFIR2010 was evaluat-
ed by external experts in 2010 and the programme 
was considered to fulfil its objectives.
In the Finnish research programme on nuclear 
waste management (KYT2010) the research is dis-
tributed into strategic topics of nuclear waste man-
agement as well as into research areas connected 
with the long-term safety of the final disposal of 
nuclear wastes. The programme is conducted dur-
ing 2006–2010 and its target volume is around 1 
million € per year.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 8.
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Article 9. Responsibility of 
the licence holder
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that 
prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear 
installation rests with the holder of the rel-
evant licence and shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that each such licence holder 
meets its responsibility.
The responsibility for the safety rests with the 
licensee as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
According to Section 9 of the Act, it shall be the 
licensee’s obligation to assure safe use of nuclear 
energy. Furthermore, it shall be the licensee’s obli-
gation to assure such physical protection and emer-
gency planning and other arrangements, necessary 
to ensure limitation of nuclear damage, which do 
not rest with the authorities.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body 
to verify that the licensees fulfil the regulations. 
This verification is carried out through continuous 
oversight, safety review and assessment as well 
as inspection programmes established by STUK. 
In its activities, STUK emphasises the licensee’s 
commitment to the strong safety culture. The ob-
vious elements of licensee’s actions to meet these 
responsibilities are strict adherence of regula-
tions, prompt, timely and open actions towards 
the regulator in unusual situations, active role 
in developing the safety based on improvements 
of technology and science as well as effective ex-
ploitation of experience feedback. In addition to 
inspections and safety assessment, the follow-up 
of licensee’s efforts in achieving results is based on 
safety indicators. This system includes indicators 
e.g. for plant availability, incidents, probabilistic 
risk assessment results, safety system operability, 
radiation doses to personnel as well as releases to 
environment.
Based on the Chapter 7 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, to ensure that the financial liability for the 
future management and disposal of nuclear wastes 
and for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities 
is covered, the nuclear power companies are every 
third year obliged to present estimates for future 
costs of these operations and take care that the 
required amount of money is set aside to the State 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund. In order to 
provide for the insolvency of the nuclear utilities, 
they shall provide securities to the Ministry of 
Employment and Economy for the part of finan-
cial liability which is not yet covered by the Fund. 
At the end of the year 2009 the funded money 
(1 800 million euros) covered most part of whole 
liability (2 080 million euros). Remaining 280 mil-
lion euros were to be covered by payment of 88 mil-
lion euros in 2010 and securities.
The arrangements for the Olkiluoto unit 3 will 
follow the same lines. The licensee with a waste 
management obligation shall submit the waste 
management scheme and the calculations of waste 
management costs, which are based on the scheme, 
to the Ministry for approval for the first time early 
enough before beginning the operations producing 
nuclear waste, and at the latest in connection with 
the operating licence application. The waste man-
agement scheme shall cover all phases of waste 
management including the decommissioning and 
the final disposal. The scheme must be sufficiently 
detailed to allow the calculations for the assessed 
liability.
The financial provisions to cover the possible 
damages to third parties caused by a nuclear ac-
cident have been arranged in Finland according 
to the Paris and Brussels Conventions. Related to 
the revision of the Paris and Brussels Conventions 
in 2004, Finland has decided to enact unlimited li-
censee’s liability by law (see Article 7). The revised 
law will also have some other modifications, such 
as extending the claiming period up to 30 years 
for victims of nuclear accidents. These changes are 
still in 2010 pending on the international ratifica-
tion of the Paris and Brussels Conventions.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 9.
Article 10. Priority to safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that all organizations 
engaged in activities directly related to nucle-
ar installations shall establish policies that 
give due priority to nuclear safety.
Regulatory requirements regarding 
safety management
The importance of a good safety culture is em-
phasised in the Nuclear Energy Act and in the 
Government Decree on the Safety of Nuclear Power 
Plants (733/2008, Sections 21, 28 and 29), which 
state that when designing, constructing, operat-
ing and decommissioning a nuclear power plant, a 
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good safety culture must be maintained by making 
sure that the decisions and activities of the entire 
organisation reflect commitment to safety. An open 
working atmosphere must be promoted to encour-
age identification, reporting and elimination of fac-
tors endangering safety, and the personnel must be 
given opportunity to contribute to the continuous 
enhancement of safety.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, a respon-
sible director has to be appointed for the construc-
tion and operation of a nuclear power plant. The 
appointment is subject to approval by STUK. The 
responsible director has a duty to ensure the safe 
use of nuclear energy and to see that the arrange-
ments for physical protection and emergency pre-
paredness and the safeguards control are complied 
with. The responsible director must have real pos-
sibilities to take effectively care of this duty.
STUK’s Guide YVL 1.4 sets general require-
ments for management systems and has been up-
dated in 2008. The new YVL 1.4 is based on IAEA 
GS-R-3, and it includes several requirements for 
promoting good safety culture: The management 
system must support the characteristics of the 
organisational culture that promote good safety 
culture, and the management must express its 
commitment to safety. The procedures used must 
strengthen a vigilant, questioning and initiative 
attitude at all levels of the organisation. The man-
agement system must also contain procedures for 
identification and continuous promotion of safety 
culture.
Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa NPP
At the Loviisa NPP, there is an organisational unit 
for safety that is independent of the units that are 
directly responsible for the operation of the plant. 
In addition, independent advisory body for safety 
issues have been established in Loviisa, including 
a nuclear safety committee with external expert 
members. Fortum has also established documented 
quality and safety policies for the Loviisa NPP.
In recent years, Fortum has been actively seek-
ing international evaluations of safety manage-
ment and procedures at the Loviisa NPP in order 
to improve its own operations. STUK considers 
this to be a positive indication of the improved 
openness of the organisation, its search for good 
practice and commitment to long-term develop-
ment work. IAEA carried out an OSART safety 
review in Loviisa in March 2007, with a follow-up 
review in July 2008. Based on these reviews, IAEA 
stated that some development actions were com-
pleted where as some have not been initiated and 
many are still in progress, although they have been 
appropriately started. WANO peer review was per-
formed in March 2010.
Due to changes in Fortum’s organisation, the 
responsible director at the Loviisa NPP changed 
in 2008 and then again in 2009. In addition, a re-
structuring of the unit responsible for safety at the 
Loviisa NPP has taken place, and new employees 
have been recruited for the unit.
Fortum has developed a special training pro-
gramme for the Loviisa NPP contractors, with 
which the licensee aims to ensure the right at-
titudes and safety culture among the contractors 
working at the NPP. In the training, Fortum com-
municates the safety-first-principle and nuclear 
and radiation safety issues for contractor person-
nel working at the site. The contractor training 
is valid only for a determined time and has to be 
repeated when expired. All contractors and suppli-
ers are regularly audited and evaluated by Fortum 
to ensure that they can fulfil the regulatory and 
safety requirements.
Olkiluoto NPP
There is a separate unit for nuclear safety at the 
Olkiluoto NPP that is independent of the units 
responsible for operation. TVO also has an inde-
pendent cross functional safety group that consists 
of specialists among NPP’s own staff and also ex-
ternal expert members that are called in for special 
topics. TVO has also established documented qual-
ity and safety policies for the Olkiluoto NPP.
A periodic safety review regarding Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 was carried out in 2007–2009. In the 
review, it was concluded that TVO has implement-
ed systematic procedures through which it aims to 
motivate the personnel to responsible working (e.g. 
pre-briefing meetings, peer checking etc.). The safe-
ty culture development process at the Olkiluoto 
NPP has been mainly implemented in the manner 
referred to in Section 28 of the Government Decree 
733/2008. The most important development areas 
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are ensuring competence, developing the handling 
process of safety-related issues, and encouraging 
safety reporting.
TVO has assessed the safety culture of the 
Olkiluoto NPP through several methods. The safe-
ty culture issues have been regularly discussed in 
the safety group meetings. Personnel surveys and 
the peer review method of the World Association 
of Nuclear Operators (WANO) have also been 
utilised. TVO has developed a safety culture self-
assessment procedure and tools in co-operation 
with the IAEA. The self-assessment is repeated 
approximately every third year.
In TVO’s performance-based bonus scheme, a 
part of the bonus is specified based on how well 
safety culture development measures have been 
implemented. TVO has taken action to develop the 
bonus scheme to give higher priority to safety and 
safety cultural related goals.
TVO has also developed the safety culture 
training and assessment methods concerning the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 project and the contributing par-
ties. Assessment method consists of a question-
naire, interviews and analysis of safety observa-
tions and non-conformance records. TVO adminis-
trates and follows up the competence of contractors 
that work at the plant regularly or for longer 
terms. These contractors have to complete the 
same basic training as NPP’s own personnel as ap-
propriate. Basic nuclear and radiation safety train-
ing is prerequisite for all persons working at the 
site. Priority to safety is addressed in the training. 
TVO regularly audit and evaluate contractors and 
suppliers to ensure that they can fulfil the regula-
tory and safety requirements.
Regulatory oversight
STUK has inspected the management systems of 
both licensees for completion of the updated Guide 
YVL 1.4. Based on the inspections, development ac-
tions needed to fulfil the requirements were identi-
fied. STUK has also reviewed the periodic safety 
review carried out by TVO at the Olkiluoto units 1 
and 2 in 2009.
Topics on safety culture are also included in 
the STUK’s periodic inspection programme. In 
2008–2009, the inspections contained topics such 
as personnel resources and competence, train-
ing and reward systems. A top level inspection of 
the periodic inspection programme, “Management 
and Safety Culture”, includes an assessment of 
safety culture issues, management and leadership. 
Additionally, safety culture issues are included 
in quality assurance audits and event analyses. 
Safety culture related findings from different in-
spections are discussed in regular meetings in 
STUK and between the senior management of the 
plants and the regulatory body.
STUK has done co-operation with VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland on safety culture relat-
ed inspections, especially recently on safety culture 
assessments for Olkiluoto unit 3 construction site. 
Safety culture related seminars have also been ar-
ranged together with both VTT and the licensees, 
and vendors.
Means used by regulatory body 
in its own activities
Safety is emphasised in the Quality Manuals of 
STUK as well as in the framework contract be-
tween STUK and its technical support organisa-
tion VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. 
STUK’s Quality Policy includes STUK’s values that 
give the highest priority to keeping the radiation 
exposure of people as low as reasonably achievable 
and preventing radiation and nuclear accidents. 
STUK has taken an active role in this area and 
both developed its own culture and taken the ini-
tiative in the assessment of cultures of the licensee 
organisations.
The periodic inspection programme is estab-
lished according to STUK’s strategic decisions 
about safety critical areas at NPPs. These areas 
are covered at least every third year. STUK con-
ducts self-assessments and personnel question-
naires to follow up the internal opinions regarding 
the priority devoted to different topics of nuclear 
safety. STUK arranges regularly training for the 
inspectors and an induction programme is set up 
for all new recruited inspectors. STUK has added 
resources to and reorganised the organisation that 
handles NPP security issues.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 10.
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Article 11. Financial and 
human resources
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that adequate 
financial resources are available to sup-
port the safety of each nuclear installation 
throughout its life.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that sufficient 
numbers of qualified staff with appropri-
ate education, training and retraining are 
available for all safety-related activities in 
or for each nuclear installation, through-
out its life.
Financial resources
Nuclear Energy Act defines as a condition for grant-
ing a Construction or Operating Licence that the 
applicant has sufficient financial resources, neces-
sary expertise and, in particular, that the operat-
ing organisation and the competence of the operat-
ing staff are appropriate. According to the Nuclear 
Energy Act, the licensee shall also have adequate 
financial resources to take care of the safety of the 
plant. In addition, Nuclear Energy Act provides 
detailed regulations for the financial arrangements 
for taking care of nuclear waste management. The 
Act on Third Party Liability provides regulations 
on financial arrangements for nuclear accidents, 
taking into account that Finland is a party to the 
Paris and Brussels conventions.
The financial preconditions are primarily as-
sessed by authorities other than STUK (mainly 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy). 
The financial position and business environment 
of the licensee also affect the safety of plants, and 
STUK therefore follows licensees’ plans to improve 
safety of nuclear power plants, as well as organi-
sational reforms, safety research conducted by 
licensees, the number of employees and the compe-
tence of personnel. The annual reports of Fortum 
Corporation and Teollisuuden Voima Oyj provide 
financial information on the utilities. Both utilities 
have annually invested typically about 10–20 M€ 
for maintaining the plant and improving safety.
A financing system for the costs of future waste 
management and decommissioning exists to ensure 
that the producers of nuclear waste bear their full 
financial liability on the coverage of those costs and 
that the costs can be covered even in case of insol-
vency of the waste generator. The pertinent licence-
holders submit annually for regulatory review the 
technical plans and cost calculations on which the 
liability estimates are based. After confirmation of 
the financial liabilities, the licensees pay fees to a 
State controlled fund and provide securities for the 
liability not yet covered by the funded money. At 
the end of 2009, the funded money (1 800 million 
euros) covered most part of whole liability (2 080 
million euros). Remaining 280 million euros were 
to be covered by payment of 88 million euros and 
securities.
Human resources
The licensee has the prime responsibility for ensur-
ing that all the employees are qualified and author-
ised to their jobs. The regulatory requirements for 
human resources are stated in the Nuclear Energy 
Act (Sections 7 and 20), the Government Decree on 
the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008) and 
STUK’s Guides YVL 1.6 and YVL 1.7. According to 
Section 30 of the Government Decree 733/2008, sig-
nificant functions with respect to safety within nu-
clear power plants must be designated, and train-
ing programmes must be prepared for development 
and maintenance of professional qualifications of 
the persons working in these positions. Adequate 
command of the functions in question must also be 
verified. The Guide YVL 1.6 sets requirements for 
NPP operator competence, and the Guide YVL 1.7 
for training and qualifications of personnel work-
ing in functions that are important for plant safety. 
The YVL Guides concerning human resources are 
currently being updated. Also other YVL Guides 
include requirements concerning licensee’s quali-
fications.
Personnel and human resources related issues 
are included in STUK’s periodic and construc-
tion inspection programmes at the nuclear pow-
er plants. A top level inspection of the periodic 
inspection programme, “Human Resources and 
Competence”, includes assessment of human re-
source management, competence development and 
training programmes. It also covers the licensee’s 
procedures for managing human resources and 
competence of suppliers, sub-suppliers and other 
partners participating in functions affecting safety. 
In 2008–2009, STUK has paid attention especially 
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to work fatigue management and management of 
working hour accumulation. STUK also partici-
pates in examinations of shift personnel, where the 
operators working in the control rooms show that 
they are conversant with all salient matters re-
lated to plant operation and safety. STUK further 
approves the appointment of certain key personnel, 
such as the responsible director and his/her depu-
ties.
Both TVO and Fortum are currently updating 
their human resource and personnel planning 
based on STUK’s requirements. Human resource 
planning at the Loviisa NPP is based on a ten-
year plan, which is subject to annual management 
review and updating. STUK has identified a need 
for human resource development in, for example, 
quality control and assurance, risk assessment 
and radiation protection. Recruitment processes 
have been started at the Loviisa NPP in order to 
improve the situation.
The training activities and procedures at the 
Loviisa NPP are currently being changed, with 
the objective of vesting the line organisation with 
responsibility for competence development while 
the training section supports the line organisation 
with their expertise. Furthermore, the training 
organisation has been recently strengthened with 
experts in behavioural sciences.
TVO recruited several new employees during 
2008 and 2009 for the Olkiluoto NPP. With these 
recruitments, TVO has been seeking to prepare for 
the generation change that is currently in progress 
in the nuclear industry in Finland. TVO also pre-
pared procedural instructions on strategic human 
resource planning during 2008. In its inspections, 
STUK has raised concerns on the number of per-
sonnel and the management of working hour accu-
mulation during annual maintenance operations. 
STUK is under the impression that the workload 
of certain key persons has increased because TVO 
deploys its personnel for the needs of both the 
operational units of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 and the con-
struction site of Olkiluoto unit 3. TVO has trained 
and instructed managers, supervisors and operat-
ing personnel on the importance of work fatigue 
management.
Following STUK’s inspections, the methods for 
assessing effectiveness of training programmes 
were developed at TVO during 2008. This includes, 
for instance, defining the training objectives more 
clearly. TVO operates a data system designed 
for competence management that has been sys-
tematically developed during the past few years 
through co-operation between training experts and 
managers. The methods for ensuring that the new 
personnel are competent before starting operating 
independently are under continuous development 
at the both NPPs operated by Fortum and TVO.
Fortum has under corporate structure own unit 
for Loviisa NPP Technical Support. Both Fortum 
and TVO also use external expertise whenever 
necessary for engineering and technical support 
functions. Their aim is to sign long-term co-oper-
ation agreements providing better preconditions 
for ensuring sufficient supplier competence. Both 
utilities provide external personnel introductory 
training and other training if necessary. They also 
assess supplier competence regularly and oversight 
supplier activities.
Ensuring an adequate national supply of ex-
perts in nuclear science and technology and high 
quality research infrastructure is a continuous 
challenge in Finland because of the retirement 
of large age groups, ongoing Olkiluoto unit 3 con-
struction project and possible new plant projects. 
In addition to the measures to maintain and 
develop the capabilities and amount of profes-
sional staff of STUK and the utilities, the similar 
requirements for maintaining and developing the 
human resources in the nuclear energy sector ap-
ply to VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, 
which acts as the main technical support organisa-
tion to STUK. In the same way one has to devote 
appropriate measures to develop the educational 
resources in technical universities and other high-
level universities in Finland.
STUK is participating in the development and 
organisation of the basic professional training 
course on nuclear safety, which is a yearly held 
5-week training programme for students and staff 
members of the participating organisations (STUK, 
the licensees, VTT, Helsinki and Lappeenranta 
Universities of Technology, Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy).
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 11.
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Article 12. Human factors
Each Contracting party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that the capabilities 
and limitations of human performance are 




Human reliability is largely based on good plant 
design and proper procedures and training. 
According to Section 6 of the Government Decree 
on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008), 
special attention must be paid to the avoidance, de-
tection and correction of any human error during 
design, construction, operation and maintenance. 
The possibility of human error shall be taken into 
account in the design of a nuclear power plant and 
in the planning of its operation and maintenance, 
so that human error and deviations from normal 
plant operations due to human error do not en-
danger plant safety. The impacts of human error 
shall be reduced by using various safety principles, 
including defence-in-depth, redundancy, diversity 
and separation.
According to Section 19 of the Government 
Decree 733/2008, the control room of a nuclear 
power plant must contain equipment that provides 
information on the operational state of the nuclear 
reactor and any deviations from normal operation. 
Furthermore, a nuclear power plant shall contain 
automatic systems that actuate safety functions 
whenever required and control and supervise their 
functioning during operational occurrences and ac-
cidents. These automatic systems shall be capable 
of maintaining the plant in a controlled state long 
enough to provide the operators with sufficient 
time to consider and implement the correct actions. 
The nuclear power plant shall have an emergency 
control post independent of the control room, and 
the necessary local control systems for shutting 
down and cooling the nuclear reactor, and for re-
moving residual heat from the nuclear reactor and 
spent fuel stored at the plant.
Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Measures at the Loviisa plant to ensure adequate 
human performance have been focused on develop-
ment of operating procedures. Large part of plant’s 
emergency operating procedures (EOPs) are re-
cently modified into flowchart format. These EOPs 
include symptom based identification which guides 
operators to event based procedures. Complex ac-
cident sequences and core melt accidents lead to 
symptom based operation. Human redundancy is 
provided by independent safety engineer. Loviisa 
plant is equipped with a full scope training simula-
tor which is used for operator training, including 
accident situations.
Fortum evaluates human reliability as part of 
the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). For ana-
lysing hidden defects influencing the course of a 
possible transient or accident, Fortum has evalu-
ated regularly different types of duties performed 
at the plant. In the analysis such operational and 
maintenance mistakes have been evaluated which 
may act as an initiating event of a transient or an 
accident. Different plant states and duties related 
to them have been evaluated in detail.
Control actions needed during an accident have 
been divided in the PRA evaluation into two parts: 
a diagnosis and actions taken to prevent the ac-
cident. Possibilities for mistakes have been studied 
with the help of a simulator. Plant procedures for 
emergency situations have been developed and will 
be further developed, taking also into account the 
results of PRA. For preventing human errors it is 
important, that the operating events are carefully 
evaluated and, if necessary, procedures or the plant 
is developed to prevent similar mistakes. Fortum 
has developed the utilisation of operating experi-
ences and does the root cause analyses out of most 
significant events.
The protection systems of the plant initiate the 
safety systems automatically when needed so that 
the operators will have enough time to consider 
actions according to operating and emergency pro-
cedures. Due to the inherent characteristics of the 
Loviisa plant, the operators will have more time for 
consideration in a transient situation than usually 
at other nuclear power plants. The Loviisa units 
1 and 2 have their own independent main control 
rooms where the needed process information is 
available and control actions can be performed. 
Alarm signals from the interim spent fuel storage 
are also available in the Loviisa unit 2 main control 
room. Process information is presented in the main 
control room with indicating meters, indicator 
STUK-B 120
31
lights and recorders as well as with the monitors 
of the process computer system. There are two re-
dundant alarm systems in the main control room. 
These systems have been realised by using two 
different techniques, conventional and computer-
based techniques. Indicator light fields are in the 
operator’s consoles, and two monitors have been 
reserved for computer alarms. In addition, data 
on events and conditions as well as the exceeding 
of warning and alarm limits are recorded by the 
alarm printers. The process computer gives process 
information in an illustrative format for the use of 
the operators.
In addition to the main control room, the shut-
down of the reactor as well as the control and 
monitoring actions necessary for safety can be per-
formed by means of a so-called emergency control 
room table, located in the main control room of the 
other unit. For severe accidents there is a dedicated 
control room shared by the both units.
The I&C systems are currently being renewed at 
the Loviisa plant. Human performance is taken into 
account in the modification. The project began in 
2002 with basic conceptual design; implementation 
begun in 2004 with construction of new buildings 
to accommodate the new systems. The project is in-
tended to be completed in 2014. The renewal project 
is discussed in more detail under Article 18.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Basis for safe operation is laid already in design 
phase. A so-called 30-minute rule has been the de-
sign basis for the protection system at the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2. Important protection measures and 
safety systems start up automatically so, that no 
actions of operating personnel are needed dur-
ing the first thirty minutes after the beginning of 
the operational transient or postulated accident. 
Proper emergency and transient situation proce-
dures as well as training of those situations reduce 
the possibility of human errors further.
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 have their own inde-
pendent control rooms, where the necessary proc-
ess information is available, and from where all 
necessary control measures can be conducted. The 
alarms covering the interim spent fuel storage 
are available in the control room of the Olkiluoto 
unit 1. The technical solutions of the main con-
trol rooms are based on the proven control room 
technology. During the renewal of turbine automa-
tion system several new computerised operator 
workstations and a large screen display system 
were installed into the main control room. Process 
information is presented by the indicating measur-
ing equipment installed in the steering desks and 
panels as well as with several computer display 
units. Conventional and computer aided alarm 
systems are used to facilitate the management of 
main processes and other sub and auxiliary proc-
esses. The alarms are indicated primarily by the 
alarm lamp panels. The parallel alarms received 
through the computer are seen on the monitors. 
In addition, the event and state data as well as 
deviations from warning/alarm limits are printed 
on the alarm printers. A safety parameter display 
system (SPDS), which improves the performance 
capability of the operating personnel in controlling 
transient and accident situations, is in use at the 
Olkiluoto plant units. Main control room can now 
be described as a hybrid control room. All the main 
control room related modifications are tested at the 
training simulator, and operators are trained for 
managing the modified systems prior to the modifi-
cations are installed.
Control room personnel have also participated 
in special Control Room Resource Management 
training. Similar training is common practice in 
civil aviation. Later this has been merged with 
TVO’s Human performance 2012 programme.
The control room personnel has participated 
in studies which evaluate fatigue in their working 
arrangements and shift patterns. TVO has had a 
12 hour shift pattern since 2005. In 2009, TVO con-
ducted a trial of resting in the control room night 
shift. Based on the experiences, TVO made this as 
a permanent procedure in Main Control Rooms.
Both Olkiluoto plant units have an emergency 
control post, from where the reactor can be tripped 
and where the main parameters of the reactor such 
as neutron flux, pressure, temperature and water 
level can be monitored. Cooling the reactor down to 
a cold state and removal of decay heat can be car-
ried out after the shutdown by using local control 
posts. The requirement of another, independent 
emergency control room emerged after the revision 
of the STUK’s Guide YVL 5.5 “Instrumentation sys-
tems and components at nuclear facilities” in 2002. 
TVO is evaluating possibilities to improve and cen-
tralise the emergency controls to better apply the 
present requirements. Modifications are planned to 
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be carried out in connection to the modernisation 
of reactor protection system in the future.
There are methods for preventing human errors 
during operation. Main areas to be considered are 
operation, maintenance and modification projects. 
Human reliability can be enhanced in every day 
activities with certain methods. These methods 
include pre-job-briefing, de-briefing, peer checking, 
independent verification and clear communication. 
TVO has trained and introduced these methods 
in feasible activities. Proper work planning and 
Permit-to-Work-system in addition to up-to-date 
procedures are key methods in maintenance re-
lated activities to ensure safety during mainte-
nance. Checking and approval requirements are 
also considered when requalifying systems back 
into operation. This work is part of a company wide 
project called “Human Performance 2012” which 
incorporates also other measures to improve hu-
man performance. The aim is to support managers 
and the personnel in managing human perform-
ance to avoid as many human mistakes as possible. 
TVO has had human factor specialist since 2004.
Human Factor issues are taken into account 
in all events. Lessons learned from the events are 
taken into account in the corrective action plans 
and lessons learned are used in internal training 
and organisational development. TVO has utilised 
operating experience and results of root cause 
analyses in the development of human aspects in 
the operating procedures. Errors related to the 
maintenance actions have also been examined 
and measures have been developed to avoid corre-
sponding errors. Fatigue has been identified as an 
important factor to be managed.
TVO has conducted a probabilistic risk assess-
ment (PRA) where the consequences of human 
errors have been studied. Latent maintenance and 
testing errors have been studied in connection with 
the system analyses related to the PRA. In addi-
tion to the human factor experts, experienced staff 
members from the operating and maintenance 
personnel have participated in assessing the pos-
sibility of errors. The identified error possibilities 
have been classified into groups according to their 
importance and the most important ones have 
been modelled in the PRA study to clarify the risks 
related to errors. The reliability of operator actions 
conducted during accident conditions was assessed 
as a part of the PRA analysis. The diagnostic errors 
that may be made in connection with accidents 
have also been assessed. Based on the results of 
the analyses concerning the human errors, a few 
additions and modifications have been made on 
the emergency and operating procedures of the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2.
At the Olkiluoto unit 3, human factors engi-
neering has been part of the design phase. Concept 
of operation is taken from excisting units and ref-
erence plants. Main control room has operational 
I&C system with operating terminals and large 
screen displays. This interface can be used in all 
plant conditions. Additional information can be 
integrated into this system, e.g. alarm systems and 
operating procedures. Safety related I&C system 
has own traditional operating panels which are 
diverse control method for operational I&C. These 
safety panels include also hardwired controls 
which are additional back-up for all I&C systems. 
Olkiluoto unit 3 has also remote shutdown sta-
tion. Feasibilty of human factors engineering will 
be demonstrated in validation studies. Integrated 
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Human factors have to be taken into account in 
the design and analysed in the failure analyses of 
plant safety systems and in probabilistic risk as-
sessments. Such analyses have been completed for 
both Finnish nuclear power plants.
As regards the operation of the facility, the 
influence of human factors and the respective 
need for corrective measures are assessed by the 
licensees and STUK, when evaluating abnormal 
events and their lessons learnt. Each operating or-
ganisation has established a systematic procedure 
for making event evaluations. Figure 10 shows the 
share of technical and human related causes for 
the latest incidents at the Finnish nuclear power 
plants. E.g. during 2009, Loviisa NPP reported 7 
events from which 6 contained human root causes 
and Olkiluoto NPP reported 10 events from which 
3 contained human root causes.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 12.
Article 13. Quality assurance
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that quality assurance 
programmes are established and implemented 
with a view to providing confidence that speci-
fied requirements for all activities important 
to nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the 
life of a nuclear installation.
Regulatory requirements regarding 
management systems
According to Section 29 of the Government Decree 
on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008), 
the organisations participating in the design, con-
struction, operation and decommissioning of a nu-
clear power plant are required to employ a man-
agement system. The quality management system 
must cover all functions influencing plant safety, 
and the licensees are further required to ensure 
that all their suppliers, sub-suppliers and other 
partners participating in functions that affect 
safety adhere to the quality management system. 
Along with the management system, the Decree 
sets requirements for the documentation of the 
lines of management and monitoring of the opera-
tions.
STUK’s Guide YVL 1.4 sets general require-
ments for the management system and was up-
dated in 2008. The updated Guide YVL 1.4 adheres 
to IAEA Safety Standard GS-R-3 on management 
systems. Requirements for the quality assurance 
programme during operation are presented in the 
Guide YVL 1.9 and requirements for quality man-
agement of system design in the Guide YVL 2.0. 
The quality management requirements related to 
specific technical areas are presented in the cor-
responding technical guides.
The management systems of the licensees 
and applicants are subject to approval by STUK. 
According to the Guide YVL 1.4, any safety-sig-
nificant revisions to the anagement system must 
be submitted for approval to STUK, but minor 
revisions are only submitted for information prior 
to their use. Implementation of the anagement sys-
tem is verified by STUK through inspections. The 
management systems of the main suppliers will 
also be reviewed and assessed and their implemen-
tation will be verified through inspections.
STUK has an own Quality Manual that includes 
quality policy, description of the quality system, 
organisation and management, main and support-
ing working processes and personnel policy. The 
results of internal audits, self-assessments and in-
ternational evaluations are used as inputs for the 
enhancement projects of the Quality Management 
System at STUK. In addition to STUK’s Quality 
Manual, all main functions of STUK have their 
own more detailed Quality Manuals.
Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Fortum’s Policy Commitment to Quality in the 
Nuclear Power Operations was issued in 1999 and 
it was confirmed in 2001 by the management of 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy. The development of 
Loviisa NPP’s quality management system is based 
on the principle of continuous improvement in ac-
cordance with the observations and remarks made 
in quality audits and quality assessments. An eval-
uation of the plant quality management system 
against the ISO/DIS 9001 and 9004:2000 standards 
were made in 2000 by Fortum Engineering. The 
work continued in 2001–2002 and a similar com-
parison with IAEA Safety Series No. 50-C/SG-Q 
was carried out. The environmental management 
system of the plant was certified in 2002 according 
to the ISO 14001:1996 standard. During the prepa-
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ration phase an environmental policy and a new 
chapter on environmental system were introduced 
in the Quality Manual.
Fortum has evaluated and prepared develop-
ment plans for their management system, which 
STUK has reviewed for implementation of the 
updated Guide YVL 1.4 requirements. The quality 
management system of Fortum Power & Heat Oy 
for the Loviisa NPP complied with the require-
ments of the Guide YVL 1.4 in many respects, but 
some deviations still remained. To comply fully 
with the Guide YVL 1.4, STUK required Fortum 
to develop and implement a process based operat-
ing and management system that will replace the 
existing function based system stepwise by the end 
of 2013. Additionally, Fortum was requested to con-
form to the requirements regarding the purchasing 
processes, and create procedures for managing 
changes occurring in the organisation or in the 
management system.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
TVO’s quality management system, Activity Based 
Management System, is described in the Quality 
Management Manual. It takes into account the re-
quirements from IAEA Safety Series No. 50-C/SG-Q 
and ISO 9001:2000. Activity Based Management 
System guides all TVO’s operations and provides 
each staff member with procedures for the safe, eco-
nomical, high-quality and environmentally friendly 
generation of electricity. TVO’s company-level poli-
cies are nuclear safety and quality policy, social re-
sponsibility policy, production policy and corporate 
security policy. The functions and responsibilities 
of TVO’s organisations and personnel are described 
in detail in the TVO’s Administrative Rules, in the 
Organisational Manual and in the manuals and 
instructions of individual organisational units. The 
Administrative Rules have been approved by STUK 
as a part of the Technical Specifications Document.
For the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction phase 
STUK has approved “The Quality Manual for 
Olkiluoto 3 Project”. The review of document as 
well as review of the QM systems of plant vendor 
and major suppliers is carried out by STUK. STUK 
has also asked external QM experts’ opinions on 
the QM systems.
TVO has evaluated and prepared development 
plan for their management system, which STUK 
has reviewed for implementation of the updated 
Guide YVL 1.4 requirements. The quality manage-
ment system of TVO for the Olkiluoto units 1 and 
2 mainly complied with the requirements of the 
Guide YVL 1.4. To fully comply, TVO was required 
to develop procedures for ensuring that the re-
quirements, interfaces and interactions between 
processes as well as risks related to operation 
have been identified in the process development. 
Further, the requirements for the control of out-
sourced processes and activities must be includ-
ed in the management system. Additionally, TVO 
should describe their procedures for assessing and 
continuously improving the safety culture. Like 
Fortum, TVO was also asked to conform to the 
requirements regarding the purchasing processes, 
as well as create procedures for managing organi-
sational changes.
TVO’s quality management system for Olkiluoto 
unit 3 construction project was also reviewed 
against the updated Guide YVL 1.4 requirements. 
According to STUK’s review, the management sys-
tem of Olkiluoto unit 3 complies with the Guide 
YVL 1.4 with the only deviation of missing proce-
dures for the regular, independent assessment of 
the management system.
Regulatory oversight
STUK has reviewed both licensees’ quality man-
agement systems for implementation of the up-
dated requirements in the Guide YVL 1.4. Both 
licensees have been required to create and submit 
development plans to correct all deviations and 
fully comply with the requirements.
Additionally, a top level inspection of the STUK’s 
periodic inspection programme, “Functioning of 
the Management System”, includes assessment 
of functioning, development and assessment of 
the management system as well as assessment 
of the organisation for quality management. The 
“Management and Safety Culture” inspection (see 
Article 10) also contains items concerning man-
agement systems. In 2008–2009, the inspections 
contained issues such as human resource man-
agement, competence development and training. 
STUK has also inspected various quality manage-
ment related documents, such as rules of proce-
dure, organisation and quality manuals.
Concerning the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction 
project, STUK has performed quality management 
and quality assurance inspections as a part of the 
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construction inspection programme. In addition, 
STUK has participated as an observer in the licen-
see’s and vendor’s audits at the subcontractors.
STUK is developing a procedure for collecting 
observations concerning management system and 
organisational issues. The aim is to collect and 
integrate observations from different inspections 
and oversight practices and make conclusions on 
the licensee’s organisation, management system 
and safety culture.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 13.
Article 14. Assessment and 
verification of safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. comprehensive and systematic safety as-
sessments are carried out before the con-
struction and commissioning of a nuclear 
installation and throughout its life. Such 
assessments shall be well documented, sub-
sequently updated in the light of operating 
experience and significant new safety in-
formation, and reviewed under the author-
ity of the regulatory body;
ii. verification by analysis, surveillance, test-
ing and inspection is carried out to ensure 
that the physical state and the operation 
of a nuclear installation continue to be 
in accordance with its design, applicable 
national safety requirements, and opera-
tional limits and conditions.
Regulatory approach to safety assessment
The Nuclear Energy Decree requires that when 
applying for a construction licence, the applicant 
must submit to STUK the following documents: 
a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, a design 
phase Probabilistic Risk Assessment, a proposal 
for a safety classification document, a description 
of Quality Management during the construction of 
the nuclear facility, preliminary plans for the ar-
rangements for security and emergency prepared-
ness, and a plan for arranging the safeguards con-
trol. For the operating licence, the applicant must 
submit to STUK: the Final Safety Analysis Report, 
the Probabilistic Risk Assessment, the safety clas-
sification document, the quality management pro-
gramme for the operation of the nuclear facility, 
Operational Limits and Conditions, a programme 
for periodic inspections, security and emergency 
plans, a description on administrative rules for 
safeguards, a programme for radiation monitoring 
in the environment of the nuclear facility, a de-
scription of how safety requirements are met, and 
a programme for the management of ageing. In ad-
dition, the Decree gives STUK a possibility to ask 
other documents considered necessary for safety 
demonstration.
Design of the facility is described in the 
Preliminary (PSAR) and Final (FSAR) Safety 
Analysis Reports. The reports are submitted 
to STUK for approval with the applications for 
Construction and Operating Licences. PSAR/FSAR 
forms the bases to STUK´s safety assessment 
which is required before granting the Construction/
Operation Licence (see Article 7). According to the 
Nuclear Energy Decree, FSAR has to be continu-
ously updated, and changes to FSAR are submit-
ted to STUK for approval. Requirements for the 
plant modification process are presented in the 
Guide YVL 2.0, “Systems design for nuclear power 
plants”. The main principle in plant modifica-
tion process is that conceptual design plans and 
system-specific pre-inspection documents of Safety 
Class 1, 2 and 3 systems must be submitted to 
STUK for approval. STUK reviews and approves 
the modification prior to its implementation at the 
plant. In connection with a system modification, 
the Final Safety Analysis Report shall be amended 
accordingly without delay.
The general design bases for nuclear fuel have 
been defined in the Guides YVL 1.0 and YVL 6.2. 
The design objective is that the probability of fuel 
failure is low during normal operational conditions 
and anticipated operational transients, and that 
during a postulated accident the rate of fuel fail-
ures remains low and the fuel remains in a coolable 
state. Detailed requirements for the design, qual-
ity management and control, handling, storage and 
transport of fuel are specified in the Guides YVL 6.2, 
YVL 6.3, YVL 6.4, YVL 6.5, YVL 6.7 and YVL 6.8.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the oper-
ating licence is granted for a fixed term. However, 
legislation has not prescribed the length of the 
term. The term is proposed by the licensee in the 
application, and must be justified on the basis of 
the ageing and planned future operation of the nu-
clear facility. Particular attention is paid to licen-
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see’s processes and activities and planned safety 
improvements to ensure safety for the estimated 
duration of operation. The procedure for operating 
licence renewal is in general the same as in ap-
plying for an operating licence for a new nuclear 
facility. Specific requirements on the documents to 
be submitted to STUK for the renewal of the oper-
ating licence are described in the Guide YVL 1.1 
“Regulatory control of safety at nuclear facilities”. 
Renewal of the operating licence always involves 
a periodic safety review of the facility. If a licence 
is granted for a significantly longer term than ten 
years, STUK requires the licensee to carry out a 
periodic safety review within about ten years of 
receiving the operating licence or of conducting the 
previous periodic safety review. For a separate pe-
riodic safety review, STUK must be provided with 
similar safety-related reports as in applying for 
renewal of the operating licence. Renewal of the op-
erating licence of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
took place in 2005–2007 and the periodic safety 
review of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 in 2007–2009 
(see Article 6).
The Government Decree on the Safety of 
Nuclear Power plants (733/2008) requires that 
nuclear power plant safety and the technical solu-
tions of its safety systems shall be substantiated by 
using experimental and calculation methods. These 
include among others analyses of operational oc-
currences and accidents, strength analyses, failure 
mode and effect analyses, and probabilistic risk 
assessments. Analyses shall be maintained and 
revised if necessary, taking into account operating 
experience, the results of experimental research, 
plant modifications and the advancement of calcu-
lation methods. The calculation methods employed 
for demonstrating compliance with safety regula-
tions shall be reliable and well qualified for the 
purpose. They shall be applied so that the resulting 
system design bases meet the acceptance criteria 
with high certainty. Any uncertainty in the results 
shall be assessed and considered when defining 
safety margins. STUK’s review of these analyses 
includes independent safety analyses.
Detailed requirements concerning transient 
and accident analyses, including sensitivity analy-
ses, are presented in the Guide YVL 2.2, “Transient 
and Accident Analyses for Justification of Technical 
Solutions at Nuclear Power Plants”. Requirements 
for probabilistic risk assessments are given in 
the Guide YVL 2.8, “Probabilistic safety analysis 
in safety management of nuclear power plants”. 
Acceptance criteria for the analyses are present-
ed in Guides YVL 6.2 “Design bases and gen-
eral design criteria for nuclear fuel” and YVL 7.1, 
“Limitation of public exposure in the environment 
of and limitation of radioactive releases from a nu-
clear power plant”.
Safety assessment of new 
nuclear power plants
Three new nuclear power plant units have been 
under consideration in Finland (see more details of 
the licensing process under Articles 7 and 17). TVO 
submitted application for a Decision-in-Principle 
to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
in 2008, Fennovoima and Fortum in 2009. In ad-
dition, two applications by Posiva Oy have been 
handled for the expansion of the planned capacity 
of spent fuel repository. The applications for NPP 
units were accompanied by documents of a total of 
seven alternative plant designs. The Government 
made on May 6 2010 positive decisions regarding 
the applications of TVO and Fennovoima and the 
Parliament ratified the decision on July 1 2010.
STUK gave the Ministry preliminary safety as-
sessments of all Decision-in-Principle applications 
in 2009. STUK’s preliminary safety assessments 
consisted of an assessment of the safety of the 
plant alternatives and the sites as well as of an 
assessment of the organisations and the quality 
management of the applicant. The assessments 
also cover the physical protection and emergency 
preparedness arrangements, nuclear fuel and nu-
clear waste management, nuclear liability and 
non-proliferation.
Most of the plant alternatives reviewed in the 
STUK’s preliminary safety assessments do not 
meet Finnish safety requirements as such. The 
nature and the extent of the required modifica-
tions vary between the plant alternatives. Some 
plant alternatives would only require fairly minor 
modifications; some would require more extensive 
structural modifications. The required technical 
solutions are still open for some alternatives.
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Deterministic safety assessment
Detailed requirements concerning transient and 
accident analyses, including sensitivity analyses, 
are presented in the Guide YVL 2.2, “Transient 
and Accident Analyses for Justification of Technical 
Solutions at Nuclear Power Plants”.
Fortum submitted with the licence renewal doc-
umentation in 2005–2007 the revised Final Safety 
Analysis Report, including the transient and acci-
dent analyses of the Loviisa units 1 and 2. Fortum 
has revised the analyses taking into account plant 
modifications implemented at both units as well 
as new regulatory requirements. The analyses 
presented in the Safety Analysis Report cover an-
ticipated operational transients, category 1 and 2 
accidents, and severe accidents. The analyses cover 
all operating states and include accident analyses 
for the storages of spent fuel and reactor waste.
STUK assessed the submitted analyses for the 
Loviisa NPP and methods applied in the analyses. 
STUK contracted VTT Technical Research Centre 
of Finland to carry out independent analyses to 
verify the results given in the licence renewal 
documentation and to conduct sensitivity analyses. 
STUK concluded that the plant behaviour in dif-
ferent transient and accident situations has been 
analysed comprehensively and that the methods 
used in the analyses are properly validated to de-
scribe the operation of the Loviisa plant.
Accident and transient analyses of the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2, as well as the analysis methods, have 
been updated and developed throughout the opera-
tion of the plant. TVO revised completely the ac-
cident and transient analyses in conjunction with 
the application for the renewal of its operating 
licence in 1995–1998. The analyses were at that 
time carried out for nuclear fuel that is no longer 
being used at the NPP units. For the periodic 
safety review in 2007–2009, TVO updated the ac-
cident analyses using the SVEA-96 Optima 2 as a 
reference fuel. The plant modifications carried out 
after the renewal of the operating licence in 1998 
were also taken into account in the update. Since 
renewal of the operating licence, Guides YVL 2.2 
and YVL 6.2 have been revised and a requirement 
regarding analyses of design extension conditions 
was introduced. When updating its analyses for 
periodic safety review, TVO has taken into account 
the new regulation.
The calculation methods used for analysing 
the plant normal operating conditions, transients 
and postulated accidents were developed by the 
supplier of the Olkiluoto plant units. The methods 
have been qualified to an extent corresponding to 
a good level from the international perspective. 
STUK reviewed the updated analyses and the 
calculation methods used. The conclusion was that 
the analyses of transients and accidents of the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 were conducted as referred 
to in Section 3 of Government Decree 733/2008. 
However, STUK required updating of the loss of 
coolant analyses assuming a level of system avail-
ability specified in the Guide YVL 2.2. TVO submit-
ted the required updates in 2010.
The preliminary analyses of Olkiluoto unit 3 
were presented to STUK in PSAR and the Topical 
Reports appended to PSAR with application for 
the construction licence. STUK contracted techni-
cal support organisations to carry out independent 
analyses to verify the results. STUK approved the 
PSAR of Olkiluoto unit 3 in January 2005 just 
before the construction licence was granted by the 
Government. TVO has submitted updated analyses 
for the Final Safety Analysis Report in 2008–2010. 
The analyses will be reviewed as a part of the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 operating licence application.
Probabilistic risk assessment
Regulatory requirements on PRA
STUK required in 1984 that the Finnish utilities 
Fortum (former Imatran Voima Oy) and TVO shall 
make extensive probabilistic risk assessments 
(PRA) for the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plants. The objective of the study was to deter-
mine the plant-specific risk topographies of the 
essential accident sequences. Another important 
objective was to enhance the plant personnel’s un-
derstanding of the plant and its behaviour in dif-
ferent situations. Therefore STUK also required 
that the PRAs are performed mainly by the utility 
personnel and external consultants are used only 
for special topics.
In 1987 STUK published the Regulatory Guide 
YVL 2.8 on PRA. The Guide was updated in 1996 
and 2003. Currently the Guide requires a full-scope 
(including internal events, fires, floods, seismic 
events, harsh weather and other external events) 
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PRA for power operation and low-power and shut-
down states. PRA shall cover the probability of core 
damage (Level 1) and large release of radioactive 
substances (Level 2). PRA shall be updated contin-
uously to reflect plant and procedure modifications 
and changes in reliability data (Living PRA).
Guide YVL 2.8 includes the following probabil-
istic safety goals:
•	 Core damage frequency less than 1∙10–5/year
•	 Large radioactive release (> 100 TBq Cs-137) 
frequency less than 5∙10–7/year.
These safety goals apply as such to new plant units. 
For operating units, instead of the numerical safety 
goals, the SAHARA (safety as high as reasonably 
achievable) principle and the principle of continu-
ous improvement are applied.
Guide YVL 2.8 also includes requirements on 
several risk-informed applications, such as analy-
sis of plant modifications, risk-informed in-service 
inspections and testing, development of emergency 
operating procedures and training programmes 
and review of safety classification and Operational 
Limits and Conditions.
For a new plant unit, a preliminary PRA cover-
ing Levels 1 and 2 shall be submitted to STUK for 
the review of the construction licence application 
(design phase PRA) and the updated and comple-
ment PRA (Levels 1 and 2) shall be submitted for 
the review of the operating licence application.
PRA’s computer models shall be made available 
to STUK. STUK uses PRA routinely to support its 
decision making, for example, in review of plant 
modifications and applications for exemption from 
Operational Limits and Conditions and in analysis 
of operating events.
Main developments in risk informed 
regulation during the reporting period
During the reporting period the role of risk in-
formed regulation and safety management has 
been further strengthened by STUK and the li-
censees. The following activities can be given as 
examples of the increased role of risk informed 
methods:
•	 Both licensees, TVO and Fortum, have devel-
oped Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection pro-
grammes for the operating units. Fortum has 
introduced the programme in 2009 and TVO 
plans to introduce it in 2011.
•	 TVO and Fortum have applied PRA in support 
of the review of safety classification of the oper-
ating units.
•	 TVO and Fortum have introduced a method for 
risk informed review and development of Op-
erational Limits and Conditions, especially al-
lowable outage times and testing intervals. TVO 
has already implemented the updated allowable 
outage times and test intervals. At Fortum the 
work is in progress.
•	 Olkiluoto unit 3 PRA is being finalised and risk 
informed applications have been used in the 
design of the unit and the risk informed appli-
cations for the operating phase are under devel-
opment in accordance with the Guide YVL 2.8. 
PRA is also used in the planning of commission-
ing testing programmes.
•	 Risk informed methods have been used to sup-
port ageing management, for example, trend 
analysis of failure data. In connection with the 
life extension of Loviisa unit 2 reactor pressure 
vessel, the probabilistic analysis of pressurised 
thermal shock has been updated to evaluate the 
safety significance of radiation induced embrit-
tlement of weld seams.
The use of PRA in several well-established ap-
plications has been continued and the methods 
have been further refined. STUK has continued the 
extension of the PRA computer code system devel-
oped at STUK. The software is used in the review 
of the PRAs submitted by the licensees and in sup-
port of risk informed decision making at STUK.
In addition to the risk informed applications 
based on regulatory requirements, the licensees 
use PRA in applications supporting their operat-
ing activities, for example availability analysis and 
risk centred maintenance.
Probabilistic risk assessment of 
the Loviisa units 1 and 2
Fortum provided STUK with Level 1 PRA in 1989. 
Since 1990 Fortum has extended PRA by analys-
ing risks related to fires, floods, earthquakes, se-
vere weather conditions and outages, as well as by 
conducting Level 2 PRA. Plant modifications have 
been carried out continuously at the Loviisa NPP, 
including safety system improvements, fire safety 
improvements, implementation of Severe Accident 
Management systems and a major modernisation 
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programme in mid 1990’s (see Annex 2). By means 
of these modifications risks have been decreased 
and the risk topography of the plant has been 
balanced. Technical solutions of the modifications 
have also been often justified with PRA.
The development of the core damage frequency 
since 1997 is shown in Figure 11. At the end of year 
2009 the calculated estimate for the total prob-
ability of reactor core damage was about 6.0∙10-5 
per reactor year. The contribution to the core dam-
age frequency from different groups of initiating 
events is shown in Figure 12. The Loviisa plant has 
allmost full scope PRA covering Levels 1 and 2, but 
some parts still need refinement of analysis, for 
example, the detailed fire PRA for shutdown states 
will be performed when the changes in cable routes 
due to the I&C renewal are known.
Fortum has also provided STUK with the Level 
2 PRA in which the integrity of the containment 
and the release of radioactive materials from the 
plant to the environment are evaluated. It was 
estimated that the total probability of a large re-
lease to the environment is about 2.7∙10–5 per year. 
The following modifications of the Loviisa plant 
made to implement the severe accident manage-
ment strategy have been included in the estimate: 
the external cooling of the reactor pressure vessel, 
the measures aimed at preventing such loading 
situations which break the reactor cavity, the 
improved control of hydrogen and the new proce-
dures for severe accident management. The esti-
mate for a large release includes a detailed Level 
2 PRA study for internal events, floods and severe 
weather conditions at power states, whereas the 
remaining areas (fire, seismic and outages) are 
based on a rough estimate on the consequences of 
the accident sequences from Level 1 analyses. The 
probability of large release will be decreased to 
1.8∙10–5/year by the year 2012 when the planned 
plant modifications have been implemented. The 
modifications include installation of alarming bo-
ron analysers to reduce the risk of reactivity 
accidents in shutdown states, changes allowing 
improved hoisting routes to reduce the risk due to 
the drop of heavy loads, modernisation of the I&C 
system and improvements of the control rod cool-
ing system to avoid leaks causing consequential 
damage in instrumentation rooms.
The results of STUK’s review show that Fortum 
has applied in its analyses commonly accepted 
methods in modelling transient and accident situ-
ations of the plant and in collecting and analysing 
reliability data. The reviews also show that the 
assessments provide an adequate basis for risk 
informed decision making.
PRA has been used by the licensee in the 
risk-informed applications required by the Guide 
Loviisa core damage frequency
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Figure 11 Loviisa core melt frequency in 1997–2009. 
The increase in the core damage frequency in 2003 
was due to extension of the PRA scope with non-
seismic external events during shutdown states. The 
preliminary conservative analyses showed relatively 
high risk due to exceptionally high outside air tem-
perature and oil spills in the Gulf of Finland in cold 
shutdown states. Later the risk was decreased due to 


















Risk distribution in 2009. Total CDF 5, 19E-5/a
Figure 12. Loviisa core damage frequency in 2009 by 
initiating event types. The most significant internal ini-
tiating events at full power (power operation, PO) are 
the small interfacing LOCAs and the loss of instrumen-
tation room ventilation. At shutdown (SD) the most 
significant internal initiating events are drop of heavy 
loads and reactivity accident due to boron dilution.
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YVL 2.8, for example in evaluation of plant modi-
fications, review of safety classification, develop-
ment of Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection pro-
gramme, optimisation of testing intervals, and 
optimisation of Operational Limits and Conditions 
(allowable outage times). The Loviisa NPP has also 
introduced a Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection 
programme for piping. The number of inspections 
was increased but the focus shifted from high 
safety classes to lower safety classes. This shift is 
due to the fact that some lower safety class piping 
has relatively large risk significance as they belong 
to vital support systems or the leaks of lower class 
pipelines may lead to consequential damage to 
safety systems. The radiation doses to inspection 
personnel will decrease as a result of the new in-
spection programme.
Probabilistic risk assessment 
of the Olkiluoto NPP
TVO submitted to STUK the first version of Level 1 
PRA in 1989. Since then, the PRA has been updat-
ed several times and the scope has been extended. 
TVO has now practically full-scope PRA covering 
levels 1 and 2 for full power operation and for low 
power and shutdown states.
Core damage frequency since 1997 is shown in 
Figure 13. Plant modifications have been carried 
out continuously at the Olkiluoto plant, including 
backfitting with severe accident management sys-
tems and power uprate and modernisation in the 
1990’s (see Annex 2).
At the end of 2009 the overall core damage fre-
quency of Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 is approximately 
1.3∙10–5 per reactor year, including all operating 
states and all groups of initiating events. The con-
tribution to core damage frequency from different 
groups of initiating events is shown in Figure 14.
In 1996, TVO submitted to STUK the Level 2 
PRA. The analysis was updated during 1997 and 
2003. According to the living PRA model in 2004 
the frequency of the large release to the environ-
ment (>100 TBq Cs-137) was 6∙10–6 per reactor 
year, which was approximately one third of the 
core damage frequency.
The regulatory review done by STUK showed 
that, in its analyses, TVO has applied generally 
approved methods in modelling the transient and 
accident situations of the plant as well as in ob-
taining and analysing the reliability data.
TVO has used PRA in the risk-informed appli-
cations required by the Guide YVL 2.8, for exam-
ple in evaluation of plant modifications, review of 
safety classification, development of Risk-Informed 
In-Service Inspection programme, optimisation of 
testing intervals, and optimisation of Operational 
Limits and Conditions (allowable outage times).
Olkiluoto core damage frequency (1/a)
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Figure 13. Development of Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 core 
damage frequency in 1997–2009. The large decrease of 
the seismic risk in 1998 is due to improvement of the 
anchorage and supports of batteries and some elec-
tronic equipment. Originally they were not designed 
against any horizontal loads. The decrease in seismic 
risk in 2009 is due to plant modifications allowing 
improved handling of spurious activation of isola-
tions due to relay chatter. The risk increase in 2000 is 
due to decreased time for creating a diesel generator 
cross connection between units after a total loss of AC 
power at one unit. The decrease of the available time 
was due to power uprate in 1998, but it was found out 
in more detailed thermal hydraulic analyses in 2000. 
The risk increase in 2009 is due to a more detailed 















Risk distribution in 2009. Total CDF 1, 34E-5/a
Figure 14. Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 core damage fre-
quency in 2009 by initiating event groups. The most 
significant internal initiating events at full power are 
the loss of off-site power and loss of feedwater.
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Probabilistic risk assessment 
of Olkiluoto unit 3
The vendor of Olkiluoto unit 3 conducted a design 
phase PRA, which TVO submitted in 2004 to STUK 
for the review of the construction licence application 
as required by the Nuclear Energy Decree. The de-
sign phase PRA includes analysis of internal initiat-
ing events, internal hazards and external hazards 
for power operation and refuelling outage. STUK 
approved the Olkiluoto 3 PRA for the construction 
licence in January 2005. The PRA of Olkiluoto 3 has 
been continuously updated by the plant vendor dur-
ing the construction phase and STUK has closely 
followed the completion of the PRA.
PRA has been used by TVO and plant vendor 
in the risk-informed applications required by the 
Guide YVL 2.8, for example in evaluation of system 
design, review of safety classification, development 
of Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection programme, 
optimisation of testing intervals, optimisation of 
Operational Limits and Conditions (allowable out-




Government Decree 733/2008 includes several re-
quirements which concern the verification of the 
physical state of a nuclear power plant. For in-
stance, in all activities affecting the plant opera-
tion and the availability of components, a system-
atic approach shall be applied for ensuring the 
operators’ continuous awareness of the state of the 
plant and its components. The reliable operation 
of systems and components shall be ensured by 
adequate maintenance as well as by regular in-
service inspections and periodical tests. General 
requirements on verification programmes and pro-
cedures are provided in the YVL Guides (e.g. Guide 
YVL 1.8, YVL 1.9, YVL 3.0, YVL 3.8).
Main programmes used for verification of the 
state of a nuclear power plant are
•	 periodic testing according to the Operational 
Limits and Conditions
•	 preventive and predictive maintenance pro-
gramme
•	 in-service inspection programme
•	 periodic inspections of pressure equipment and 
piping
•	 surveillance programme of reactor pressure ves-
sel material
•	 programmes for evaluating the ageing of com-
ponents and materials.
Activities for verifying the physical state of a pow-
er plant are carried out in connection with nor-
mal daily routines and with scheduled inspections, 
testing, preventive maintenance etc. Activities are 
performed by the licensee and in the case of certain 
inspections by contractors approved separately. 
Detailed programmes and procedures are estab-
lished and approved by the licensee. They are also 
reviewed and, when needed, approved by STUK. 
The results of tests and inspections are documented 
in a systematic way and used through a feedback 
process to further develop the programmes. The 
Operational Limits and Conditions are approved 
by STUK. In general, the role of STUK is to verify 
that the licensees follow the obligations imposed 
on them and carry out all activities scheduled in 
verification programmes.
Comprehensive evaluations related to the state 
and operation of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants 
were carried out in the periodic safety reviews 
by Fortum in 2005–2007 and TVO in 2007–2009. 
These activities were controlled by STUK.
Inspection qualification
According to international experience and the 
Guide YVL 3.8, STUK has recognised the qualifica-
tion of non-destructive testing systems and proce-
dures as an issue of high importance. This issue re-
quires high priority at both nuclear power plants. 
The implementation of qualified NDT systems has 
been started in 1990’s.
General requirements on inspection qualifica-
tion are provided in the Guide YVL 3.8. The doc-
ument “European methodology for qualification” 
drawn up by the European Network for Inspection 
and Qualification (ENIQ) shall be used as the 
minimum requirement level for qualification of 
inspection systems to be used in in-service inspec-
tion, and it shall be complemented by the ENIQ 
Recommended Practices. In the content of licen-
sees’ guidelines published by the qualification body, 
the requirements presented in the Guide YVL 3.8, 
in the European Methodology for Qualification 
(EUR 17299) and in its recommendations have 
been taken into account.
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The licensees Fortum and TVO have estab-
lished the Steering Committee for Qualification 
and nominate its members on annual basis. The 
Steering Committee for Qualification is guiding 
and supervising the practical qualification work 
with the help of a separate Technical Support 
Group nominated and supervised by the Steering 
Committee.
Based on a contract with the licensees, Inspecta 
Certification is nominated as the qualification 
body for qualification management, implementa-
tion, control and assessment as well as the issuing 
of qualification certificates in Finland. The Finnish 
qualification body is a qualification body of type 1, 
which is an independent third party organisation 
as defined by ENIQ Recommended Practice 7. 
When needed Inspecta Certification uses also ex-
perts outside of its own organisation for individual 
qualifications.
Most of the qualifications have already been 
performed and approved by STUK.
STUK ordered in 2009 an assessment of the 
current qualification activities in Finland from an 
independent expert organisation. The purpose was 
to assess whether Finnish inspection qualification 
practice leads to reliable and effective in-service in-
spection of safety critical components. Review was 
performed in two parts: 1) review of the inspec-
tion qualification system as specified in the Guide 
YVL 3.8 and the national qualification guideline 
documents issued by the qualification body and 
2) review of the inspection qualification practices. 
As a conclusion of the assessment it was reported 
that the qualification system meets the Finnish re-
quirements, is effective and provides confidence in 
the inspections of safety critical components.
In-service inspections
The condition of the pressure-retaining components 
of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs is ensured with 
regular in-service inspections. The components of 
the primary circuit are inspected by means of non-
destructive examination methods. These regularly 
repeated examinations are carried out during out-
ages according to the Guide YVL 3.8. The results 
of the in-service inspections are compared with the 
results of the previous inspections and of the pre-
service inspections which have been carried out 
before the commissioning.
The in-service inspection plans are submitted to 
STUK for approval before each individual in-serv-
ice inspection. Programmes and related inspection 
procedures are changed when necessary, taking 
into account the development of requirements 
and standards in the field, the advancement of ex-
amination techniques and inspection experiences 
as well as operating experiences in Finland and 
abroad.
Guide YVL 3.8 and the latest revisions of the 
ASME Code, Section xI are applied as approval 
bases for the in-service inspection programmes 
and procedures. ASME Code, Section xI, Appendix 
R and ENIQ European Framework Document for 
Risk-informed In-service Inspection are used as 
approval bases for the risk-informed in-service in-
spection programmes.
The reliability of the non-destructive exami-
nation methods for the primary circuit piping 
and components has been essentially improved 
after the commissioning of the both Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs. Guide YVL 3.8 calls for the qual-
ification of the entire NDT-system; equipment, 
software, procedures and personnel. Most of the 
inspection systems are already qualified at the 
both plants. STUK follows the development and 
implementation of the plans.
A risk-informed inspection programme has 
been introduced and approved by STUK at Loviisa 
unit 1 for the inservice inspections of safety-critical 
pipelines. The deployment of risk-informed inspec-
tion methods for targeting inspections has been de-
veloped in Finland by STUK, Fortum, FNS (Fortum 
Nuclear Services), TVO and VTT. The objective of 
risk-informed in-service inspection programmes 
is to allocate inspection resources to the targets 
that are most critical from the point of view of risk. 
Using this approach, it is possible to ensure that 
the current inspection objects are well-justified, 
identify new objects and omit certain less safety-
critical objects from the existing inspection pro-
gramme. According to experts’ view, the programme 
is the most extensive risk-informed in-service in-
spection programme so far implemented in Europe.
The development of a risk-informed inspection 
programme for Loviisa unit 2 has been started. 
The length of the inspection period of the regular 
inspections (e.g. ASME Code, Section xI) is nor-
mally ten years. Inspection programmes have been 
complemented with additional inspections as re-
gards the reactor pressure vessel and the primary 
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circuit piping, and the length of the inspection 
period of the reactor pressure vessel has been re-
duced to eight years. The length of the inspection 
period of the objects susceptible to thermal fatigue 
is typically three years.
At the Olkiluoto plant, attempts have been 
made to focus the inspections on areas where 
faults are most likely to emerge. These include, for 
example, items susceptible to fatigue due to tem-
perature variations or items susceptible to stress 
corrosion cracking. The selection of inspection 
items is under continuous development. For this 
purpose, a risk-informed in-service inspection pro-
cedure is being developed for the Olkiluoto units 1 
and 2. Inspections and inspection schedules will be 
optimised on the basis of risk-informed methods 
when the next inspection interval programmes are 
drawn up.
The frequency of the non-destructive examina-
tions performed at regular intervals is usually ten 
years at the Olkiluoto NPP. The inspection fre-
quency for items susceptible to thermal fatigue is 
three years, and the inspection frequency for items 
susceptible to stress corrosion cracking is three or 
five years.
In addition to the inspections mentioned above, 
physical inspections concerning the condition and 
reliability of pressure equipment are carried out 
as regular pressure equipment inspections accord-
ing to the Finnish pressure equipment legislation. 
Such inspections are a full inspection, an internal 
inspection and an operational inspection. These 
inspections include non-destructive examinations 
as well as pressure and tightness tests. The inspec-
tions of piping have been defined in the system-
specific monitoring programmes. These periodic 
inspections are dealt with in the Guides YVL 3.0, 
YVL 3.3, YVL 5.3, and YVL 5.7. The periodic in-
spection programmes of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
NPPs fulfil the requirements of YVL Guides, as 
regards the number and techniques of inspections.
Ageing management
According to the Government Decree (733/2008), 
the design and construction of a nuclear power 
plant shall include provision for the ageing of sys-
tems, structures and components (SSCs) important 
to safety. Their condition shall be monitored to 
ensure operability and conformity in design-basis 
conditions. The needed replacements, repairs and 
modifications, shall be carried out in a systematic 
manner.
The regulatory oversight of ageing in operating 
plants focuses on operating licence renewals and 
Periodic Safety Reviews (PSRs) where the conform-
ance to the relevant Government Decrees and YVL 
Guides, including experiences with ageing and 
its management, is investigated. STUK’s findings 
from other regulatory control practices, particu-
larly the periodic inspection programme, are used 
as verification. The periodic inspections are done 
on plant site according to annual planning and 
tackle both the technical aspects of each discipline 
and the process of ageing management. STUK also 
receives annual reports from each nuclear power 
plant unit on ageing management activities within 
each technical discipline.
Ageing management at the Loviisa NPP
Radiation embrittlement of the reactor pressure 
vessel (RPV) and the related surveillance and miti-
gation actions dominated the ageing management 
in Loviisa NPP since the early years of operation. 
This was more relevant to Loviisa unit 1 whose 
girth weld at the level of the reactor core has a 
higher content of impurities. In 1996, the brittle 
weld joint of the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure vessel 
was heat-treated to improve the ductility proper-
ties of the welding material. In this connection the 
reactor pressure vessel was subject to thorough 
non-destructive tests. Embrittlement rate has 
been re-assessed based on the new surveillance 
programme representing the critical weld. For both 
units, deterministic and probabilistic safety analy-
ses and associated thermal hydraulic and fracture 
mechanics studies have been done in a few years’ 
periods to justify continued service of the RPV. For 
Loviisa unit 1, the latest analyses are valid until 
2012 and for Loviisa 2 the analyses are updated in 
2010. Fortum’s application to extend the operation 
of the Loviisa unit 2 RPV until the end of 2030, i.e., 
to the end of the plant unit’s operating licence is 
presently under STUK’s review.
In the mid-1990’s, Fortum implemented their 
systematic plant-wide ageing management pro-
gramme. The SSCs are assigned to categories A 
through D based on their technical and economical 
replaceability. SSC failures in category A would 
limit plant lifetime and thus deserve a part-assem-
bly-wise break-down of ageing related remedies. 
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Category A comprises the main primary compo-
nents. Data indicative of plant status and trends 
are collected with operation, maintenance and in-
spection IT systems, R&D activities and via experi-
ence exchange. The consequent ratings of operabil-
ity, remaining service life and necessary actions for 
each SSC are stored on the plant database.
In 2006 the operating utility Fortum submitted 
to the Government an application to continue the 
operation of Loviisa units 1 and 2 until the end of 
2027 and 2030, respectively, meaning a 20-year ex-
tension to the original design lifetime. Among the 
ageing-related justification were the main fatigue 
analyses, updated to cover the whole 50 years’ 
life span with consideration of the environmen-
tal effects. Documents on In-Service Inspection 
Summary Programme, Ageing Management 
Programme Principles and Implementation, and 
SSC Status and Service Life Extensibility were 
also submitted. For electrical and I&C components 
it was noted that massive projects are underway to 
replace cables in containment due to its detected 
considerable ambient temperature rise, and for 
plant-wide replacing of obsolete protection and 
plant I&C systems and components. In its review, 
STUK made a general point that the state-of-the-
art permitted a quantitative life-time evaluation 
only in case of ageing by fatigue. However, other 
potential mechanisms have been identified and 
resources are in place to monitor, inspect, mitigate 
and repair as needed. The operating organisation 
has also strong technical support which has con-
vincingly resolved forthcoming ageing issues in the 
past, and the history records are well preserved. 
The Government granted the applied operating li-
cences on condition that two PSRs are undertaken 
during the licence period.
Ageing management at the Olkiluoto NPP
The ageing management activities at the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 arose from wide-spread indications of 
inter-granular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in 
reactor auxiliary system piping. Early replacement 
of entire piping systems, achievable with modest 
doses to maintenance staff, considerably mitigated 
IGSCC and led the way to the utility’s strategy 
of seeing to the critical SSCs so that a remaining 
plant life-time of 40 years (design life-time) could 
be always demonstrated.
Since 1991, the AGE Group, with assistance of 
several technical discipline related expert groups, 
has taken care of these activities by gathering 
information of possibly needed future actions from 
several sources and by preparing and updating a 
table of recommended major modifications, replace-
ments, repairs and overhauls. The modernisation 
and power uprating of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 
2 by 16% in 1994–1996 evolved from these recom-
mendations and was completely carried out by the 
utility’s technical support organisation residing on 
plant site. The associated significant renewal cam-
paigns of obsolete electrical and instrumentation 
systems and components largely contributed to 
current 20-year operating licence periods terminat-
ing in 2018. Efforts to enhance the reliability and 
good performance of the plant components, and to 
ensure the spare part and support service availa-
bility have continued until recent years. The major 
foreseeable modifications until decommissioning 
have been identified.
Systematic maintenance planning is an integral 
part of ageing management at the Olkiluoto units 
1 and 2. Nominated owners of equipment groups, 
characterised by a common type or location, ana-
lyse the entire maintenance programme and its 
experiences, and assist in selection of the most ef-
fective maintenance works. Annual findings from 
each equipment group are stored into a relational 
data base on the plant computer.
STUK reviewed TVO’s clarification on the actual 
condition and ageing implications of the main SSCs 
in connection to the Periodic Safety Review (PSR) 
carried out in 2007–2009. Supporting assessment 
has been done in several periodical inspections on 
plant site. The main components were generally 
found to be in good condition, but the appearance of 
IGSCC in Nickel-based alloys could not be excluded 
and it possibly explains an indication reported from 
the safe-end weld of the main feedwater nozzle, 
made from Alloy 182. The PSR also referred to a 
completed pilot project for updating fatigue analy-
ses of selected systems to incorporate the environ-
mental effect as required in the implementation 
process of the Guide YVL 3.5. Based on recommen-
dations from expert consultancy of VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland, more refined modelling 
is employed now that the utility is renewing all fa-
tigue analyses to justify a prospective re-licensing 




At the Olkiluoto unit 3, the ageing manage-
ment is taken into account at the design phase. The 
most severe operating conditions and long-term 
influences, under which an individual component is 
expected to serve as a part of a process system, are 
used to determine the design basis requirements for 
that component. With known design basis require-
ments and defined life times of SSCs, their mate-
rials, fabrication and other ageing management 
related issues are specified accordingly. This in-
cludes precautions against foreseeable degradation 
mechanisms with state-of-the art technology, and 
provision for inspections, overhauls, testing and re-
placements as needed while respecting the ALARA 
principle. The anticipated life-span of the main tech-
nologies and independence from single technologies 
are particularly considered in I&C system and som-
ponent design. The design and fabrication of SSCs 
are verified with qualified analyses, inspections and 
testing, overseen by STUK, in order to demonstrate 
fulfillment of quality and performance requirements 
set by the design specifications. During Olkiluoto 
unit 3 operation, the ageing of SSCs and retaining 
the design margins will be managed by dedicated 
programmes and monitoring tools, and by in-service 
inspections to whose planning risk-informed meth-
ods are applied.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 14.
Article 15. Radiation protection
Each contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that in all operational 
states the radiation exposure to the workers 
and the public caused by a nuclear installa-
tion shall be kept as low as reasonably achiev-
able and that no individual shall be exposed 
to radiation doses which exceed prescribed 
national dose limits.
Regulatory requirements regarding 
radiation protection
The main regulations governing radiation pro-
tection of Nuclear Power Plant operation are 
the Radiation Act (592/1991), Radiation Decree 
(1512/1991), Government Decree for Nuclear 
Safety of NPPs (733/2008) and YVL Guides, Part 
7 (12 guides). Radiation Decree stipulates that the 
effective dose caused to a worker shall not exceed 
an average of 20 millisieverts (mSv) per year in 
any five years period, nor 50 mSv in any single 
year. The limit for the annual dose of an individual 
in the population, arising from the normal opera-
tion of a nuclear power plant, is 0.1 mSv. Based 
on this, STUK shall upon application confirm the 
release limits for radioactive materials during the 
normal operation of a nuclear power plant. ALARA 
requirement is issued in the Radiation Act and 
more in detail implementation requirements are 
given in the YVL Guides both for NPP workers and 
release abatement. During 2007–2009 no changes 
in the Guides as regards radiation protection were 
made because the guides were well up-to-date after 
revision mainly in early 2000.
Radiation doses of NPP workers
There exists an ALARA programme for workers 
at the Loviisa NPP updated in 2009. It includes 
main objectives as the continuous improvement 
in the collective dose indicator trend: decreasing 
of a four years average, now being at 0.6 manSv/
reactor unit/year. Important measures are e.g. 
minimisation of antimony 122 and 124 content in 
primary cooling water and optimised use of addi-
tional shielding in the primary coolant circuit area 
during outages. ALARA programme includes also a 
goal that no employee at the plant should receive 
a radiation dose exceeding 15 mSv per year. As 
a plant modification, rearrangement of controlled 
area activities for decontamination and operation-
al waste management is underway, to be commis-
sioned in 2010–2011.
TVO’s ALARA programme for the Olkiluoto 
NPP contains a compilation of major objectives and 
procedures regarding the radiation protection and 
reduction of doses of employees. The ALARA pro-
gramme is included in TVO’s radiation protection 
manual, which is regularly updated. The ALARA 
programme includes the goals that collective dose 
should not exceed 1 manSv for two reactor units in 
a normal year (1.5 manSv when major additional 
maintenance is needed) and no employee at the 
plant should receive a radiation dose exceeding 10 
mSv per year.
TVO conducted an independent assessment for 
its periodic safety review in 2008, comparing the 
operating experience of radiation protection of 
workers at Olkiluoto plant units and at similar 
type of Swedish BWRs. The results indicate that 
the standards and goals of radiation protection are 
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comparable at all the plants surveyed. However, 
some procedural differences do exist. For example, 
regarding radiation sources, the primary coolant 
at plant units in Olkiluoto have, from time to time, 
contained more antimony than the Swedish BWR 
plants. Consequently, TVO has replaced antimony-
containing components in the primary circuit with 
new ones with low antimony content. The reduction 
in moisture of primary steam with the equipment 
upgrades (new steam dryers) during 2005–2007 at 
the Olkiluoto NPP substantially reduced the radia-
tion dose rates at the turbine plant.
The risk-informed procedure will be deployed to 
in-service material inspections in piping and weld-
ing for the first time in outages 2011. This will also 
contribute towards reducing the amount of work 
carried out in most active areas, thus reducing the 
radiation exposure of employees.
The radiation dose statistics of the workers are 
presented for the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plants in Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 15 
and 16. The individual radiation doses have re-
mained fairly under the set annual and five years 
dose limits. The maximum combined dose of a 
Finnish worker at the NPPs for a single year dur-


















































































































































Figure 16. Collective occupational doses at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.












2007 0.72 9.8 1.42
2008 1.56 13.5 2.28
2009 0.75 8.5 1.47
*) calculated by using the registered radiation doses, which are ≥ 0.1 mSv/
month.












2007 1.18 9.4 1.04
2008 0.94 8.1 0.92
2009 1.19 9.9 0.99
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2005–2009, the maximum dose was 54.6 mSv and 
was also received by a person working both at the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
In international comparison (e.g. the ISOE ra-
diation dose database of the NEA, the Nuclear 
Energy Association of the OECD countries), the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 have been among the best 
boiling water reactors when comparing both in-
dividual and collective radiation doses. The long-
term planning of annual maintenance operations 
has made it possible to keep their duration short, 
which usually reduces the amount of work car-
ried out and hence also the exposure to radiation. 
Loviisa NPP has managed to decrease their collec-
tive dose and is well in comparison with different 
type of PWRs.
Radioactive effluents
STUK confirms upon the licensee’s application 
the release limits for radioactive materials dur-
ing the normal operation of a nuclear power plant. 
Operational Limits and Conditions have stringer 
requirements which apply for the radioactive sub-
stances of primary coolant (fuel integrity), thus 
practically preventing releases. Fuel rods at the 
Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants have 
very low failure rates. Both nuclear power plants 
have efficiently implemented measures to reduce 
the releases of radioactive substances into the en-
vironment.
The radioactive effluents from the plants in 
2007–2009 are shown in Tables 3 and 4. Radioactive 
releases into the environment from the Finnish 
nuclear power plants have been well below author-
ised limits (for important nuclides and pathways, 
of the order of 0.01% to 0.1% of set values based 
on the requirements). Calculated radiation expo-
sures to the individual of the critical group living 
in the environment of the nuclear power plants are 
shown in Figure 17.
STUK has requested reports from Fortum and 
TVO on the implementation of the Guide YVL 7.1 
concerning the potential solutions (Best Available 
Techniques, BAT) for further reduction of the ra-
dioactive releases from the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
NPPs. Fortum has developed caesium removal 
technology from liquid releases which is in success-
ful operation. The utility has still some comparison 
with VVER reactor R & D issues and evaluation of 
their own developments underway, to be reported 
in 2011. TVO and the Olkiluoto plant had previous-
ly carried out improvements on water treatment 
and purification of discharge waters, and no new 
solutions have been presented now. TVO had also 
an independent assessment, comparing the emis-
sions and operating experience in the Olkiluoto 
plant units and in equivalent Swedish BWRs. The 
results indicate that the standard of radiation pro-
tection is also in this respect at least the same at 
the reference plant units surveyed.
Environmental radiation monitoring
STUK has approved the operating programme for 
environmental radiation monitoring in the sur-
roundings of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs for 
2008–2011. The changes in the programme com-
pared with the previous one were related to, inter 
alia, the use of reference samples, measurements 
Table 3. Radioactive effluents from the Loviisa NPP. The proportion of the release limit is given in parenthesis.
Airborne effluents Liquid effluents 
excluding tritium 
[Bq]
Year Noble gases Kr-87 ekv. [Bq] Iodine I-131 ekv. [Bq]
Aerosols 
[Bq]
2007 5.50E+12 (0.03%) 7.34E+05 (0.0003%) 1.12E+08 3.54E+08 (0.04%)
2008 5.51E+12 (0.03%) 1.68E+06 (0.0008%) 8.18E+07 2.90E+08 (0.03%)
2009 7.95E+12 (0.04%) 2.63E+07 (0.01%) 1.22E+08 1.79E+09 (0.2%)
Table 4. Radioactive effluents from the Olkiluoto NPP. The proportion of the release limit is given in parenthesis.
Airborne effluents Liquid effluents 
excluding tritium 
[Bq]Year Noble gases Kr-87 ekv. [Bq]




2007 1.13E+11 (0.0006%) 1.48E+07 (0.01%) 3.01E+07 5.66E+08 (0.2 %)
2008 below detection limit 1.50E+06 (0.001%) 1.76E+07 3.43E+08 (0.1 %)
2009 below detection limit 1.06E+05 (0.0001%) 2.93E+07 2.01E+08 (0.07 %)
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of the water treatment plant sludge and the in-
terpretation of measurement results on carbon-14 
nuclides.
An outside contracted laboratory collects and 
analyses about 300 samples (air, fallout, sediment, 
indicator organisms, milk, etc.) per year from the 
environment of each NPP. Very small quantities of 
radioactive substances of local origin were detected 
in 2007–2009 on some samples from the environ-
ment of each nuclear power plant. Concentrations 
of the radioactive substances were very low, and 
effects on the public are insignificant.
Regulatory oversight
On the basis of documents submitted by the opera-
tors, STUK approved in 2007 the use of the dosim-
etry service of the Loviisa nuclear power plant and 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant until 2011. As 
appropriate, the approval also covers the agreement 
between the operator and the outsourced servic-
es sold by Doseco company, responsible for routine 
dosimetry at the Olkiluoto NPP. STUK has audited 
also the dose monitoring service at Doseco Oy.
The dosimeters used for measuring the occu-
pational radiation doses of Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants have underwent annual tests of STUK 
regularly with acceptable results. These tests com-
prise irradiating a random sample of dosimeters 
at STUK’s radiation standard laboratory and de-
termination of the doses at the power plant (blind 
test).
STUK carries out yearly radiation protection 
inspections on-site according to the periodic in-
spection programme, e.g. covering the resources, 
expertise and operation of the radiation protection 
organisation, dosimetry, radiation measurements 
in the plant, radioactivity measurements of emis-
sions, and monitoring of radiation in the environ-
ment. STUK required Fortum to develop its opera-
tions further at the Loviisa NPP and, among other 
things, intensify the radiation protection training 
of work planners and improve temperature condi-
tions in rooms containing emission-measuring in-
struments, in line with the Operational Limits and 
Conditions. STUK required subsequently also TVO 
to develop further the radiation protection training 



















































































































































Figure 17. Calculated annual radiation exposures to the members of critical groups in the environment 
of the Finnish nuclear power plants. Doses have been clearly under the limit 100 μSv.
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STUK carries out outage radiation protection 
inspections on-site during annual maintenances. 
The inspections at the Loviisa plant have shown 
e.g. that the radiation protection staff has de-
veloped job-specific introductory training, where 
certain employee categories are given special ra-
diation protection training related to their duties. 
Contamination control of work areas at the plant 
during outages needs continuous attention and 
radiation protection control measures. STUK has 
carried out similar radiation protection inspections 
at the Olkiluoto NPP. The plant has developed the 
contamination measurements at the exits of the 
controlled area. However, it will be necessary in 
the future to assess whether the current level of 
permanent staffing is sufficient and verify the ef-
ficiency of certain outsourced radiation protection 
activities in the reactor refuelling area.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 15.
Article 16. Emergency preparedness
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that there are on-
site and off-site emergency plans that are 
routinely tested for nuclear installations 
and cover the activities to be carried out 
in the event of an emergency. For any new 
nuclear installation, such plans shall be 
prepared and tested before it commences 
operation above a low power level agreed 
by the regulatory body.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that, insofar as 
they are likely to be affected by a radio-
logical emergency, its own population and 
the competent authorities of the States in 
the vicinity of the nuclear installation are 
provided with appropriate information for 
emergency planning and response.
3. Contracting Parties which do not have a 
nuclear installation on their territory, in-
sofar as they are likely to be affected in the 
event of a radiological emergency at a nu-
clear installation in the vicinity, shall take 
the appropriate steps for the preparation 
and testing of emergency plans for their 
territory that cover the activities to be car-
ried out in the event of such an emergency.
Emergency preparedness on-site of NPPs
Regulations concerning emergency response ar-
rangements at the NPPs are given in the Nuclear 
Energy Act, the Nuclear Energy Decree and the 
Government Decree on Emergency Response 
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants (735/2008). 
Detailed requirements and the monitoring proce-
dures of STUK are given in the Guide YVL 7.4.
Fortum and TVO have analysed accident 
and safety-impairing events at the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs, and these are specified in the 
safety analysis reports of the plants. These analy-
ses have been used as the basis for planning the 
Finnish nuclear power plant emergency response 
arrangements.
Emergencies are classified and described briefly 
in the plant’s emergency plan. The notifications and 
alarms to plant personnel and authorities required 
by different classes of emergencies, as well as the 
scope of operations of the emergency response or-
ganisation pertaining to the type of emergency, are 
described in the emergency procedures.
A person responsible for emergency response 
arrangements have been appointed both for the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. The 
emergency response organisation has been de-
scribed in the emergency plan and procedures, 
updated with regard to personnel changes once 
a year. The more limited staffing of the emergen-
cy response organisation required for emergency 
standby state (alert) is defined in the shift supervi-
sor guides for the emergency response.
The facilities of the emergency response organi-
sation at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plants include system for a major display of plant 
process and radiation data in the process compu-
ter. Most important data is transmitted also to the 
STUK’s emergency response centre.
Emergency response training and exercises are 
annually arranged for the emergency response or-
ganisation of the nuclear power plants. The emer-
gency response training has included classroom 
and action group-specific practical training as well 
as special training, such as first aid, fire and radia-
tion protection training. In addition to severe ac-
cidents, the emergencies covered by the emergency 
response exercises also included conditions classi-
fied as emergency standby. The content and scope 
of the training as well as feedback obtained from 
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the training are assessed in the inspections of the 
STUK’s periodic inspection programme.
STUK verifies the preparedness of the organi-
sations operating nuclear power plants in yearly 
on-site inspections. Emergency preparedness at 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto power plants meet the 
key regulatory requirements. At the Loviisa NPP, 
the inspection has focused on the reorganisation 
of the emergency response organisation, testing of 
the connections used for plant data transfer during 
an emergency situation and the securing of con-
nections, and the development of the power plant’s 
alerting and training procedures. The renewed 
emergency premises at the Loviisa NPP could 
be now better utilised in real situation, because 
equipment and accessories in the premises are 
upgraded. The emergency exercise of the Loviisa 
power plant was arranged in the rebuilt emergency 
response centre premises early 2010. It was also 
an emergency and rescue operation exercise un-
der the leadership of the State Provincial office of 
Southern Finland.
The inspections at the Olkiluoto NPP have 
covered, among other things, the tasks of the ac-
tion groups of the plant’s emergency response 
organisation and the procedures and training for 
the nearby construction sites of Olkiluoto 3 reac-
tor and Onkalo rock examination facility related 
to the spent fuel disposal facility concerning the 
evacuation of personnel from the site in case of an 
accident at Olkiluoto units 1 or 2. The licensee and 
the authorities have engaged in close co-operation. 
Personnel mustering exercises have been organ-
ised in the limited area of the Olkiluoto 3 construc-
tion site.
Wind measuring sensors of the weather mast at 
the Olkiluoto plant site have been replaced to new 
acoustic type sensors. The new sensors are more 
versatile and accurate. More comprehensive data 
is now available on the weather conditions, includ-
ing the dispersion calculation methodology. STUK 
required that the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants as-
sess not only the development of the single weather 
mast system but also that of the off-site additional 
measurements and the related predictive models 
with regard to the dispersion of any releases into 
the atmosphere. Topical reports from the plants 
and utilities will be issued in 2011.
New, more accurate and stable real-time radia-
tion monitoring instruments have been installed 
into the external radiation monitoring network 
of the Olkiluoto NPP surroundings. The installed 
instrumentation is now identical to that in the na-
tionwide radiation monitoring network of Finland 
for emergency purposes. Both the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto monitoring networks have up to 15 ra-
diation measurement stations, five and four of 
them close to the plant area and the others in a 
half circle at 5 km distance from the plant. Three 
additional measurement stations will be installed 
in the vicinity of Olkiluoto 3 before the plant unit 
is in operation.
Training events on preparation for an accident 
at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant were organ-
ised for the fire and rescue authorities throughout 
the area of the Satakunta regional rescue services 
and the personnel of the Provincial State Office 
of Western Finland. In 2008, an emergency and 
rescue operation exercise was carried out at the 
Olkiluoto power plant under the leadership of the 
State Provincial Office of Western Finland.
Off-site arrangements
In addition to the on-site emergency plans estab-
lished by the licensees, off-site emergency plans 
required by the rescue legislation (468/2003) are 
prepared by regional authorities. The requirements 
for off-site plans and activities in a radiation emer-
gency are provided in the Decree of the Ministry 
of Interior (774/2001). STUK is an expert body to 
support the Ministry of Interior in the emergency 
response in the case of nuclear and radiological 
accidents. STUK publishes VAL Guides for emer-
gency response. Guide VAL 1 (2010) “Protective 
Actions in Nuclear or Radiological Emergency” pro-
vides detailed guidance. In the case of an accident 
the local authorities are alerted by the operating 
organisation of the plant.
STUK has an Emergency Preparedness Manual 
for its own activities in the case of a nuclear ac-
cident or radiological emergency. STUK has an 
expert on duty for 24 hours a day. The message on 
an exceptional event (alarm) can be received from 
the operating organisations of the facilities, or au-
tomatically from the radiation monitoring network 
that is dense in the whole country (300 measuring 
stations), or from foreign authorities.
The off-site plans include provisions to inform 
the population in the case of an accident. Written 
instructions on radiation emergencies, emergency 
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planning and response arrangements have been 
provided to the population living within the 20 km 
Emergency Planning Zone. These are regularly up-
dated and distributed.
The regulations and guides are tested in off-site 
emergency exercises conducted every third year. 
Full scale off-site emergency and rescue exercise 
was carried out in Finland in 2008 based on the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant accident scenario. In 
2010 the national exercise concerned the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant.
The rescue planning is strengthened in a co-op-
eration between the nuclear power plant, regional 
rescue centre and STUK. This includes common 
training and regular meetings.
Information to the neighbouring countries
Finland is a party to the Convention on Early 
Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency, done in 
Vienna in 1986. Being a member of the European 
Union, the Council Decision (87/600/EURATOM) 
on Community arrangements for the early ex-
change of information in the event of a radiologi-
cal emergency applies in Finland, too. In addition, 
Finland has respective bilateral agreements with 
Denmark, Germany, Norway, Russia, Sweden and 
Ukraine. Accordingly, arrangements have been 
agreed to directly inform the competent authorities 
of these countries in the case of an accident.
In addition to the domestic nuclear emergency 
exercises held annually on each nuclear power 
plant site, STUK has taken part in international 
emergency exercises. STUK has also participated 
as a co-player in emergency exercises arranged by 
the Swedish and Russian nuclear power plants and 
authorities. Neighbouring countries have been ac-
tively invited to take part in the Finnish exercises.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 16.
Article 17. Siting
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that appropriate proce-
dures are established and implemented:
i. for evaluating all relevant site-related fac-
tors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear 
installation for its projected lifetime;
ii. for evaluating the likely safety impact of a 
proposed nuclear installation on individu-
als, society and the environment;
iii. for re-evaluating as necessary all rele-
vant factors referred to in sub-paragraphs 
(i) and (ii) so as to ensure the continued 
safety acceptability of the nuclear instal-
lation; for consulting Contracting Parties 
in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear in-
stallation, insofar as they are likely to be 
affected by that installation and, upon 
request providing the necessary informa-
tion to such Contracting Parties, in order 
to enable them to evaluate and make their 
own assessment of the likely safety impact 
on their own territory of the nuclear instal-
lation.
Regulatory approach to siting
Requirements for the siting of a nuclear power 
plant are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act and 
the Nuclear Energy Decree. The application for a 
Decision-in-Principle has to include e.g.:
•	 a	description	of	settlement	and	other	activities	
and town planning arrangements at the site 
and its vicinity
•	 an	description	of	the	suitability	of	the	planned	
location for its purpose, taking account of the 
impact of local conditions on safety, security 
and emergency response arrangements, and the 
impacts of the nuclear facility on its immediate 
surroundings
•	 an	 assessment	 report	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
Act on the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure (468/1994) as well as a description 
of the design criteria the applicant will observe 
in order to avoid environmental damage and to 
restrict the burden to the environment.
More detailed requirements on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) are provided in the Decree 
on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure 
(713/2006).
In the design of a nuclear power plant, site-
related external events have to be taken into ac-
count. Government Decree 733/2008 provides as 
follows: “The safety impact of local conditions, as 
well as the security and emergency preparedness 
arrangements, shall be considered when selecting 
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the site of a nuclear power plant. The site shall be 
such that the impediments and threats posed by 
the facility to its environment remain extremely 
minor and heat removal from the plant to the en-
vironment can be reliably implemented.” STUK 
issued in 2001 the Guide YVL 1.10 “Safety criteria 
for siting a nuclear power plant”, which describes 
generally all requirements concerning the site and 
surroundings of a nuclear power plant, gives re-
quirements on safety factors affecting site selection 
and covers regulatory control. Requirements on 
seismic design are set forth in the Guide YVL 2.6. 
Deterministic analyses are made to assess the 
impact of various natural phenomena and other 
external events. The probabilistic risk assessment 
required for the safety review of Construction and 
Operating Licence applications provides informa-
tion on risks caused by external events.
The general principle in the siting of nuclear 
power plants is to have facilities in a sparsely 
populated area and remote from large population 
centres. In the vicinity of the plant, no activities 
are allowed that could pose an external threat to 
the plant. Site characterisation is performed based 
on geological, seismic, hydrological and meteoro-
logical factors as well as on transport routes and 
risks, industrial activities, agriculture, nature and 
population. Extreme meteorological conditions and 
consequences (e.g. frazil ice formation) have to be 
taken into consideration in the site evaluation and 
plant design.
In connection with the decisions for construction 
of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants in the 1970s, 
site-related safety requirements were quite easily 
and practically achievable in a sparsely populated 
country like Finland. The precautionary action zones 
have only a few tens of permanent inhabitants. 
Similar attention was not given to the recreational 
houses and the transient summertime population in 
the coastal area (mainland and islands) where the 
conditions might be demanding for efficient emer-
gency preparedness and rescue action. The number 
of recreational houses on the seaside within 5 km 
the existing plants is of the order of 400–500.
Finland is a party to the Convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, done in Espoo in 1991. The Convention is 
applied for Finnish nuclear facility projects by pro-
viding a full participation to all neighbouring coun-
tries which announce the willingness to participate 
in the environmental impact assessment procedure 
in question. In Finland, the EIA is conducted at an 
early stage of a NPP project, prior to the selection 
of the plant design, based on the power range of 
the plant and on general information on the avail-
able designs.
The bilateral agreements mentioned under 
Article 16 include provisions to exchange informa-
tion on the design and operation of nuclear facili-
ties. In the European Union a specific statement is 
also prepared for each new nuclear power plant 
unit in a member state before authorisation of 
the operation (Euratom Treaty, Article 37). This is 
based on a General Data report submitted by the 
member state and on its examination in a plenary 
meeting of Group of Experts. For Olkiluoto unit 3 
this process was conducted in 2010. Based on the 
legislation on land use planning, statements from 
neighbouring countries must be requested for the 
land use plans of a nuclear power plant. In prac-
tice the regional plan drafts for Fennovoima’s two 
northern sites were submitted to all Baltic Sea 
countries and Norway (8 altogether).
Re-evaluation of site related factors
The operating licence for a nuclear facility is grant-
ed for a fixed term. For the licence renewal of the 
Loviisa units in 2005–2007 and the Periodic Safety 
Review of the Olkiluoto units in 2007–2009, com-
prehensive re-assessments of safety, including the 
environmental safety of the nuclear facility and the 
effects of external events on the safety of the facil-
ity, were conducted by the licensees and reviewed 
by STUK. The assessments covered meteorology, 
hydrology, geology, seismology, population and use 
of land and sea area. During the operation of a 
nuclear facility, the Final Safety Analysis Report 
(FSAR), including its site-specific parts, has to be 
periodically reviewed and updated as needed. A 
detailed re-evaluation of the site related factors 
was carried out in 2007–2009 for the Olkiluoto and 
Loviisa sites in connection with the Environmental 
Impact Assessment and Decision-in-Principle pro-
cedures for new NPP units.
Assessment of new nuclear power 
plants and candidate sites
The Construction Licence for the Olkiluoto 3 unit 
was granted by the Government in February 2005. 
The construction is in progress. Site-related fac-
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tors were evaluated and reviewed in connection 
with the Construction Licence procedure. Further 
clarifications have been submitted by the licensee 
during construction.
In 2007, initiatives for building additional nu-
clear power reactors in Finland were announced. 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) proce-
dures were carried out for the possible Olkiluoto 4 
and Loviisa 3 units in 2007–2009.
A new nuclear power company, Fennovoima, 
was founded in 2007. The company started a pre-
liminary site survey process, mainly on the coast 
of the Gulf of Bothnia (the northern gulf of the 
Baltic Sea) and on the eastern Gulf of Finland (the 
eastern gulf of the Baltic Sea), the northernmost 
candidate site being 20–30 km from the borderline 
of Sweden. Fennovoima prepared an EIA pro-
gramme and subsequently an EIA report for three 
(originally four) alternative new candidate sites in 
2007–2009.
The EIA procedure did not reveal any major nu-
clear or radiation safety issues as regards the pro-
posed new NPP sites or new units on the existing 
sites. EIA was anyhow a tool to cope comprehen-
sively with the environmental issues depending on 
the specific site (e.g. sea environment and eutroph-
ication, special natural species and phenomena, 
biodiversity, Natura natural reserve assessment, 
fisheries, salmon migration, combined heat and 
power production) and to increase the opportunity 
for citizens and authorities to receive information, 
become involved in the planning and express their 
opinions on the project.
Comments were requested from altogether nine 
countries near the Baltic See by the Finnish 
Environmental Ministry. Several comments from 
e.g. Estonia, Sweden and Germany were given and 
considered by the Finnish authorities. Additionally, 
the Austrian Government as a party of the Espoo 
convention sent their statement on each EIA and 
requested for consultation in Finland. Thus, sub-
sequent meetings were arranged in 2008–2009 at 
the Finnish Ministry of the Environment where 
a Finnish delegation of experts from the utility 
concerned, STUK and the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy gave detailed explanations to the 
questions provided.
Separate applications for the Government’s 
Decision-in-Principle for new NPP units were sub-
mitted in 2008 and 2009 by TVO, Fortum and 
Fennovoima. The relevant site-related factors po-
tentially affecting the safety of a the planned new 
NPP units and the related nuclear facilities during 
their projected lifetime were again evaluated for 
the existing Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites and for 
the alternative new sites at Pyhäjoki, Simo and 
Ruotsinpyhtää proposed by Fennovoima. In late 
2009, Fennovoima removed the Ruotsinpyhtää site 
from its application for a Decision-in-Principle. 
The evaluations were reviewed by STUK and other 
expert organisations in their respective fields. In 
addition to the Finnish regulations, IAEA Safety 
Requirements and Safety Guides and WENRA re-
quirements were considered in the review.
Specific issues regarding the new sites are the 
size of precautionary action zone (5–6 km radius 
in Finland), the limitation of maximum population 
within it which may be affected in a severe acci-
dent situation and the possibility to evacuate the 
population. According to the Finnish regulations, 
an early evacuation before an expected release 
shall be possible within a time of four hours from 
the evacuation decision. The population in 2010 in 
the vicinity of the Finnish candidate sites is inter-
nationally compared relatively small (maximum of 
3000 inhabitants up to 6 km from the site at Simo). 
Three other issues which have to be taken into 
account, if the northernmost Simo site is chosen, 
are seismic conditions (similar to typical Central 
European sites), pack ice and the possible need 
of restrictions on the approach area of the Kemi-
Tornio airport.
According to STUK’s preliminary safety as-
sessments, no site related factors were found at 
any of the sites which would prevent building the 
proposed new NPP units and the related other 
nuclear facilities according to the safety require-
ments. More detailed evaluation of the site related 
factors will be conducted in connection with the 
Construction Licence application.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 17.
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Article 18. Design and construction
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. the design and construction of a nuclear 
installation provides for several reliable 
levels and methods of protection (defence 
in depth) against the release of radioac-
tive materials, with a view to preventing 
the occurrence of accidents and to mitigat-
ing their radiological consequences should 
they occur;
ii. the technologies incorporated in the design 
and construction of a nuclear installation 
are proven by experience or qualified by 
testing or analysis;
iii. the design of a nuclear installation al-
lows for reliable, stable and easily manage-
able operation, with specific consideration 
of human factors and the man-machine 
interface.
Implementation of defence in depth
Regulatory requirements regarding nuclear 
power plant design and construction
According to the Government Decree 733/2008, sev-
eral levels of protection have to be provided in the 
design of a nuclear power plant. The design of the 
nuclear facility and the technology used is assessed 
by STUK when reviewing the applications for a 
Decision-in-Principle, Construction Licence and 
Operating Licence. Design is reassessed against 
the advancement of science and technology, when 
the Operating Licence is renewed and in the peri-
odic safety reviews.
In the design, construction and operation, prov-
en or otherwise carefully examined high quality 
technology shall be employed to prevent opera-
tional transients and accidents and mitigate their 
consequences. A nuclear power plant shall en-
compass systems by means of which operational 
transients and accidents can be quickly and reli-
ably detected and the aggravation of any event 
prevented. Effective technical and administrative 
measures shall be taken for the mitigation of the 
consequences of an accident. The design of a nucle-
ar power plant shall be such that accidents leading 
to extensive releases of radioactive materials must 
be highly unlikely.
Dispersion of radioactive materials from the 
fuel of the nuclear reactor to the environment shall 
be prevented by means of successive barriers which 
are the fuel and its cladding, the cooling circuit of 
the nuclear reactor and the containment building. 
Provisions for ensuring the integrity of the fuel, 
primary circuit and containment are included.
In ensuring safety functions, inherent safety 
features attainable by design shall be made use of 
in the first place. If inherent safety features cannot 
be made use of, priority shall be given to systems 
and components which do not require an external 
power supply or which, in consequence of a loss of 
power supply, will settle in a state preferable from 
the safety point of view (passive and fail-safe func-
tions).
In order to prevent accidents and mitigate the 
consequences thereof, a nuclear power plant shall 
be provided with systems for shutting down the 
reactor and maintaining it in a subcritical state, 
for removing decay heat generated in the reactor, 
and for retaining radioactive materials within 
the plant. Principles ensuring the implementation 
of these safety functions even in the event of a 
malfunction must be applied in designing the sys-
tems in question. Such principles are redundancy, 
separation and diversity. The most important sys-
tems necessary for transferring the plant to, and 
remaining in, a controlled state must be capable of 
fulfilling their function even if any individual sys-
tem component is inoperable and even if any other 
component of the same system or of a supporting 
or auxiliary system necessary for its operation is 
simultaneously out of use due to required repair 
or maintenance. Common-cause failures in safety 
systems shall only have minor impacts on plant 
safety. Furthermore, a nuclear power plant shall 
have on-site and off-site electrical power supply 
systems. The execution of safety functions shall be 
possible by using either of the two electrical power 
supply systems.
The plant shall also be provided with systems, 
structures and components for controlling and 
monitoring severe accidents. These shall be inde-
pendent of the systems designed for operational 
conditions and postulated accidents. Systems nec-
essary for ensuring the integrity of the contain-
ment building in a severe accident shall be capable 
of performing their safety functions, even in the 
case of a single failure.
Special attention shall be paid to the avoidance, 
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detection and correction of any human error during 
design, construction, operation and maintenance. 
The possibility of human error shall be taken into 
account in the design of the nuclear power plant 
and in the planning of its operation and mainte-
nance, so that human errors and deviations from 
normal plant operations due to human error do not 
endanger plant safety. The impacts of human error 
shall be reduced by using various safety design 
methods, including defence-in-depth, redundancy, 
diversity and separation.
Detailed requirements are given in Guides 
YVL 1.0, YVL 2.0, YVL 2.4, YVL 2.7, YVL 3.0, 
YVL 4.3, YVL 5.2, YVL 5.5, YVL 6.2.
An assessment of the design of the facility and 
related technologies is made by STUK for the first 
time when assessing the application for a Decision-
in-Principle. Later on, the evaluation is continued 
when the Construction Licence application is re-
viewed. Finally, the detailed evaluation of systems 
and equipment is carried out through their de-
sign approval process. The design of Loviisa plant 
units was reassessed by STUK in 2005–2007 and 
Olkiluoto plant units in 2007–2009 in the periodic 
safety review process.
Application of defence in depth 
concept at the Finnish NPPs
During the time period 2007–2009, no significant 
faults or signs of wear were detected in the integ-
rity of equipment and structures critical to plant 
safety. The condition of the multiple barriers con-
taining releases of radioactive substances has re-
mained good both at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants.
A fuel leak was observed at the Loviisa unit 2 
on 28 November 2008. The leak was detected as 
the activity of exhaust gases increased. All fuel 
bundles were tested during 2009 annual outage 
and leaking fuel bundles were removed from the 
reactor. Leaking fuel rod was detected also at the 
Loviisa unit 1 on November 2009. The previous 
fuel leak in Loviisa before these two cases occurred 
in 1999.
During the 2009 annual outage a new type of 
fuel bundles were loaded into the reactor at the 
Loviisa NPP. The fuel enrichment is slightly higher 
which has an impact on shutdown margin of the 
reactor. Also six rods in the bundle contains burn-
able poison. Acceptable control rod positions in 
the Operational Limits and Conditions were also 
changed in order to keep the shutdown margin of 
the reactor core at the same level as before.
TVO aims to prevent fuel leaks by more ef-
fectively preventing loose parts from entering the 
reactor, but a small fuel leak caused by a loose 
part was detected at the Olkiluoto unit 2 during 
the 2006–2007 operating cycle. TVO submitted to 
STUK for approval the preinspection documenta-
tion of new type fuel bundles, scheduled for load-
ing in the reactor in spring 2009. The number of 
fuel rods per bundle has been increased and the 
diameter of the rods has been correspondingly re-
duced. Partial length rods have been introduced in 
these bundles, and the bundle length has slightly 
increased. STUK approved the documentation in 
April 2009.
Inspections of the reactor pressure vessel and 
piping revealed no deterioration of the materials 
at the Finnish NPPs. The steel liner of the Loviisa 
NPP containment is subjected to a leak tightness 
test at four-year intervals. The reactor contain-
ment at the Olkiluoto NPP is subjected to a leak 
tightness test three times during a 12-year period. 
In addition, leak tightness tests have been made 
systematically to containment isolation valves, 
personnel airlocks and containment penetrations. 
The results show that the leak tightness of the con-
tainment building has remained acceptable at the 
both NPPs. At the Olkiluoto NPP, strain measure-
ments of structures and a survey of fractures in the 
containment indicate that no changes have taken 
place in the structures. During the leak tightness 
tests performed at the Olkiluoto unit 1 in 2008 
and at the Olkiluoto unit 2 in 2010, strain did not 
exceed the elastic zone, and new fractures were not 
created. The structures are in good condition at the 
Olkiluoto NPP.
During the time period 2007–2009, no signifi-
cant failures were observed in the Loviisa plant’s 
safety functions and the systems, equipment and 
structures implementing them. At the Olkiluoto 
NPP, the overvoltage event challenged the safety 
functions in 2008. A high voltage peak caused by 
an operational transient in the voltage regulator of 
the main generator caused an uncontrolled coast-
down of the core coolant flow. The event did not 
cause a hazard to the environment, but it revealed 
a significant flaw in the overvoltage protection of 
the electrical systems at the plant. At the Olkiluoto 
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units 1 and 2, the uncontrolled trips of reactor cool-
ant pumps caused by overvoltage are temporarily 
prevented by modifying the protective relay func-
tions in the auxiliary power supply network. In 
addition, the power company amended the plant 
operating instructions. The event is described in 
more detail in Annex 2.
A potential undervoltage event identified at the 
Oskarshamn power plant was taken into account 
in the safety improvement programme at the both 
Finnish NPPs. Fortum was requested to carry out 
an analysis of the impact of long term undervolt-
age periods in the grid on the Loviisa power plant’s 
equipment. At the Olkiluoto NPP, analysis concen-
trated in particular on the effects of voltage drops 
of long duration on the pump motors in safety sys-
tems. These analyses were completed during 2009. 
Similar analyses have been prepared before, and 
these new ones were intended to study the current 
situation of plants.
In connection with the Loviisa plant’s licence 
renewal, Fortum has also prepared a plan on ac-
tions aimed at further enhancing the safety of the 
plant units in the future, necessitating a revision 
of the analyses. The most important ongoing plant 
modification project related to the Defence in Depth 
concept at the Loviisa plant is the upgrade of the 
I&C systems of the plant units. The project started 
in 2004 with the construction of a new I&C build-
ing, and the project is to be completed in 2014.
Fortum and TVO have also reviewed all of the 
analyses of transient and accident situations at 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants in 
connection with the operating licence renewal and 
periodic safety review. Deterministic safety assess-
ment is described in more detail under Article 14.
Severe accidents were not taken into account in 
the original design of the operating Finnish nucle-
ar power plants. However, since the commissioning 
of the plants, many improvements have been im-
plemented to mitigate the consequences of severe 
accidents. Mitigations systems are described in 
detail in Annex 2.
For the Olkiluoto unit 3, application of the 
Defence in Depth principle was presented in the 
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). The 
design follows the principles laid down in the 
Government Decree 733/2008. Compared with the 
existing reactors, the possibilities to mitigate the 
consequences of the severe accidents are taken into 
account already in the early design phase. This 
is achieved by implementing features to ensure 
containment integrity. Design provisions include 
e.g. core catcher for corium spreading and cooling, 
hydrogen recombination, and containment heat re-
moval. In addition, aircraft crash protection design 
requirements for both a military aircraft and a 
large passenger aircraft are taken into account.
Incorporation of proven technologies
It is stated in the Government Decree 733/2008 
that proven or otherwise carefully examined high-
quality technology shall be employed in the de-
sign, construction and operation of a nuclear power 
plant. The respective detailed requirements are 
provided in many YVL Guides.
Practical implementation of the new safety re-
quirements and procedures to ensure adequate re-
liability of digital instrumentation and control sys-
tems in the modernisation projects of the operating 
power plants and in the design of the new nuclear 
power plant can be considered as one of the major 
challenges for the next ten years. This includes also 
the issues related to the digital control rooms.
At the Loviisa plant, the I&C systems are cur-
rently being renewed. The project began in 2002 
with basic conceptual design; implementation be-
gun in 2004 with construction of new buildings 
to accommodate the new systems. The project is 
intended to be completed in 2014. The renewal is 
proceeding in carefully designed phases such that 
the I&C systems are renewed step by step, allow-
ing each renewed system to be taken into operation 
during normal refuelling outages. The first phase 
was implemented at the Loviisa unit 1 during the 
2007 annual maintenance, including the upgrade of 
the I&C of reactor power limitation and control rod 
control. Control room facilities are also renewed 
in phases with the system renewal. For example, 
large screen display devices were installed in the 
control rooms in 2006 and 2007.
STUK has reviewed the licensing documents 
related to the project, such as Conceptual Design 
(including Defence-in-Depth and Diversity assess-
ment), System pre-inspection documents for vari-
ous systems, and also Preliminary Suitability docu-
ments pertaining to the qualification of the digital 
I&C platforms being used in the project. STUK has 
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also witnessed the installations in connection with 
the oversight of annual maintenance.
At the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units 1 
and 2, changes in the control room are made gradu-
ally. Digital instrumentation and control technol-
ogy has already been implemented in the modern-
ised systems. The safety systems man-machine-
interface is still of conventional technology. The 
development of detailed safety requirements and 
procedures to ensure adequate reliability of such 
systems is still underway.
Design for reliable, stable and 
manageable operation
Government Decree 733/2008 requires that a nu-
clear power plant’s control room shall contain equip-
ment which provide information about the plant’s 
operational state and any deviations from normal 
operation as well as systems which monitor the 
state of the plant’s safety systems during operation 
and their functioning during operational transients 
and accidents. Furthermore, it requires that a nu-
clear power plant shall contain automatic systems 
that maintain the plant in a safe state during tran-
sients and accidents long enough to provide the op-
erators a sufficient time to consider and implement 
the correct actions. Special attention shall be paid 
to the avoidance, detection and repair of human er-
rors. The possibility of human errors shall be taken 
into account both in the design of the nuclear power 
plant and in the planning of its operation so that the 
plant withstands well errors and deviations from 
planned operational actions.
Plant systems reliability and human factors 
are systematically considered in the probabilistic 
safety analyses. The analyses support the efforts 
to eliminate accidents or to mitigate their con-
sequences. The probabilistic safety analyses are 
subject to the approval of STUK. Human factors in 
relation to the monitoring and control of Finnish 
nuclear power plants area described under Article 
12. Significant effort has been devoted by the regu-
lator and utilities involved in the assessment of 
modern control room concepts. Existing plants are 
moving towards so-called hybrid control rooms, 
where normal operation is based on digital controls 
and video screens, but safety backups are still im-
plemented also using traditional mosaic displays, 
analogy indicators and switches.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 




Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. the initial authorization to operate a nu-
clear installation is based upon an appro-
priate safety analysis and a commissioning 
programme demonstrating that the instal-
lation, as constructed, is consistent with 
design and safety requirements;
ii. operational limits and conditions derived 
from the safety analysis, tests and opera-
tional experience are defined and revised 
as necessary for identifying safe bounda-
ries for operation;
iii. operation, maintenance, inspection and 
testing of a nuclear installation are con-
ducted in accordance with approved pro-
cedures;
iv. procedures are established for respond-
ing to anticipated operational occurrences 
and to accidents;
v. necessary engineering and technical sup-
port in all safety-related fields is available 
throughout the lifetime of a nuclear instal-
lation;
vi. incidents significant to safety are reported 
in a timely manner by the holder of the rel-
evant licence to the regulatory body;
vii. programmes to collect and analyse op-
erating experience are established, the re-
sults obtained and the conclusions drawn 
are acted upon and that existing mecha-
nisms are used to share important experi-
ence with international bodies and with 
other operating organizations and regula-
tory bodies;
viii. the generation of radioactive waste re-
sulting from the operation of a nuclear 
installation is kept to the minimum prac-
ticable for the process concerned, both in 
activity and in volume, and any necessary 
treatment and storage of spent fuel and 
waste directly related to the operation and 
on the same site as that of the nuclear in-
stallation take into consideration condi-
tioning and disposal.
Initial authorisation
According to Government Decree 733/2008 Section 
22, in connection with the commissioning of a nu-
clear power plant, the licensee shall ensure that 
the systems, structures and components and the 
plant as a whole operate as designed. At the com-
missioning stage, the licensee shall ensure that an 
expedient organisation is in place for the future 
operation, alongside a sufficient number of quali-
fied personnel and instructions suitable for the 
purpose. 
Requirements for the commissioning programme 
are set forth in the Guide YVL 2.5. According to the 
Guide YVL 2.5, the purpose of the commissioning 
programme is to give evidence that the plant has 
been constructed and will function according to 
the design requirements. Through the programme 
possible deficiencies in design and construction can 
also be observed. The Operating Licence is needed 
before fuel loading into the reactor. Authorisation 
for fuel loading is given by STUK after its specific 
inspection where readiness of the power plant and 
operating organisation is checked. Furthermore, 
according to the Nuclear Energy Decree, the vari-
ous steps of the commissioning, i.e., criticality, low 
power operation and power ascension, are subject 
to the approval of STUK.
The commissioning programme is described in 
the Preliminary and Final Safety Analysis Reports. 
The participation of the operating staff in the com-
missioning programme is a requirement of the 
Guide YVL 1.6. The commissioning programme is 
to be submitted to STUK for approval. The detailed 
commissioning test programmes and test reports 
for systems in safety classes 1, 2 and 3 are submit-
ted separately to STUK for approval. STUK wit-
nesses commissioning tests and assesses the test 
results before giving stepwise permits to proceed in 
the commissioning.
Olkiluoto unit 3 commissioning
Preparations for commissioning of the Olkiluoto 
unit 3 are underway. Commissioning is divided 
into 5 phases, starting with component commis-
sioning. This is followed by system commissioning 
and plant level commissioning in cold and hot con-
ditions. Fuel loading requires Operating Licence 
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and STUK’s approval. First criticality and power 
test can then follow. Latest phase is demonstra-
tion run. All commissioning documentation is part 
of Commissioning Manual which includes also or-
ganisational procedures. Vendor has prepared an 
Overall Commissioning Programme as well as sys-
tem level commissioning documentation and TVO 
and STUK have already approved some of these. 
Preparations for plant level commissioning are 
still underway. STUK oversees the commissioning 
of safety classified systems and related result docu-
mentation is provided for STUK’s review.
Before TVO can start commissioning activities, 
all systems go through commissioning inspection. 
This step certifies that components and system are 
properly installed and they function as designed. 
This is also part of pressure vessel requirements. 
As part of the construction inspection programme 
inspections, STUK oversees TVO’s actions for en-
suring that the plant is commissioned appropri-
ately.
Trial tests in the Loviisa NPP for 
power uprate in the 1990’s
Fortum planned and carried out a trial test pro-
gramme after the modernisation and power uprate 
project in 1994–1997. Normal operation and in a 
limited way also transient behaviour of the plant 
were studied in the trial tests. Studies were made 
by means of the plant simulator and the results of 
transient analyses were used in the planning of the 
trial test programme. Due to the small number of 
plant modifications required for the power increase 
of the Loviisa plant, a simple trial test programme 
supported by the simulator studies was considered 
as appropriate and acceptable. According to the 
trial test programme, transient tests and extensive 
measurements concerning the state of the plant 
were carried out at various power levels. Based 
on the trial tests it was considered that the units 
operate as planned also at the increased power 
level. The increase of the power level was licensed 
in 1998.
Trial tests in the Olkiluoto NPP 
for power uprate in the 1990’s
Test operations were conducted in stages at dif-
ferent power levels under STUK’s supervision and 
within the frames permitted by STUK. Before up-
rating the reactor power to a higher power level 
STUK conducted a safety review concerning the 
test operation for the power level in question and 
asked the Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee for 
a statement concerning the review before granting 
the test operating licence.
Test operation programmes that included the 
entire plant units and were drawn up by TVO, were 
based on the original commissioning programmes 
that were run through during the start-up phase 
and that were modified taking into account the test 
requirements caused by the modernised systems. 
For the long-term test operation of the plant units 
the thermal power of reactor units were uprated 
step by step from the nominal power of 2160 MW 
to 2500 MW.
The most significant plant transient tests of the 
test operation were the load rejection test, turbine 
trip test and the by-pass test of the high-pressure 
preheaters. STUK considered it necessary to con-
tinue the test operation at the 2500 MW power lev-
el for about two months before issuing a statement 
in favour of continuing the operation of the plant 
units at the 2500 MW power level. The increase of 
the power level was licensed in 1998.
Operational Limits and Conditions
Nuclear Energy Decree requires that the applicant 
for an Operating Licence must provide STUK with 
the Operational Limits and Conditions (OLCs). 
The OLCs shall at least define limits for the proc-
ess parameters that affect the safety of the facility 
in various operating states, provide regulations on 
operating restrictions that result from component 
failures, and set forth requirements for the test-
ing of components important to safety. Technical 
and administrative requirements and restrictions 
for ensuring the safe operation of a nuclear power 
plant shall be set forth in the plant’s OLCs. Guide 
YVL 1.1 requires that the minimum staff availabil-
ity in all operational states and the limits for the 
releases of radioactive substances are also defined 
in the document.
The OLCs have been established for each nu-
clear power plant unit and are updated based 
on operational experiences, tests, analyses and 
plant modifications. The OLCs are subject to the 
approval of STUK prior to the commissioning of 
a facility. Strict observance of the OLCs is veri-
fied by STUK’s continuous oversight, reporting 
requirements and through a periodic inspection 
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programme. The OLCs, operating procedures and 
other plant documentation need to be updated as 
part of plant modification process.
Fortum has established the OLCs for the Loviisa 
units 1 and 2, and STUK has reviewed and ac-
cepted them. The OLCs are continuously updated, 
and all the changes need to be approved by STUK. 
The limitations and conditions of the reactor and 
plant operation, the requirements for periodic tests 
and the essential administrative instructions are 
presented in the OLCs.
The OLCs for Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 deter-
mine the limits of process parameters that affect 
the plant safety, for different operating modes, 
set the provisions for operating limits caused by 
component inoperability and set forth the require-
ments for the tests that are conducted regularly for 
components important to safety. Furthermore, the 
OLCs include the bases for the set provisions.
Figure 18 presents the number of exemptions 
and deviations from the Operational Limits and 
Conditions. The main reason for the large number 
of exemptions at the Loviisa NPP in years 2002–
2003 was the project to renew the radiation moni-
tors that required exemptions in all operational 
states. During the period 2007–2009, most of ex-
emption applications concerned I&C renewal or 
overdue repairs of component failures.
In the case of the Olkiluoto NPP, the main 
reason for the exemptions has been the conduct 
of maintenance and repair works. Deviation from 
the OLCs has to be analysed and reported by the 
licensee (causes, safety assessment and correc-
tive actions). Olkiluoto NPP deviations reported 
in 2007–2009 concerned mainly the delays in the 
periodic tests.
Procedures for operation, maintenance, 
inspection and testing
Government Decree 733/2008 Section 23 requires 
that the control and supervision of a nuclear power 
plant shall utilise written instructions that cor-
respond to the current structure and state of the 
plant. Written orders and related instructions 
shall be provided for the maintenance and repair 
of components. Section 26 requires that the plant 
shall have a condition monitoring and mainte-
nance programme for ensuring the integrity and 
reliable operation of systems, structures and com-
ponents. More detailed requirements are presented 
in the Guides YVL 1.1, YVL 1.8 and YVL 1.9. The 
procedures for operation, maintenance, inspection 
and testing have been established at both Finnish 
nuclear power plants. The procedures shall be ap-
proved by the licensee itself, and most of them are 
required to be submitted to STUK for information. 
STUK verifies by means of inspections and con-
tinuous oversight performed by resident inspec-
tors that approved procedures are followed in the 
operation of the facility.
Loviisa NPP
A structured system of procedures exists at the 
Loviisa plant. The procedures cover work processes 
and functions important to safety and availability. 
The system of procedures is a part of the quality 
system of the plant. Strict requirements have been 
set in the Quality Assurance Manual for the cover-
age, responsibilities, updating and observance of 
the procedures. According to the Manual the evalu-
ation of the system of procedures is included in the 
annual review of the coverage and effectiveness of 
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plant procedures is acceptable at the Loviisa plant. 
Procedures are maintained, evaluated and devel-
oped systematically and in a controlled way. The 
most important procedure types are:
•	 Administrative procedures including Organisa-
tional Manual and Administrative Rules,
•	 Operating procedures and testing procedures,
•	 Procedures for emergency and transient situa-
tions,
•	 Fuel handling procedures,
•	 Radiation protection procedures, and
•	 Maintenance procedures.
Loviisa plant has upgraded computer systems used 
in managing documentation and permit-to-work 
system. By means of a work order system it is 
ensured that the plant operators are aware of the 
state and configuration of the unit. Fortum has 
developed, and develops further, its work order sys-
tem based on accumulated operating experiences. 
In addition to the work order system the operators 
in the main control room of the units follow fail-
ures, repairs and preventive maintenance of the 
components referred to in the Operating Limits 
and Conditions. A shift supervisor gives a permit 
to start a specific work when he has evaluated the 
work plans specified in the work order system, tak-
ing into account the operability requirements of 
the systems and components set in the Operational 
Limits and Conditions.
The maintenance activities of the Loviisa units 
1 and 2 cover preventive, predictive and repairing 
maintenance as well as implementation of modifi-
cation works, spare part maintenance and activities 
during outages. The scheduling of the modification 
planning for the next maintenance outage is fixed 
in order to get enough time for preparations. Minor 
modifications are concentrated to every second 
annual maintenance outage and major works are 
carried out every fourth year. This is accomplished 
by starting from a long term investment planning 
which converts into a long term modification plan.
The functioning of the systems and components 
is ensured with regular tests. The systems and 
components to be tested and the time periods of the 
tests are presented in the Operational Limits and 
Conditions. At least the respective periodic tests 
are required after the modification and repair-
ing works and maintenance activities requiring 
dismounting. The performance test programme to 
be carried out after an essential modification is 
required to be approved by STUK in advance. In 
addition, inspections regarding to the functioning 
and condition of components are carried out when 
necessary based on operating experiences from 
other plants and on the advancement of techni-
cal knowledge. Other operating organisations of 
VVER-type reactors have been essential sources of 
operating experiences in this respect.
STUK oversees monitoring and maintenance 
activities as well as repair and modification works 
with regular inspections and continuous oversight 
performed by resident inspectors. During inspec-
tions it is aimed to make sure that the utility has 
adequate resources, such as a competent staff, 
instructions, a spare part and material storage 
as well as tools for the sufficiently effective im-
plementation of the monitoring and maintenance 
activities. Special subjects are the condition moni-
toring programmes for the carbon steel piping and 
their results. Special attention has also been paid 
to the reliable activities of subcontractors as well 
as to the technical competence of external human 
resources. Both the utility and STUK oversee com-
panies that perform inspection activities and the 
technical competence of organisations that carry 
out various duties.
Olkiluoto NPP
The measures that are followed in the operation 
and maintenance of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 are 
based on written procedures. The administrative 
and technical procedures needed in the operation 
of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 have been gathered 
into the Operating Manual. The Operating Manual 
contains also necessary transient and emergency 
procedures for unusual conditions. The most im-
portant procedures have been reviewed by STUK. 
Updating and comprehensiveness of the proce-
dures are among the inspection issues included in 
the STUK’s periodical inspection programme. TVO 
updates the procedures when necessary and checks 
systematically that the procedures are up-to-date 
in four-year-intervals.
The administrative and technical procedures 
needed in the operation of the Olkiluoto units 
1 and 2 have been gathered into the Operating 
Manual. The Operating Manual contains also nec-
essary transient and emergency procedures for un-
usual conditions. The most important procedures 
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have been reviewed by STUK. Updating and com-
prehensiveness of the procedures are among the 
inspection issues included in the STUK’s periodical 
inspection programme. TVO checks the procedures 
periodically, approximately in four-year-intervals.
The Work Request System ensures that the 
operators of the plant are aware of the plant state. 
TVO has developed its Work Request System and 
will continue to do so, on the basis of operational 
experience. In the main control room of the plant 
units, the operators follow, in addition to the Work 
Request System, the failures, repairs and pre-
ventive maintenance of the components specified 
in the Operational Limits and Conditions. The 
Shift Supervisor grants the permission to begin a 
single work after inspecting the work plans and 
taking into account the operability requirements 
for the systems and components set forth in the 
Operational Limits and Conditions.
The maintenance activities of the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 covers preventive and corrective 
maintenance as well as the design and execution 
of modifications, spare part service, outage actions 
and the related quality control. The Maintenance 
Department plans and implements the annual 
maintenance outages together with the Operation 
Department and Technical Support Department. 
Special attention has been paid to the reliable 
work of the subcontractors and to the technical 
competence of the external work force. The techni-
cal expertise of testing laboratories and contrac-
tors is controlled both by the power company and 
STUK.
The systems and the components that will be 
tested as well as the test dates are presented in 
the Operational Limits and Conditions. Periodical 
testing that correspond at least to the aforemen-
tioned, are required after maintenance measures 
that require modifications, repairing or disassem-
bling. STUK’s approval is required in advance for a 
functional test programme that is conducted after 
a significant modification. Inspections that concern 
the operability and condition of components are 
also conducted, if necessary, on the basis operation-
al experience received from elsewhere and develop-
ment of technical knowledge. The most significant 
sources of experience, in this sense, have been the 
Swedish BWR plants and international communi-
cation organs.
STUK oversees the condition monitoring and 
maintenance as well as the modification and repair 
work by regularly repeated inspections. The inspec-
tions aim to ensure that the power company has 
adequate resources such as a competent personnel, 
instructions, a spare part and material storage as 
well as the tools for adequately efficient implemen-
tation of condition monitoring and maintenance 
actions. Special items are the condition monitoring 
programmes of the carbon steel pipelines and their 
results.
Procedures for responding to operational 
occurrences and accidents
Government Decree 733/2008 Section 23 gives ba-
sic requirements for operating and emergency pro-
cedures.
At both Finnish nuclear power plants, proce-
dures for anticipated operational occurrences and 
accidents are in use. To the extent found necessary, 
the procedures have been verified during operator 
training at the plant simulators. At both nuclear 
power plants there are also advanced safety panels 
for monitoring critical safety functions. STUK has 
independently evaluated the appropriateness and 
comprehensiveness of the procedures for antici-
pated operational occurrences and accidents.
Plant specific symptom based EOPs (Emergency 
Operating Procedures) have been available at the 
Olkiluoto units since late 1980’s. TVO has an action 
plan for developing isolation procedures. STUK re-
quired in decision made in the last periodic safety 
review (PSR) that after this development work, 
TVO shall assess the need to develop other EOPs 
end submit a plan to STUK by the end of 2011.
The Loviisa specific EOP project was launched 
by Fortum in summer 2000. Before the project, an 
extensive feasibility study of different approaches 
was carried out. Most of the accident procedures 
are now in the new format, however, some sce-
narios are still controlled by the existing proce-
dures. The project was finalised in early 2006. Next 
development of EOPs was started in 2007 to cover 
also the shutdown states during outages. The EOP 
development continues now as normal routine at 
the Loviisa plant. Fortum Technical Support is 
responsible for the strategies and the Loviisa plant 
for the validation, training and procedure layout.
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Engineering and technical support
Government Decree 733/2008 Section 30 requires 
that the organisation shall have access to profes-
sional expertise and technical knowledge required 
for the safe operation of the plant, the maintenance 
of equipment important to safety, and the manage-
ment of accidents. The requirements in the Guide 
YVL 1.7 also cover technical support. Competence 
of the engineering and technical support is super-
vised by the licensee. In addition, STUK carries out 
inspections and audits by which also the compe-
tence of the support staff is evaluated.
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj is an independent or-
ganisation and it has longstanding expertise in 
nuclear operations. TVO uses external expertise 
regularly in various design and modification activi-
ties when needed.
Fortum has under corporate structure own unit 
for technical support that provide support to the 
Loviisa NPP among other projects. There are also on-
site experts at the Loviisa NPP for various engineer-
ing and technical support functions. In 2009, there 
were remarkable organisational changes in Fortum 
but these changes strengthened the role of the 
Technical Support from Loviisa NPP’s point of view.
Reporting of incidents significant to safety
Guide YVL 1.5 provides in detail the reporting 
requirements on incidents. The Guide provides a 
number of examples of operational disturbances 
and events, which have to be reported to STUK. 
It also defines requirements for the contents of 
the reports and the administrative procedures for 
reporting, including time limits for submitting of 
various reports. STUK publishes information con-
cerning significant events (INES ≥ 1) as press re-
leases. Information from other events is published 
on STUK´s website. STUK describes the events 
also in its quarterly and yearly reports on nuclear 
safety that are also available to the general pub-
lic through internet or paper reports in Finnish. 
STUK’s Annual Report on nuclear safety (see 
Reference 1) summarises events from the whole 
year and is available to the general public through 
internet or paper reports both in Finnish and in 
English.
Figures 19 and 20 present the total number of 
reported events and INES classified (≥ 1) events at 
the Finnish nuclear power plants.










 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 11 5 3 2 6 6 2 3 3 1
 8 10 4 3 3 3 3 5 3 0    
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 1 3 3 0 3 5 3 1 3 2
 2 0 2 8 3 1 1 2 2 3
Figure 19. Annual total number of event reports (operational transient reports) submitted by Loviisa and 
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Figure 20. Annual total number of events at INES Level 1 and above at the Finnish nuclear power plants.
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INES-classified events
At the Loviisa NPP, two events in 2007, three 
events in 2008 and six events in 2009 were clas-
sified on the International Nuclear Event Scale 
(INES). Only one in 2008 was classified as INES 
1. The others were INES 0. The INES 1 event 
concerned an incorrect simulation in the reactor 
protection system. The simulation would have pre-
vented a reactor trip resulting from the stopping of 
four reactor coolant pumps. The safety significance 
of the incorrect simulation was low, but deficien-
cies in the procedure made the event significant. 
The power company prepared a root cause analysis 
on the event. New procedures have been taken 
into use after the incident. Incident is described in 
more detail in Annex 2.
At the Olkiluoto NPP, seven events in 2007, 
eight events in 2008 and five events in 2009 were 
classified on the International Event Scale (INES). 
Ten of these events were rated at level 1, others 
being of level 0:
•	 Common-cause failure in main steam line outer 
isolation valve actuator in 2009 (IRS report 
8029)
•	 Stuck of the Olkiluoto unit 2 fuelling machine 
when removing spent fuel element from the re-
actor core, 2009
•	 Indicator light failure in the main control room 
leading to loss of one pump of shutdown cooling 
system, 2009
•	 Deficient leaktightness of piping penetrations 
in 2008 (IRS report 7997)
•	 Common-cause failure in emergency diesel 
starter motors in 2008 (IRS report 7935)
•	 Loss of safety-classified electrical equipment 
due to generator high voltage peak in 2008 (IRS 
report 7932)
•	 Control rod was driven against the administra-
tive procedure set in the Operational Limits 
and Conditions, 2008
•	 Periodic tests of the some Olkiluoto unit 1 ra-
diation monitoring instruments was not done 
within time limit given by the Operational Lim-
its and Conditions, 2008
•	 Partially failed scram at the Olkiluoto unit 2 in 
2007 (IRS report 7920)
•	 Qualification of some fuses was not done prop-
erly, 2007
Some of these incidents are described in more de-
tail in Annex 2.
Operational experience feedback
According to the Section 24 of the Government 
Decree 733/2008, nuclear power plant operational 
experience feedback shall be collected and safety 
research results monitored, and both assessed for 
the purpose of enhancing safety. Safety-significant 
operational events shall be investigated for the 
purpose of identifying the root causes as well as de-
fining and implementing the corrective measures. 
Improvements in technical safety, resulting from 
safety research, shall be taken into account to the 
extent justified on the basis of the principles laid 
down in Section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act.
Guide YVL 1.11 provides detailed requirements 
and administrative procedures for the systematic 
evaluation of operating experiences, and for the 
planning and implementation of corrective actions. 
Foreign operational occurrences have to be as-
sessed as well, from the point of view of their safety 
significance. The licensees have developed the re-
quired procedures for analysing operating experi-
ences. The procedures for root cause analyses are 
in use. Further attention is, however, still needed 
to avoid recurrence of incidents.
STUK verifies by means of inspections and by 
reviewing licensee’s event reports that the activi-
ties of the licensees as regards incident evaluation 
are effective. When necessary, a special investiga-
tion team is appointed by STUK to evaluate a cer-
tain incident. The evaluation of foreign operational 
occurrences and incidents is based on the reports of 
the IRS Reporting System (IAEA/NEA) and on the 
reports of other national regulatory bodies. IRS re-
ports are also evaluated by the licensees. Reports for 
the IRS System on safety-significant occurrences at 
Finnish nuclear power plants are written by STUK.
STUK has also participated in co-operation be-
tween international organisations such as the IAEA, 
the OECD/NEA and the EU, which exchange infor-
mation on safety issues and operating events. Other 
forums that STUK uses to obtain information are 
WENRA, the VVER Forum and the NERS Forum 
as well as some bilateral agreements. A special ex-
change of information between Rostechnadzor and 
STUK on the operation of the Kola and Leningrad 
STUK-B 120
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nuclear power plants and of Finnish nuclear power 
plants is also ongoing activity.
At the Loviisa NPP, VVER reactor operating 
experience is collected, screened and evaluated by 
a dedicated operating experience feedback group 
composed of engineers from the plant operation or-
ganisation and from Technical Support. The main 
information to be handled comes from WANO 
(World Association of Nuclear Operators) Moscow 
Centre which links all the VVER reactor operators. 
Additional reports are received from the IAEA, 
OECD/NEA and NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission). The activities of the operation ex-
perience feedback group are not limited only to 
VVER reactors. The plant managers of VVER-440 
reactors run a so-called VVER Club with periodic 
meetings. The plant operation problems, moderni-
sation, back-fitting, plant life management and 
safety questions are handled and experiences are 
exchanged in these meetings and in further indi-
vidual contacts.
TVO has also an operating experience feedback 
group. This onsite group gives recommendations 
to the line organisation that makes decisions on 
eventual corrective actions. The industry operating 
experience from similar reactor types is followed 
by several means. The main sources of informa-
tion are ERFATOM (the owners group for Nordic 
BWR operators), KSU (Swedish nuclear training 
centre), WANO and the Swedish Forsmark NPP. 
Information is also coming directly from sever-
al sources (IAEA and OECD/NEA, IRS), Loviisa 
power plant (e.g. operating experience meetings 
and reports), vendors (Westinghouse Atom, Alstom 
Power Sweden AB), component manufacturers, the 
WANO Network, BWROG (BWR Owners Group) 
and BWR Forum (FANP).
Management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste on the site
Management of low and intermediate level waste 
from the production to the final disposal takes 
place at the NPP sites. Final disposal facilities for 
low and intermediate level waste are in operation 
at Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites. Since the disposal 
facilities are operated by the nuclear power plant 
operators, the technical feasibility and economic 
motivation to minimise the generation of radioac-
tive waste are evident.
The detailed requirement for radioactive waste 
minimisation is included in the Guide YVL 8.3. It 
calls for a limitation of waste volumes in particular 
from repair and maintenance works, and segrega-
tion of wastes on the basis of activity. Clearance of 
wastes from regulatory control, prescribed in the 
Nuclear Energy Decree and in the Guide YVL 8.2, 
aims at limiting the volumes of waste to be stored 
and disposed of. The Guide YVL 6.2 provides for 
prevention of fuel failures, which also contributes 
to the limitation of activity accumulation in waste 
from reactor water cleanup systems.
The Guide YVL 8.3 also requires that besides 
the short-term radiation protection objectives, also 
the long-term properties of waste packages with 
respect to final disposal shall be taken into account 
in the conditioning and storage of waste. The Guide 
includes also more specific requirements for the 
conditioning and interim storage of wastes. The 
Guide YVL 8.1 calls for a waste type description, to 
be approved by STUK, for each category of reactor 
waste to be disposed of. In the description of waste 
type, the most important characteristics of waste 
with respect to the safety of disposal are defined.
Low and intermediate level waste
In 2007–2009 the policy to minimise the waste pro-
duction at the Olkiluoto NPP has included the high 
quality requirements for the fuel, careful planning 
of the maintenance work and decontamination. 
The segregation and monitoring of the operation-
al wastes have been effective, enabling the clear-
ance from the regulatory control of waste below the 
clearance limits. In 2010, TVO transported mois-
ture separator reheaters removed from Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 during refurbishment in 2005 and 
2006 to Studsvik Nuclear AB for treatment.
At the Loviisa NPP, conditioning and disposal of 
liquid low and intermediate level waste will start 
after commissioning of the cementation plant. The 
target date for the start of operation is in spring 
2011. The management of solid low and intermedi-
ate level waste has been developed by building new 
facilities for the treatment, activity monitoring 
and interim storage of waste. New facilities will be 
commissioned in 2010.
At the Loviisa NPP site, the repository for the 
low and intermediate level waste is located at the 
depth of 110 meters in granite bedrock. It consists 
of two tunnels for solid low level waste and a cav-
ern for immobilised intermediate level waste.
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The repository for the low and intermediate 
level waste at the Olkiluoto NPP site consists of 
two silos at the depth of 60 to 95 meters in tonalite 
bedrock, one for solid low level waste and the other 
for bituminised intermediate level waste.
The original plan presented in the construc-
tion licence application for unit Olkiluoto 3 was to 
dispose all the low and intermediate level waste in 
the existing repository in Olkiluoto. However, the 
waste packages of the conditioned intermediate 
level waste have different dimensions compared 
to the waste packages from operating units in 
Olkiluoto. Therefore TVO will in the operating 
licence application propose that the conditioned in-
termediate level waste is first stored on-site in the 
existing waste storage facility, and later disposed 
of in the extension of the repository. The solid low 
level waste from Olkiluoto unit 3 can be disposed of 
in the existing repository.
At the end of 2009, 6410 cubic meters of low and 
intermediate level operating waste has accumulated 
at the Olkiluoto NPP and 3180 cubic meters at the 
Loviisa NPP. About 80% of Olkiluoto waste and 62 
% of Loviisa waste has been disposed of in the on-
site repositories. Low and intermediate level waste 
not yet disposed of is stored inside the plants.
Decommissioning
The Guide YVL 1.0 requires that provision for a 
nuclear power plant’s decommissioning shall be 
made already during the plant’s design phase. One 
criterion when deciding the plant’s materials and 
structural solutions shall be that volumes of de-
commissioned waste are to be limited. The Guide 
YVL 7.18 calls for selection of such construction 
materials that limit the degree of activation and 
spread of contamination and makes decontamina-
tion of surfaces feasible.
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree the 
licence applications must include the plans for 
decommissioning. The utilities are obliged to keep 
the decommissioning plans up-to-date and submit 
them to the Ministry every six years, last in 2008. 
STUK reviewed the plans and submitted its opin-
ion to the Ministry in 2009.
The assumption in the decommissioning plan 
of the Loviisa NPP is that both units will be shut 
down after 50 years operation in 2027 and 2030. 
The dismantling starts immediately and lasts un-
til 2035. Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 are planned to be 
shut down after 60 years operation in 2038 and 
2040. The dismantling starts after 30 years delay. 
The final planning and building of disposal facili-
ties will start already during the safe storage pe-
riod and all together the decommissioning project 
will last about 15 years. The reason for delayed 
dismantling is the radiation protection of the per-
sonnel. Olkiluoto unit 3 is planned to shut down 
after 60 years operation in 2070’s. The dismantling 
will start after the dismantling of the older units 
has been completed.
According to STUK’s opinion to the Ministry, 
the decommissioning plans at this phase of the 
NPP operation are reasonably comprehensive and 
detailed. The decommissioning can be done as 
planned, and the plans are sufficient to be used in 
the cost estimations.
Spent fuel
Spent fuel from the Loviisa NPP was transport-
ed back to Russia until 1996. Amendment of the 
Nuclear Energy Act issued in 1994 requires that 
spent fuel generated in Finland has to be treat-
ed, stored and disposed of in Finland. Accordingly, 
spent fuel shipments to Russia were terminated, 
and the necessary extension of the wet type spent 
fuel storage facility was commissioned in 2001. The 
installation of the dense racks into the storage fa-
cility started in 2007 and continues until 2018. The 
capacity of the storage facility will be adequate for 
the total amount of the spent fuel 1100 tU allowed 
in the operating licence issued in 2007.
At Olkiluoto NPP the wet type spent fuel stor-
age facility was commissioned in 1987. The current 
capacity about 1200 tU is adequate until 2014. TVO 
has started the construction works for enlarging 
the Olkiluoto interim storage in summer 2010. The 
extension includes construction of three new pools 
and it will be done according the updated safety 
requirements (Government decision 733/2008). 
Extension has been included in Olkiluoto NPP 
units 1 and 2 operating licence and has been han-
dled as plant modification. STUK reviewed TVO's 
application and gave approval for construction 
during first half of the 2010. Extension has been 
planned to be ready in the end of 2013.
At the end of 2009, the spent fuel accumula-
tion at the Olkiluoto NPP was about 1277 tons of 
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The power companies Fortum and TVO es-
tablished in 1995 the joint company Posiva to 
take care of spent fuel final disposal. Research, 
development and planning work for spent fuel 
disposal is in progress and the disposal facility 
is envisaged to be operational in about 2020. The 
Decision-in-Principle on the spent fuel disposal 
facility was made by the Government in 2000 and 
ratified by the Parliament in 2001. It covers the 
final disposal of the spent fuel from the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 and Loviisa units 1 and 2. A sepa-
rate Decision-in-Principle for the disposal of the 
spent fuel from the Olkiluoto unit 3 was made in 
2002. The facility will be constructed in the vicini-
ty of Olkiluoto NPP site. To confirm the suitability 
of the site, construction of the underground rock 
characterisation facility ONKALO was started 
in 2004. The excavation of ONKALO will be com-
pleted by the end of 2011.
In 2008 and 2009, Posiva submitted to the 
Government the applications for Decisions-in-
Principle to expand the disposal facility for the 
planned NPP units Olkiluoto 4 and Loviisa 3. 
Government made a positive decision on 6 May 
2010 regarding spent fuel from Olkiluoto 4 unit. 
Subsequently Parliament ratified the decision on 
1 July 2010.
Safety regulation for spent fuel disposal is in-
cluded in the Government Decree on the safety of 
disposal of nuclear waste 736/2008 and STUK’s 
Guides YVL 8.4 and YVL 8.5.
A detailed description of spent fuel and radio-
active waste management and related regulation 
is included in the Finnish National Report on the 
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and Radioactive 
Waste Management (STUK-B 96, October 2008).
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 19.
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ANNEX 1 List of main regulations
Legislation (as of 28th April 2010)
1. Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), revised in 2008
2. Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988), revised in 
2008
3. Act on Third Party Liability (484/1972)
4. Decree on Third Party Liability (486/1972)
5. Radiation Act (592/1991)
6. Radiation Decree (1512/1991)
7. Government Decree on the Safety of Nuclear 
Power Plants (733/2008)
8. Government Decree on the Security in the Use 
of Nuclear Energy (734/2008)
9. Government Decree on Emergency Response 
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(735/2008)
10. Government Decree on the Safety of Disposal of 
Nuclear Waste (736/2008)
11. Act on the Finnish Centre for Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety (1069/1983)
12. Decree on the Finnish Centre for Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety (618/1997)




Guide YVL 1.0 Safety criteria for design of nuclear 
power plants, 12.1.1996
Guide YVL 1.1 Regulatory control of safety at nu-
clear facilities, 10.2.2006
Guide YVL 1.2 Documents pertaining to safety con-
trol of nuclear facilities, 11.9.1995
Guide YVL 1.3 Mechanical components and struc-
tures of nuclear facilities. Approval of testing and 
inspection organizations, 17.3.2003
Guide YVL 1.4 Management systems for nuclear 
facilities, 9.1.2008
Guide YVL 1.5 Reporting nuclear facility opera-
tion to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, 
8.9.2003
Guide YVL 1.6 Nuclear power plant operator com-
petence, 5.10.2006
Guide YVL 1.7 Functions important to nuclear 
power plant safety, and training and qualification 
of personnel, 28.12.1992
Guide YVL 1.8 Repairs, modifications and preven-
tive maintenance at nuclear facilities, 2.10.1986
Guide YVL 1.9 Quality assurance during operation 
of nuclear power plants, 13.11.1991
Guide YVL 1.10 Requirements for siting a nuclear 
power plant, 11.7.2000
Guide YVL 1.11 Nuclear power plant operating 
experience feedback, 22.12.1994
Guide YVL 1.12 INES classification of events at 
nuclear facilities, 16.1.2002
Guide YVL 1.13 Nuclear power plant outages, 
9.1.1995
Guide YVL 1.14 Mechanical equipment and struc-
tures of nuclear facilities. Control of manufactur-
ing, 4.10.1999
Guide YVL 1.15 Mechanical components and struc-
tures in nuclear installations. Construction inspec-
tion, 28.4.2008




ANNEX 1 list of mAin regulAtions
Systems
Guide YVL 2.0 Systems design for nuclear power 
plants, 1.7.2002
Guide YVL 2.1 Nuclear power plant systems, struc-
tures and components and their safety classifica-
tion, 26.6.2000
Guide YVL 2.2 Transient and accident analyses for 
justification of technical solutions at nuclear power 
plants, 26.8.2003
Guide YVL 2.4 Primary and secondary circuit pres-
sure control at a nuclear power plant, 24.3.2006
Guide YVL 2.5 The commissioning of a nuclear 
power plant, 29.9.2003
Guide YVL 2.6 Seismic events and nuclear power 
plants, 19.12.2001
Guide YVL 2.7 Ensuring a nuclear power plant’s 
safety functions in provision for failures, 20.5.1996
Guide YVL 2.8 Probabilistic safety analysis in safe-
ty management of nuclear power plants, 28.5.2003
Pressure equipment
Guide YVL 3.0 Pressure equipment of nuclear fa-
cilities, 9.4.2002
Guide YVL 3.1 Nuclear facility pressure vessels, 
1.7.2005
Guide YVL 3.3 Nuclear facility piping, 26.6.2006
Guide YVL 3.4 Approval of the manufacturer of 
nuclear pressure equipment, 14.1.2004
Guide YVL 3.5 Ensuring the firmness of pressure 
vessels of a NPP, 5.4.2002
Guide YVL 3.7 Pressure equipment of nuclear fa-
cilities. Commissioning inspection, 26.9.2008
Guide YVL 3.8 Nuclear power plant pressure equip-
ment. In-service inspection with non-destructive 
testing methods, 22.9.2003
Guide YVL 3.9 Nuclear power plant pressure 
equipment. Construction and welding filler materi-
als, 5.11.2004
Buildings and structures
Guide YVL 4.1 Concrete structures for nuclear fa-
cilities, 22.5.1992
Guide YVL 4.2 Steel structures for nuclear facili-
ties, 19.12.2001
Guide YVL 4.3 Fire protection at nuclear facilities, 
1.11.1999
Other structures and components
Guide YVL 5.1 Nuclear power plant diesel genera-
tors and their auxiliary systems, 23.1.1997
Guide YVL 5.2 Electrical power systems and com-
ponents at nuclear facilities, 24.6.2004
Guide YVL 5.3 Nuclear facility valve units, 
28.4.2008
Guide YVL 5.5 Instrumentation systems and com-
ponents at nuclear facilities, 13.9.2002
Guide YVL 5.6 Air-conditioning and ventilation 
systems and components of nuclear facilities, 
25.11.2004
Guide YVL 5.7 Nuclear facility pump units, 
28.4.2008
Guide YVL 5.8 Hoisting and transfer functions at 
nuclear facilities, 26.9.2008
Nuclear materials
Guide YVL 5.1 Nuclear power plant diesel genera-
tors and their auxiliary systems, 23.1.1997
Guide YVL 5.2 Electrical power systems and com-
ponents at nuclear facilities, 24.6.2004
Guide YVL 5.3 Nuclear facility valve units, 
28.4.2008
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Guide YVL 5.5 Instrumentation systems and com-
ponents at nuclear facilities, 13.9.2002
Guide YVL 5.6 Air-conditioning and ventilation 
systems and components of nuclear facilities, 
25.11.2004
Guide YVL 5.7 Nuclear facility pump units, 
28.4.2008
Guide YVL 5.8 Hoisting and transfer functions at 
nuclear facilities, 26.9.2008
Radiation protection
Guide YVL 7.1 Limitation of public exposure in 
the environment of and limitation of radioactive 
releases from a nuclear power plant, 22.3.2006
Guide YVL 7.2 Assessment of radiation doses to 
the population in the environment of a nuclear 
power plant, 23.1.1997
Guide YVL 7.3 Calculation of the dispersion of 
radioactive releases from a nuclear power plant, 
23.1.1997
Guide YVL 7.4 Nuclear power plant emergency 
preparedness, 9.1.2002
Guide YVL 7.5 Meteorological measurements of a 
nuclear power plant, 28.5.2003
Guide YVL 7.6 Monitoring of discharges of radi-
oactive substances from a nuclear power plant, 
22.3.2006
Guide YVL 7.7 Radiation monitoring in the envi-
ronment of a nuclear power plant, 22.3.2006
Guide YVL 7.8 Environmental radiation safety re-
ports of a nuclear power plant, 22.3.2006
Guide YVL 7.9 Radiation protection of workers at 
nuclear facilities, 21.1.2002
Guide YVL 7.10 Monitoring of occupational expo-
sure at nuclear facilities, 29.1.2002
Guide YVL 7.11 Radiation monitoring systems and 
equipment of a nuclear power plant, 13.7.2004
Guide YVL 7.18 Radiation safety aspects in the 
design of a nuclear power plant, 26.9.2003
Radioactive waste management
Guide YVL 8.1 Disposal of low and intermediate 
level waste from the operation of nuclear power 
plants, 10.9.2003
Guide YVL 8.2 Clearance of nuclear waste and de-
commissioned nuclear facilities, 18.2.2008
Guide YVL 8.3 Treatment and storage of low and 
intermediate level waste at a nuclear power plant, 
29.6.2005
Guide YVL 8.4 Long-term safety of disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel, 23.5.2001
Guide YVL 8.5 Operational safety of a disposal fa-
cility for spent nuclear fuel, 23.12.2002.
The guides are available online at www.edilex.fi/
stuklex/en/ (not all published in English).
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Loviisa NPP
The Loviisa plant comprises of two VVER units 
that are operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy 
(Fortum). The plant units were connected to the 
electrical grid in February 8, 1977 (Loviisa 1) and 
November 4, 1980 (Loviisa 2). The nominal ther-
mal power of both of the Loviisa units is 1500 
MW (109% as compared to the original 1375 MW). 
The increase of the power level was licensed in 
1998. The Operating Licences of the units are valid 
until the end of 2027 (unit 1) and 2030 (unit 2). 
According to the conditions of the licences, two 
periodic safety reviews are required to be carried 
out by the licensee (by the end of the year 2015 and 
2023).
Most significant plant modifications at the 
Loviisa NPP during the plant lifetime
Several plant changes have been carried out dur-
ing Loviisa NPP plant lifetime. The most important 
projects since the plant commissioning have been 
modifications made for protection against fires, 
modifications based on the development of the PRA 
models, severe accident mitigation programme, re-
actor uprating, and contruction of training simula-
tor, interim storage for spent fuel and repository 
for reactor operational waste.
In some of the earliest modifications in 1982, 
a hydrogen removal system was installed in the 
containment building in order to eliminate the risk 
of explosion during an accident when hydrogen is 
released from the core. The system consisted of 60 
glow plugs that can ignite a controlled hydrogen 
burn.
In 1993, strainer area in the floor sumps of the 
emergency cooling system and the containment 
spray system was significantly enlarged by new de-
sign, and the sump systems were improved so as to 
provide more reliable pumping of the water accu-
mulated in the two sumps during a loss of coolant 
accident (when the emergency make-up water tank 
is empty) back into the reactor and to the spray 
nozzles. The sumps were equipped with several 
hundreds of strainer units, a nitrogen flush system 
to blow any insulation debris off the strainers, and 
control instrumentation. The amount of debris the 
strainer system can cope with increased ten-fold.
In connection with the PRISE project in 1994–
1995 (protection from primary to secondary leaks), 
the plant protection system was modified to pro-
vide automatic isolation of the damaged steam 
generator at high water level (the steam and feed 
water lines are closed), and to stop the respective 
reactor coolant pump. The aim was to protect the 
steam line from water hammer. Also new measur-
ing equipment, based on the detection of nitro-
gen-16 isotope, was installed in the steam lines in 
order to ensure the detection of any leaks from the 
primary circuit.
Protection against fires at the Loviisa NPP
The possibility of fires and nuclear accident risks 
caused by them were not adequately taken into ac-
count initially in the functional design and the lay-
out design of the Loviisa plant. Therefore, fire com-
partments were not implemented so that the plant 
safety functions could be maintained during all fire 
situations considered possible. For this reason the 
significance of an active fire fighting (fire alarm 
and extinguishing systems as well as operative fire 
fighting) is important along with structural fire 
protection arrangements.
Fire safety has been improved with several 
measures at the Loviisa plant after its commis-
sioning. These measures have been implemented 
in various fields of fire protection. As a result, the 
plant safety against the effects of fires has been es-
sentially improved.
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For a provision against oil fires in the turbine 
hall several measures have been taken. Fire insu-
lators of the load-bearing steel structures of the 
turbine building have been installed. The turbine 
hall has been equipped with an automatic sprin-
kler system and the significant parts of the tur-
bines have been protected. Later on, the fire wall of 
the turbine hall has been built up to protect com-
ponents important to reactor decay heat removal. 
Furthermore, the additional emergency feedwater 
system has been built for the case that all feedwa-
ter and emergency feedwater systems would be 
lost in a turbine hall fire. At the Loviisa NPP the 
decay heat removal systems are in the turbine hall. 
That´s why a separate building for additional de-
cay heat removal system outside turbine hall was 
built in 2005. The new system is needed for cooling 
the plant to cold shutdown, if normal systems are 
not operable.
The main transformers have been protected 
with a sprinkler system which essentially reduces 
the risk that a fire would spread into the surround-
ing buildings, especially into the turbine hall. The 
risk to lose the AC-power (station black-out) dur-
ing transformer fires has been reduced by protect-
ing the diesel generators against fires. The 110 
kV net connection has been physically separated 
from the 400 kV connection so that the loss of both 
connections as a result of a transformer fire is 
improbable. Several improvements against fires 
have been done in off-site power supply arrange-
ments and in diesel generators. The original fire 
water pumps are supplied only from the off-site 
electrical network. Therefore, an additional fire 
water pump station has been constructed at the 
plant. It has been equipped with diesel-driven fire 
water pumps and with a separate fire water tank. 
Fire water piping and fire extinguishing systems 
as well as their coverage have been improved. A 
new addressed fire alarm system was completed in 
1999 at Loviisa 1 and in 2001 at Loviisa 2. Several 
structural improvements for fire safety have been 
done, or are under design.
The level of the operative fire protection has 
been improved by establishing a plant fire fight-
ing crew which is permanent, constantly ready to 
depart and has the proper equipment. As regards 
fire protection and fire risks also plant instructions 
have been complemented.
Severe Accident Management 
implementation at Loviisa NPP
The Loviisa severe accident programme, which 
includes plant modifications and severe accident 
management procedures, was initiated in the end 
on 1980’s in order to meet the requirements of 
STUK. For Loviisa NPP, the severe accident man-
agement approach focuses on ensuring the follow-
ing top level safety functions:
•	 depressurisation of the primary circuit
•	 absence of energetic events, i.e. hydrogen burns
•	 coolability and retention of molten core in the 
reactor vessel
•	 long term containment cooling
•	 ensuring subcriticality
•	 ensuring containment isolation.
The developed severe accident management (SAM) 
strategy lead to a number of hardware changes at 
the plant as well as to new severe accident guide-
lines and procedures.
The primary system depressurisation is an 
interface action between the preventive and miti-
gation parts of SAM. If the primary feed function 
is operable, the depressurisation may prevent the 
core melt (primary system cooling by feed and 
bleed). If not, it sets in motion the mitigation ac-
tions and measures to protect the containment 
integrity and mitigate large releases. Manual de-
pressurisation capability has been designed and 
implemented through motor-operated high capac-
ity relief valves. Depressurisation capacity will 
be sufficient for bleed & feed operation with high-
pressure pumps, and for reducing the primary 
pressure before the molten corium degrades the 
reactor vessel strength. Depressurisation is to be 
initiated from indications of superheated tempera-
tures at core exit thermocouples. The depressurisa-
tion valves were installed at the same time with 
the replacement of the existing pressuriser safety 
valves in 1996.
The cornerstone of the SAM strategy for Loviisa 
is the coolability of corium inside the reactor pres-
sure vessel (RPV) through external cooling of 
the vessel. Since the RPV is not penetrated, all 
the ex-vessel phenomena such as ex-vessel steam 
explosions, direct containment heating and core-
concrete interactions can be excluded. Some of the 
design features of the Loviisa plant make it most 
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amenable for using the concept in-vessel retention 
of corium by external cooling of the RPV as the 
principle means of arresting the progress of a core 
melt accident. Such features include the low power 
density of the core, large water volumes both in the 
primary and in the secondary side, no penetrations 
in the lower head of the RPV, and ice condensers 
which ensure a passively flooded cavity in most 
severe accident scenarios. On the other hand, if 
in-vessel retention was not attempted, showing 
resistance to energetic steam generation and cool-
ability of corium in the reactor cavity could be labo-
rious for Loviisa NPP, because of the small, water 
filled cavity with small floor area and tight venting 
paths for the steam out of the cavity.
An extensive research programme regarding 
the thermal aspects was carried out by Fortum. 
The work included both experimental and analyti-
cal studies on heat transfer in a molten pool with 
volumetric heat generation and on heat transfer 
and flow behaviour at the RPV outer surface. 
Based on experiments, the in-vessel retention con-
cept for Loviisa was finalised. STUK approved the 
conceptual design in December 1995. The modifica-
tions were completed in 2002. The most laborious 
one of them was the modification of the lower neu-
tron and thermal shield such that it can be lowered 
down in case of an accident to allow free passage 
of water in contact with the RPV bottom. Also a 
strainer facility was constructed in the reactor cav-
ity in order to screen out possible impurities from 
the coolant flow and thereby prevent clogging of 
the narrow flow paths around the RPV.
Based on plant-specific features, the only real 
concern regarding potential energetic phenomena 
is due to hydrogen combustion events. The Loviisa 
NPP reactors are equipped with ice-condenser con-
tainments, which are relatively large in size (com-
parable to the volume of typical large dry contain-
ments) but have a low design pressure of 0.17 MPa. 
The ultimate failure pressure has been estimated 
to be well above 0.3 MPa. An intermediate deck 
divides the containment in the upper (UC) and 
lower compartments (LC). All the nuclear steam 
supply system components are located in the lower 
compartment and, therefore, any release of hydro-
gen will be directed into the lower compartment. 
In order to reach the upper compartment, which 
is significantly larger in volume, the hydrogen and 
steam have to pass through the ice-condensers.
In the 1990’s an extensive research programme 
was carried out at Fortum to assess the reliability 
and adequacy of the existing igniters system. The 
experiments and the related numerical calcula-
tions demonstrated that the global convective loop 
around the containment for ensuring well mixed 
conditions will be created and maintained reliably 
provided that the ice-condenser doors will stay 
open. A new hydrogen management strategy for 
Loviisa was formulated which concentrates on two 
functions: ensuring air recirculation flow paths 
to establish a well-mixed atmosphere (opening 
of ice condenser doors) and effective recombina-
tion and/or controlled ignition of hydrogen. Plant 
modifications included installation of autocatalytic 
hydrogen recombiners, modifications in the ignit-
ers system (igniters were removed from the upper 
compartment and left only in the lower compart-
ment) and a dedicated system for opening the ice-
condenser doors. The modifications were completed 
in 2003.
The studies on prevention of long term over 
pressurisation of the containment showed that the 
concept of filtered venting was not possible at the 
Loviisa NPP because the capability of the steel 
liner containment to resist subatmospheric pres-
sures is poor. An external spray system was then 
designed to remove the heat from the containment 
in a severe accident when other means of decay 
heat removal from the containment are not oper-
able. Due to the ice condenser containment, the 
time delay from the onset of the accident to the 
start of the external spray system is long (18–36 
hours). Thus the required heat removal capacity is 
also low, only 3 MW (fraction of decay power is still 
absorbed by thick concrete walls). The system is 
started manually when the containment pressure 
reaches the design pressure 1.7 bar. Autonomous 
operation of the system independently from plant 
emergency diesels is ensured with dedicated local 
diesel generators. The active parts of the system 
are independent from all other containment decay 
heat removal systems. The containment external 
spray system was implemented at the two units in 
1990 and 1991.
The SAM strategy implementation included 
also a new, dedicated, limited scope instrumenta-
tion and control system for the SAM systems, a 
dedicated AC-power system and a separate SAM 
control room which is common to both units. These 
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were implemented mainly in year 2000 for Loviisa 
unit 1 and in 2002 for Loviisa unit 2.
In addition to the hardware modifications, se-
vere accidents guidance for the operating person-
nel has been implemented. It consists of SAM pro-
cedures for the operators and of a so-called Severe 
Accident Handbook for the Technical Support 
Team. The SAM procedures are entered after a 
prolonged uncover of the reactor core indicated by 
highly superheated core exit temperatures. The 
procedures are symptom oriented and their main 
objective is the protection of containment integ-
rity through ensuring the top level severe accident 
safety functions.
Modernisation and power uprating 
of Loviisa NPP in 1994–1997
The key aspects in the project for the modernisa-
tion and power uprating of Loviisa NPPs were to 
verify the plant safety, to improve production ca-
pacity and to give a good basis for the extension of 
the plant’s lifetime to 50 years, which corresponds 
to the additional 20 years of operation applied for 
both units of the Loviisa NPP in 2006.
In the first phase, before starting the project, a 
feasibility study for uprating of the reactor ther-
mal power was carried out. The main result was 
in short that no technical or licensing issues could 
be found which would prevent the raising of the 
reactor thermal output up to 1500 MW from the 
original level of 1375 MW. The feasibility study 
gave also a good picture of the necessary plant 
modifications. It focused on the following tasks: 
the optimisation of the power level and definition 
of the new parameters of the main process, reactor 
core and fuel studies, including RPV irradiation 
embrittlement, safety analyses and licensing, the 
main components and systems, and project plan-
ning and risk assessment.
The reactor power uprating from 1375 MW to 
1500 MW was planned on the basis of optimising 
the need for major plant modifications. In the pri-
mary side and the sea water cooling system, the 
mass flow rates were not affected, but the tempera-
ture difference has been increased in proportion to 
the power upgrading. In the turbine side, the live 
steam and the feedwater flow rate were increased 
by about 10%; the live steam pressure was not 
changed.
The reactor fuel loading was considered on the 
basis of the previous limits set for the maximum 
fuel linear power and fuel burn-up. The increase in 
the reactor thermal output was carried out by op-
timising the power distribution in the core and the 
power of any single fuel bundle was not increased 
above the maximum level before power upgrading. 
In parallel with this work, more advanced options 
related to the mixing rate of the cooling water in 
the fuel subchannels and the increasing of fuel en-
richment were investigated. The dummy elements 
installed on the periphery of the core at the Loviisa 
units 1 and 2 were preserved to minimise irradia-
tion embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel.
The VVER 440 design margins in the primary 
side are rather large and the hardware modifica-
tions needed there were quite limited. Replacement 
of the pressuriser safety valves was indicated al-
ready during the feasibility study as a necessary 
measure because of the power upgrading. Most 
of the other substantial measures in the primary 
side were carried out on the basis of the continuing 
effort to maintain and raise the safety level of the 
plant, and they were not directly included in the 
power upgrading.
It was necessary to carry out more extensive 
measures in the turbine plant and to the electrical 
components. Steam turbines were modified to a 
higher steam flow rate. Because of these measures, 
also the efficiency and operation reliability has im-
proved. Certain modifications were carried out in 
the electrical generators and the main transform-
ers to ensure reliability in continuous operation 
with the upgraded power output.
The implementation of the modernisation 
project was carried out in co-operation between 
Loviisa NPP and Fortum Nuclear Services (former 
Fortum Engineering). In addition, many other or-
ganisations such as the Technical Research Centre 
of Finland (VTT) participated in the work. The last 
step in the process to uprate the reactor thermal 
power was the long-term trial run to verify the 
main process parameters as well as plant opera-
tion in both steady state and transient situations. 
The first trial run at 103% reactor power could be 
started in January 1997. Test runs continued step 
by step during the year, and the last transient test 
at final reactor power 109% was completed success-
fully in December 1997. Transient tests defined in 
the test programme were performed with a reactor 
thermal power of 105% and 109%. The test results 
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corresponded very well with all analyses and cal-
culations. All the acceptance criteria for the tests 
were fulfilled. Measures to improve the efficiency 
of the steam turbines continued in the annual 
maintenance outages until the year 2002.
STUK was closely involved at every stage of 
the project, from the early planning of the concept 
to the evaluation of the results from the test runs. 
STUK examined all the modification plans that 
might be expected to have an impact on plant 
safety. Individual permits were granted stage by 
stage, based on the successful implementation of 
previous work.
The renewal of the operating licence for the 
increased reactor power was carried out according 
to the nuclear safety legislation. First the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy (former Ministry 
of Trade and Industry) gave a permission to make 
plant modifications and test runs with upgraded 
reactor power under the existing operating licence 
and under the control of STUK. Then the assess-
ment of the environmental impact (EIA-procedure) 
of the project was carried out. STUK approved the 
Final Safety Analyses Report (FSAR), the safety-re-
lated plant modifications, and the test programmes 
and the results. Finally the Government granted 
the renewed operating licence in April 1998. The 
licence was awarded to 1500 MW nominal reactor 
thermal power until the end of the year 2007.
The revision of emergency operating 
procedures (2000–2005)
The emergency operating procedures of Loviisa 
nuclear power plant were revised in the so called 
HOKE project, launched in 2000. The project en-
compassed the drawing up of diagnosis procedures 
for tran sients and emergencies arising from prima-
ry and secondary leaks, procedures for operators 
and the safety engineer as well as action sheets for 
onsite measures.
In accordance with the new procedures, nuclear 
power plant operators follow their own separate 
procedures and initiate the necessary actions in 
their fields of responsibility in the event of an emer-
gency or a transient. The shift manager co-or dinates 
these actions and reviews the main actions and pa-
rameters using his own procedures. The safety en-
gineer in parallel with the operators inde pendently 
oversees safety functions using separate procedures 
to ensure that plant behaviour is as planned.
The revised procedures consist of guidelines 
and instructions presented as flow charts. The 
guidelines define strategy and give grounds for op-
erator actions during emergencies and transients. 
It serves as a basis for actual control room proce-
dures containing operator procedures. The guide-
lines are used for training purposes as well.
The validation and verifica tion of the proce-
dures and their background ma terial ascertains 
authenticity of the procedures i.a. by comparison 
with the plant and by simulator tests. Verification 
authenticates i.a. correlation and functioning of 
the new procedures with other plant procedures. 
The project included training given to the control 
room personnel of the Loviisa plant in the use of 
the new procedures. Due to the revision’s signifi-
cance STUK required that shift supervi sors and 
operators working in the control room have given 
shift-specific proof of workmanship prior to the in-
troduction into use of the revised procedures.
In December 2005, STUK authorised the intro-
duction into service of the revised emergency op-
erating procedures.
Latest plant modifications at the 
Loviisa NPP (2008–2010)
Replacement of high-pressure 
safety injection system pumps
Two of the four pumps in the high-pressure safety 
injection system of both plant units were replaced 
with new types. The reason for changing the pump 
type was the poor availability of spare parts and an 
im provement in the functional reliability of the sys-
tem. In 2004, STUK approved the power company’s 
conceptual plan and time schedule for replacing 
the pumps. In line with the schedule, two pumps 
were replaced during the annual maintenance out-
age of Loviisa 1 in 2008, one for both system redun-
dancies, and the respective pipeline modifications 
were also car ried out. The corresponding work was 
carried out at Loviisa 2 during the 2006 annual 
maintenance outage.
Construction and commissioning of a 
liquid waste solidification facility
A solidification facility for liquid radioactive waste 
has been constructed on the Loviisa plant site. The 
solidification facility processes the evaporation resi-
dues generated at the power plant and the radioac-
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tive ion exchange resins from the purification filters. 
The power company initiated the commissioning 
phase of the solidification facility implementation 
project during 2006 by carrying out sys tem- and 
plant-level tests using inactive substances. Plant-
level tests continued in 2008 using radioactive evap-
oration residues and in 2009 with radioactive ion 
exchange resins. There will be some plant modifica-
tions done based on the findings during the commis-
sioning phase after which the commissioning can 
be finilised and the operation may be started in the 
facility after approval of STUK.
Latest incidents at the Loviisa NPP (2008–2010)
Loviisa 2, deficiency in the 
reactor protection system
It was observed at Loviisa 2 on 12 December 2008 
that a simulation had been left in the reac tor pro-
tection system indicating that three reactor coolant 
pumps were in operation. As a result, the reactor 
protection system would not have been in formed 
if these pumps had stopped and the reactor trip 
signal, triggered if four or more reactor coolant 
pumps had stopped, would not have been activat-
ed. The condition was in non-compliance with the 
Operational Limits and Conditions. The simula-
tions were im mediately removed when the incor-
rect setup was detected. The event caused no dan-
ger to the environment or the personnel, but it 
weakened the operability of the reactor protection 
system.
The error had not been detected in connection 
with the monthly reactor protection system tests. 
No physical inspections of the couplings in the I&C 
cabinets in question are carried out during normal 
operation of the plant. The error was revealed as 
an instrumentation technician performed meas-
ures related to a different test at the cabinets 
in ques tion. Apparently, the simulations had re-
mained active after the testing completed in the 
annual maintenance outage that ended in October. 
The event indicates a significant deficiency in 
practices at the Loviisa plant: the protection sys-
tem had been made unavailable without adequate 
documentation. For this reason, simulations were 
left undetected and remained in place when the 
plant was started up. The unavailability was also 
not possible to detect in the periodic tests carried 
out monthly at the plant.
The reactor trip command would not have 
worked if the reactor coolant pumps had stopped 
due to, for example, a power failure. In such a 
case, the reactor trip would have occurred a little 
later, resulting from increased reactor pressure or 
coolant temperature. This would have led to a mo-
mentary deterioration of reactor cooling, and an in-
crease in pressure. However, based on safety analy-
ses carried out for the plant unit, there would have 
been no risk of fuel damage. The stopping of reactor 
coolant pumps with no resulting reactor trip is in-
cluded in the safety analyses that the plant unit’s 
operating licence is based on. The power company 
investigated the event and performed additional 
analyses to gain a more de tailed understanding of 
the reactor behaviour in these conditions.
On the seven-level International Nuclear Event 
Scale (INES), the event was rated at level 1.
Periodic safety reviews at the Loviisa NPP
During the years 1996–1998 the overall safety re-
view of the Loviisa plant was carried out by the 
licensee and independently by STUK in connection 
to the renewal of operating licences of nuclear pow-
er plant units. The safety documentation, includ-
ing safety assessments done by the licensee, was 
submitted to STUK at the end of 1996. In addition 
to the review of the licensing documents such as 
Final Safety Analysis Report, STUK also made an 
independent safety assessment. The statement of 
STUK was given to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy (former Ministry of Trade and 
Industry) in March 1998. As regards radiation and 
nuclear safety, the main conclusions in the state-
ment were that the conditions of the Finnish nu-
clear energy legislation are complied with.
The latest overall safety review of the Loviisa 
plant took place in 2005–2007 in connection of 
the relicensing of the operation of the plant. The 
operating licence application was addressed to the 
Government and was handled by the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. Fortum filed the 
application to the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy in November 2006. Legislative and 
regulative requirements for the application of the 
operating licence are described in the Nuclear 
Energy Decree (161/1988) Sections 33, 34, 36 and 
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The Loviisa plant was reaching its original 
design age in 2007–2010, but the technical and 
economical lifetime of the plant is estimated to be 
at least 50 years according to the current knowl-
edge of the plant ageing. Due to consistent plant 
improvements, the safety level of the plant has 
been increased as shown by the probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA).
Based on the application, STUK carried out a 
comprehensive review of the safety of the Loviisa 
plant. The review was completed in July 2007 
when STUK provided the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy with it’s statement on the safety 
of the plant. The Finnish Government granted in 
July 2007 to Fortum new licences for unit 1 until 
the end of 2027 and for unit 2 until the end of 2030. 
The length of the operating licences corresponds to 
the current goal for the plant’s lifetime, which is 
50 years. Two periodic safety reviews (by the end 
of the year 2015 and 2023) are to be carried out by 
the licensee as a licence condition.
The statement of safety included also STUK’s 
safety assessment which provided a summary of 
the reviews, inspections and continuous oversight 
carried out by STUK. Based on the assessment, 
STUK considered that the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant meets the set safety requirements for opera-
tional nuclear power plants but there are some res-
ervations related to the redundancy and separation 
of components needed for performing safety func-
tions. These reservations are originating from the 
design basis laid down during the 1970s. However, 
substantial modernisations have been carried out 
at the Loviisa NPP since its commissioning to im-
prove safety. Risk factors have been systematically 
identified and eliminated using operating experi-
ence, research and development and probabilistic 
risk analysis. Fortum has many ongoing projects 
for enhancing safety. This is in line with the prin-
ciple of continuous improvement of safety provided 
in section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act. As a sum-
mary of the review of the issues and documenta-
tion pertaining to the periodic safety review and 
the continuous oversight results, STUK noted that 
the prerequisites for safe operation of Loviisa NPP 
have been met.
Planned and ongoing activities to 
improve safety at the Loviisa NPP
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment and 
enhancement approach is presented in the nu-
clear legislation. Actions for safety enhancement 
are to be taken whenever they can be regarded 
as justified, considering operating experience, the 
results of safety research and the advancement 
of science and technology. The implementation of 
safety improvements has been a continuing proc-
ess at the Loviisa nuclear power plants since its 
commissioning and there exists no urgent need to 
upgrade the safety of this plant in the context of 
the Convention.
For continued safe operation, plant improve-
ment projects are still necessary. The largest ongo-
ing investment is the complete renewal of the plant 
I&C system, which is scheduled to be completed by 
2014.
Reactor pressure vessel relicensing
Plant lifetime management includes credible proce-
dures for following the plant ageing. The conditions 
of components which are practically impossible to 
be replaced by new ones (pressure vessel, steam 
generators, etc.) are monitored most actively.
Several modifications have been made at the 
both Loviisa plant units to reduce the risk of reac-
tor vessel brittle fracture. In 1980, 36 fuel bundles 
at the outer edge of the reactor core were replaced 
with by stainless steel elements (dummies) to re-
duce the risk of reactor vessel brittle fracture in the 
long term. The purpose was to reduce the impact of 
neutron radiation on the reactor pressure vessel 
thereby preventing premature embrittlement of 
the pressure vessel. The reactor pressure vessel of 
Loviisa unit 1 was heat treated in 1996 to restore 
quality of one of the mostly affected weldings.
Fortum stated during the last operating licence 
renewal process that the brittle fracture risk can 
be managed until the end of the 50 years plant 
lifetime. The use of the reactor pressure vessel at 
the Loviisa unit 1 is licensed until the outage 2012 
and at the Loviisa unit 2 until the outage 2010. 
The licence renewal of the reactor pressure vessels 
required Fortum to update the safety analyses. The 
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application to extend the operation of the pressure 
vessel at the Loviisa unit 2 until the end of 2030, 
i.e., to the end of the plant unit’s operating licence, 
is presently at STUK’s review.
I&C renewal project at Loviisa NPP
I&C systems of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
units are being renewed stepwise in a project that 
will continue until the year 2014. Some modifica-
tions will also be made to the functions of the plant 
systems. Furthermore, a new emergency control 
room will be provided for each unit to replace the 
emergency control panels currently located mutu-
ally in the main control rooms of the other unit. 
I&C renewal will be implemented in several project 
phases so that each phase will be adopted during 
maintenance outages.
Preliminary planning of the renewal project 
started several years ago and in the beginning of 
2005 the licensee signed the delivery contract with 
the consortium of Framatome and Siemens. New 
buildings at the plant site have been constructed 
and will accommodate the main equipment of the 
safety and operational I&C. The first phase of the 
project included e.g. the renewal of the reactor 
preventive protection I&C and was implemented 
in the outage 2008 at Loviisa unit 1 and at Loviisa 
unit 2 in the outage 2009.
Olkiluoto NPP
The Olkiluoto plant comprises of two BWR units 
that are operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj 
(TVO). The plant units were connected to the elec-
trical network in September 2, 1978 (Olkiluoto 1) 
and February 18, 1980 (Olkiluoto 2). The nominal 
thermal power of both Olkiluoto units is 2500 MW, 
which was licensed in 1998. The new power level 
is 115.7% as compared to the earlier nominal pow-
er 2160 MW licensed in 1983. The original power 
level of both units was 2000 MW. The Operating 
Licences of the units are valid until the end of 
2018. According to the conditions of the licences, 
the licensee carried out a periodic safety review 
and submitted it to the regulator in the end of 
2008.
Most significant plant modifications at the 
Olkiluoto NPP during the plant lifetime
Several plant changes have been carried out during 
Olkiluoto NPP plant lifetime. The most important 
projects since the plant commissioning have been 
two reactor upratings, severe accident mitigation 
programme, modifications based on the develoment 
of the PRA models, contruction of training simula-
tor, interim storage for spent fuel and repository 
for reactor waste, and investigation programme 
for disposal of spent fuel. The first power uprat-
ing project was carried out in 1983–1984. Thermal 
power was uprated from 2000 MW to 2160 MW 
(8%). The plant modifications included for example 
a new relief valve that was installed in the reactor 
primary system, changes in the reactor protection 
system, and increase of cooling capacity of some 
heat exchangers.
Severe Accident Management 
implementation at the Olkiluoto NPP
Several new research programmes were launched 
in the beginning of 1980’s, whose objective was both 
to clarify the character and magnitude of loads 
arising from a severe accident and to find means 
for controlling the loads on the containment. The 
main provisions for severe accident management 
were installed at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 dur-
ing the SAM project which was finished in 1989. 
The measures implemented were
•	 containment overpressure protection
•	 containment filtered venting
•	 lower drywell flooding from wetwell
•	 containment penetration shielding in lower dry-
well
•	 containment water filling from external source
•	 containment instrumentation for severe acci-
dent control
•	 Emergency Operating Procedures for severe ac-
cidents.
The means for managing severe accidents had to 
be adjusted to the existing design, and so an opti-
mal implementation of all chosen solutions was not 
possible. Subsequent development of the accident 
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management procedures and additional minor 
plant modifications at Olkiluoto plant have taken 
place during the years after that when new aspects 
on the issue have emerged.
To secure depressurisation of the reactor pri-
mary system in severe accident situations and to 
prevent a new pressurisation of the reactor, two 
valves of the relief system were modified. It is now 
possible to keep the valves open with the help of 
nitrogen supply or water supply from outside the 
containment.
One of the most significant deficiencies at the 
Olkiluoto plant containments, from the standpoint 
of controlling severe accidents, has been the small 
size of the containment, which may cause the con-
tainment to pressurise due to the hydrogen and 
steam generation during an accident,. Another de-
ficiency is the location of the reactor pressure ves-
sel inside the containment, which is such that the 
core melt erupting from the pressure vessel may 
expose the structures and penetrations that ensure 
the tightness of the containment, to pressure loads 
and thermal stresses. To eliminate these deficien-
cies, the containment was e.g. provided with a pres-
sure relief system. Gases that pressurise the con-
tainment can be removed through a filter designed 
for the purpose, if the pressure inside the contain-
ment threatens to increase too much. The part of 
the containment underneath the reactor pressure 
vessel can be flooded with water in order to protect 
the containment bottom and penetrations from 
the thermal effect of core melt. Some penetrations 
of the containment have been protected from the 
direct effect of core melt also by structural means. 
To ensure the cooling of reactor debris, the plant 
units are also provided with a water filling system, 
by the means of which the water level inside the 
containment can be raised all the way to the same 
level with the upper edge of the reactor core.
The cooling of reactor core melt and the protec-
tion of containment penetrations requires that the 
lower dry well of the containment is flooded at such 
an early stage of the accident that if the pressure 
vessel melts through, the erupting core melt falls 
into a deep water pool. When the core melt falls 
into the water a so-called steam explosion, which 
causes a strong and quickly propagating pressure 
wave in the water pool, may occur. A lot of research 
has been done on steam explosions. The results 
show that the core melt discharged through the 
pressure vessel cools down as it travels through 
the water pool and cannot create a steam explo-
sion. However, the structures of the lower equip-
ment hatch have been enforced to decrease the 
risk for loss of containment integrity due to loads 
caused by steam explosions.
Research results have demonstrated that in 
unfavourable conditions iodine may form organic 
compounds that are not easily absorbed in the 
containment or in the filter. Such conditions may 
occur at the Olkiluoto plant, if the water inside the 
containment is acidified due to chemicals released 
during the accident. Organic iodine may also be 
generated in the primary circuit, if iodine reacts 
with the hydrocarbons that are released, when 
the boron carbide contained in the control rods be-
comes oxidised during the core damage. To improve 
the possibilities for retaining organic iodine in the 
filtered venting system, chemicals have been added 
to the water in the scrubber tank of the system. 
To minimise the formation of organic iodine, it is 
also possible to control the pH of the containment 
water volume by a specific system. The function 
of the system is based on addition of NaOH to the 
fire fighting water reservoir which is used for fill-
ing of the containment in post-accident conditions. 
The lower drywell will be flooded from the wetwell 
prior to the NaOH supply and the lower drywell 
water pool pH will be kept above 7.
Protection against fires at the Olkiluoto NPP
The possibility of fires and the risks of nuclear pow-
er plant accidents arising from fires have been tak-
en into account in the functional and layout design 
of the existing Olkiluoto plant. Fire safety has been 
improved in different areas of the fire protection 
at the existing Olkiluoto plant after commission-
ing. Although the loss of external electrical supply 
has been taken into account in the plant design, 
the plants were provided with e.g. a new start-
up transformer, based on the experience gained 
from the fire of the electric supply unit in 1991, to 
improve the independency of plant’s external grid 
connections. Furthermore, the main transformers, 
in-house transformers and start-up transformers 
are protected with a sprinkler extinguishing sys-
tem, which reduces essentially the risks arising 
from transformer fires. The use of halon is forbid-
den in Finland after the year 1999 with the excep-
tion of some special items. Due to this the halon ex-
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tinguishing systems at the existing Olkiluoto plant 
were replaced with other extinguishing systems by 
the year 2000. Fire risks have been assessed in a 
probabilistic risk assessment that concentrates on 
fire issues. Based on this the fire protection of ca-
bles, that are crucial to safety, have been improved 
at the entire plant. On the basis of the probabilistic 
risk assessment these improvements reduce the 
risks arising from fires considerably.
Modernisation and power uprating 
of Olkiluoto NPP in 1994–1998
The main goals of the modernisation project at 
the Olkiluoto NPP were the reviewing of safety 
features and enhancing safety, when feasible, im-
proving the production related performance, find-
ing factors limiting the plant lifetime and elimi-
nating them, when feasible, and enhancing the 
expertise of the own staff and improving productiv-
ity. In order to achieve the safety goal, the exist-
ing plant design was reviewed and compared by 
the TVO to the present and foreseeable safety re-
quirements. Compliance with the European Utility 
Requirements (EUR) was also reviewed. The feasi-
bility of fulfilling new requirements set for the new 
nuclear power plants was considered case by case. 
The living PRA model of the plant was utilised in 
this context.
The most important safety related modifica-
tions included in the modernisation programme 
are listed below:
•	 Reactor pressure relief system was diversified 
by installing two additional relief valves.
•	 ATWS behaviour was improved by modifying 
some trip signals and making boron injection 
automatic and more effective.
•	 Additional severe accident mitigation measures 
were implemented.
•	 Earthquake resistance of the plant was checked 
and related modifications were made.
•	 Partial scram function was strengthened.
•	 Generator breaker was replaced with a new 
one, which is able to break also short circuit 
current.
•	 Protection against frazil ice at the seawater in-
take was improved.
•	 Protection against snowstorms at the air intake 
of the emergency diesels was improved.
The modernisation programme as a whole reduced 
the severe core damage frequency estimate by a 
factor of three.
The radiation exposure of the population was 
reduced in accordance with the ALARA principle. 
Liquid releases were reduced by a factor of ten 
by improving the liquid waste handling systems. 
Also occupational doses were reduced. In practice, 
this meant minimising the cobalt content in the 
primary circuit. Renewal of steam dryers reduced 
the occupational doses remarkably, because the 
moisture of the steam was reduced.
The development of the BWR technology, mar-
gins revealed by operational experience, and plant 
modifications due to other reasons made also pow-
er uprating possible. Thermal power was uprated 
from 2160 MW to 2500 MW (15.7%). The most im-
portant changes were made in fuel technology. The 
operation was changed from with 8×8 bundles to 
10×10 bundles. The new bundles have 40 percent 
lower average linear heat rating than the old ones. 
Some additional design changes implemented due 
to the uprating were the increasing of inertia of the 
main circulation pumps electrically, steam separa-
tors replacement, high-pressure turbine and feed 
water system modifications, decay heat removal 
system capacity increasement, and generator and 
main transformers replacements. The low pressure 
turbines were also replaced and in that way about 
30 MW additional production capacity in each unit 
was achieved.
The modernisation programme of the Olkiluoto 
plant units 1 and 2 was started in 1994 and com-
pleted in 1998. The installations were performed 
during the refuelling outages of the years 1996–
1998. Some later installations were realised during 
outages in 1999. In spite of large modifications the 
refuelling outage times were reasonable, between 
15 and 20 days. The test programme was quite the 
same as in the case of a new plant.
Licensing steps related to the modernisation 
programme included an uprated Safety Analysis 
Report (PSAR, for example) and an uprated 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (level 1 PSA), 
which were reviewed and approved by STUK. 
Design modifications and test runs were accepted 
by STUK before implementation. The Final Safety 
Analysis Report (FSAR) and the related Topical 
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Reports were rewritten. It meant also that al-
most all transient and accident analyses were 
redone taking into account the uprated power 
level and modified plant design. The FSAR and 
Topical Reports were submitted to STUK at the 
end of 1996. An operating licence renewal applica-
tion, covering design modifications and the power 
uprating, was submitted to the Government at the 
end of 1996. The licence was granted in 1998. The 
power uprating was reviewed also according to the 
Environmental Impact Legislation.
Modernisation and power uprating project con-
tained several safety, ageing and efficiency rem-
edies. Mostly influences of modifications have been 
positive. A negative finding has been a slight 
increase of steam moisture. To improve this in 
both units steam dryers were replaced in out-
ages 2005–2007. Another slightly negative finding 
was increase of condensate clean up temperature, 
which decreased the life cycle of clean up resins. 
To avoid this problem the location of condensate 
clean up system was changed in the process. In this 
context even the first LP-preheaters were replaced 
and modernised.
The modernisation of turbine plant was contin-
ued with replacement of steam reheater moisture 
separators (MSR). They were replaced with mod-
ern two stage MSR’s. This replacement required 
modernisation of HP-turbine as well. These re-
placements were performed in outages 2005 and 
2006. In the same outages the I&C system of the 
turbine plant process was be replaced with a mod-
ern digital one.
Turbine plant process automation 
system renewal (2004–2006)
A new computerised turbine plant automation sys-
tem was installed in the Olkiluoto unit 2 in 2005 
annual maintenance outage (equivalent modifica-
tion was performed at Olkiluoto unit 1 in 2006). 
One reason to switch from analogue to programma-
ble technology was the obsolescence the old system. 
In addition, the modifications made in the turbine 
plant process in 2005, and in 2006, required some 
additional modifications to the automation system. 
The new system improves information management 
and control of the turbine plant as well as facilitates 
component maintenance. Another system renewal 
objective is increased reliability and reduced suscep-
tibility to malfunctions by added redundancy.
The new automation system is implemented 
by programmable technology. This allows an in-
creased number of process status measurements 
and versatile information handling possibilities. As 
regards turbine automation, it facilitates for tur-
bine operators improved information management, 
process control at operating work stations, trend 
monitoring and setting of safety limits. Safety limit 
settings enable turbine operator reaction to even 
minor process changes. The control desk for the 
turbine side in the control room was replaced with 
a safety function control desk and a turbine sys-
tems control and monitoring board with operator’s 
work stations. The control room was also fitted 
with a screen display. In addition, the process com-
puter system capacity had to be upgraded in con-
nection with the control system renewal to handle 
the large volume of data yielded by the turbine au-
tomation. The automation interface was introduced 
at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 training simulator in 
September 2004, which made possible the training 
of operating personnel in its use.
Latest incidents at the Olkiluoto 
NPP (2008–2010)
Olkiluoto 1, Trip of the main circulation 
pumps and simultaneous loss of their fly 
wheel systems during scram 30 May 2008
There was a reactor scram and trip of main cir-
culating pumps during start up after the annual 
outage at Olkiluoto unit 1 on May 2008. When the 
power was 60% the excitation system of the main 
generator caused high excitation current, and the 
generator output voltage rose to 125 % of the nomi-
nal 20 kV. The “115 % / 6 s over voltage relay”, in-
tended to drop the plant to house load operation in 
grid over voltage situations, opened the breaker on 
the high-voltage side of the main transformer dis-
connecting the plant from the 400 kV grid. When 
connection to the 400 kV grid was lost, the national 
grid no longer resisted the voltage increase, and 
the voltage at the plant’s 6.6 kV busbars rapidly 
peaked to around 150 % for duration of 150 ms. 
The main and house load transformers saturated 
and their differential protection opened the gen-
erator switch and initiated a turbine trip. Electric 
motor driven pumps supplying hydraulic steering 
oil to the steam dumping valves stopped, prevent-
ing dumping of steam to the turbine condenser and 
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leading to an automatic reactor trip and closing of 
the main steam isolation valves. The switch-over 
automatic connected the plant to the alternative 
110 kV grid after a 2 s blackout time. All four 
emergency backup diesels started, but were not 
connected since the 110 kV feed was established 
successfully.
The voltage peak caused all six in-vessel type 
main coolant pumps to trip since the voltage in 
the intermediate circuit of the pump’s frequency 
converters exceeded the 770 V protection level. 
The protection also disconnected the respective 
flywheels which provide additional inertia to the 
main coolant pumps in order to ensure sufficient 
cooling during transients. The flywheels are a 
separate set of motors which use their inertia to 
produce electricity as a generator for the main cool-
ant pumps in case of a loss of normal power supply. 
The over voltage protection of these safety classi-
fied systems was thus inadequate. Two main cool-
ant pumps could not be started later due to broken 
brake resistors.
There were no malfunctions in safety classified 
UPS systems of the plant or in any other systems 
besides main coolant pump drives. The flywheel 
generators are safety classified and were installed 
as part of the power upgrading project in 1997–
1998. Since the pumps were at minimum speed 
in the beginning of the transient, the fly wheel 
equipment was not needed to slow down the pump 
ramps, and the transient had no consequences for 
fuel coolability. Starting at full power, a similar in-
cident could lead a significant number of fuel rods 
to heat transfer crisis and possibly part of them to 
cladding temperatures endangering fuel integrity.
The event was classified as level 1 on the INES 
scale.
Several potential root causes were investigated. 
The primary cause of the incident was most prob-
ably a missing excitation current measuring signal 
and a software error of the voltage regulator. Root 
cause for the main coolant pump trip was inad-
equate dimensioning of the safety classified fly-
wheel generator systems against overvoltages.
As a corrective action, the voltage condition 
of over 115 % for 6 s in the generator busbar will 
now trip both the generator switch and the excita-
tion field switch in addition to the breaker on the 
high-voltage side of the main transformer. This 
will prevent the power peaks caused by the plant’s 
own generator after a loss of the stabilising effect 
of the grid. A new condition of “simultaneous high 
excitation current (165 A) and more than 115 % 
over voltage for 0.5 s in the generator busbar” will 
cause a turbine trip and open the generator and 
the excitation field switches. The feeder circuit 
breakers of the main coolant pump drives will be 
disconnected if the voltage of 6.6 kV busbars is 
less than 80 % for 350 ms or more than 115 % for 
50 ms. This will according to the transient calcula-
tions proactively prevent overvoltages from reach-
ing the pump drives. If the voltage returns between 
90 % and 110 %, the breakers will close again after 
3 s stabilising time. In addition, all breakers feed-
ing 6.6 kV busbars from station transformers will 
be disconnected if voltage exceeds 130 % for 30 ms. 
This will prevent the electrical consumers from 
calculated extreme overvoltages. Also the 400 kV 
switchyard busbar protection relay will open the 
generator breaker and all breakers feeding 6.6 kV 
busbars from station transformers. This will pre-
vent generator induced overvoltages after a short 
circuit near the plant. The breaker on the high-
voltage side of the main transformer is not opened 
if the generator breaker is closed.
Corrective actions mentioned above are inter-
mediate solution that enables the licensee to provi-
sionally continue the operation of the units. The so-
lution obtained by altering and adding the plant’s 
low safety class protection systems lowered the 
probability of tripping the main coolant pumps by 
voltage transients. However, from the determinis-
tic point of view, the operability of safety classified 
components of the main coolant pump drives now 
relies on correct operation of lower and non-safety 
classified components and protections. The licensee 
is planning further plant improvements to com-
pletely remedy the situation.
The most important lesson learnt from the event 
was that the design of NPP’s electric systems must 
take into account the transients coming from inter-
nal and external grid. The possible transients shall 
be analysed, the relay protection systems shall be 
designed to limit the transient voltages during and 
after disconnection of an electrical fault, safety 
critical components shall be dimensioned to with-
stand analysed voltage transients and software 
voltage limits set in the voltage regulator of the 
main generator can not be relied to limit transients 
generated by the generator.
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Deficient leaktightness of pipe penetrations
A STUK inspector observed deficiencies in the leak 
tightness of the emergency cooling system pump fa-
cilities, the so-called H rooms, at the Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant. The pipe penetrations through 
the walls had not been properly sealed. As the H 
rooms are also separate fire compartments, the 
problem also concerned the integrity of fire com-
partmentation. STUK required that TVO clarify 
the situation and launch corrective measures. TVO 
began repairs on the penetrations on 15 October 
2008, and the work was completed on 23 October 
2008. At Olkiluoto 1 and 2, 33 and 11 poorly sealed 
penetrations were repaired, respectively.
Both plant units have four so-called H rooms in 
their reactor buildings. These facilities include the 
necessary pumps for the reactor emergency cooling 
and the containment pressure relief. The H rooms 
have a connection to the containment condensation 
pool via pump suction lines. If a pump suction line 
breaks and the leak cannot be isolated, the conden-
sation pool water leaking from the pipe will flow 
into the H room. The flow will end when the water 
levels in the H room and the containment conden-
sation pool are equal. Plant design provides provi-
sion for such situations. If the H room is not leak- 
proof, condensation water will also flow outside the 
H room, and the surface level of the condensation 
pool could become too low. Part of the reactor emer-
gency cooling systems and containment pressure 
control functions would then be lost.
The probability of an unisolated pipe break as 
described above is very low. Pump suction lines 
have isolation valves that close automatically in 
case of a leak. No significant stress that would 
threaten the integrity of the pipes is targeted at 
the suction lines.
STUK required that TVO estimate the plant 
maintenance procedures due to the event and will 
make the necessary changes to the procedures. 
TVO executed a project to survey all pipe penetra-
tions at the plant and to assess their maintenance 
procedures.
TVO delivered a report on the situation to 
STUK on 16 October 2008, and reported the issue 
in more detail in a special report in November, as 
required by YVL Guide 1.5. In February, the special 
report was complemented with test results.
In January 2009, TVO carried out tests on the 
pressure response of the penetration structure. 
Based on the test results, it was observed that it 
is unlikely that all H room penetrations meet the 
pressure response requirements, even after the re-
pairs. Problematic penetrations have a fabric bel-
lows on one side of the penetration and rubber bel-
lows on the other side. Such a structure would not 
withstand water pressure from the fabric bellows 
side. TVO repaired the penetrations by installing 
rubber bellows on both sides of the penetration. 
The work was completed on 18 January 2009.
On the seven-level International Nuclear Event 
Scale (INES), the event was rated at level 1.
A common cause failure in main 
steam line outer isolation valve 
actuator at Olkiluoto unit 1
In a regular main steam line isolation valve test 
at Olkiluoto unit 1 during start-up after the an-
nual outage on May 12, 2009, one outer isolation 
valve failed to open after it had been closed. The 
failed valve actuator (type AUMA SA30.1-B16) was 
sent to the manufacturer for inspections in order 
to find the cause of the malfunction. Based on 
the preliminary inspection, it was concluded that 
the cause was grease that had leaked from the 
actuator gearbox, and prevented switch-over from 
manual operation to the electric motor. The actua-
tor was replaced on May 12, and the plant start-up 
was continued.
On June 2, 2009, the results of the complete 
inspection of the actuator by the manufacturer 
became known to the plant safety personnel and 
operation team, and on June 3, to the nuclear 
safety authority (STUK). The inspection had re-
vealed that the initial assumption of the failure 
mechanism had been erroneous, and the actual 
reason was a mechanical failure of the planetary-
type reduction gear, which is located between the 
electric motor and the actuator gearbox. In addi-
tion, it became known that another actuator – the 
one that had been taken from the storage in order 
to replace the failed one – had broken on May 12 
during calibration runs prior to installation. It 
had been opened for inspection by the plant’s own 
maintenance personnel, and it had been found out 
that the planetary reduction gear between the elec-
tric motor and the actuator gearbox was broken. 
This information had not been passed forward by 
the maintenance personnel, and both plant units 
were started prior to the information regarding the 
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failure mechanism was known to the plant’s safety 
personnel or the authorities.
When the failure mechanism became known, 
the nuclear safety authority ordered, on June 4, 
the plant operator to ascertain the operability of all 
eight main steam line isolation valves (planetary 
reduction gearboxes) of the two plant units by June 
30. This was done by re-placing the remaining 7 
of them (one having already been replaced with a 
new one after the failure), and inspecting the ones 
that had been removed. Several of the gearboxes 
showed early indications of fatigue in the planet 
gear teeth.
The event was rated as level 1 on the INES 
scale.
Periodic safety reviews at the Olkiluoto NPP
During the years 1996–1998 the overall safety re-
view of the Olkiluoto plant was carried out by the 
licensee and independently by STUK in connection 
to the renewal of operating licences of nuclear pow-
er plant units. The safety documentation, includ-
ing safety assessments done by the licensee, was 
submitted to STUK at the end of 1996. In addi-
tion to the review of the licensing documents such 
as Final Safety Analysis Report, STUK also made 
an independent safety assessment. The statement 
of STUK was given to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in June 1998. As regards radiation and 
nuclear safety, the main conclusions in the state-
ment were that the conditions of the Finnish nu-
clear energy legislation are complied with.
The latest overall safety review of the Olkiluoto 
plant took place in 2007–2009 in connection of 
the periodic safety review. The operating licence 
for Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2, required that a 
comprehensive safety review (PSR) shall be carried 
out by the end of 2008. The operating licence also 
covers the interim storage facilities for spent fuel 
and medium and low activity operational waste, 
so these facilities were also included in the PSR. 
Regulatory guide YVL 1.1 specifies the contents 
of the PSR. For a separate periodic safety review, 
STUK shall be provided with similar safety-related 
reports as in applying for the operating licence.
TVO began preparations for the periodic safety 
review a few years after the current operating 
licence was granted. The PSR documentation was 
submitted to STUK for approval in the end of 2008. 
STUK made a decision concerning the PSR in 
October 2009. In the STUK’s decision the licensee’s 
PSR was approved as a comprehensive periodic 
safety review according to the licence condition. 
The decision included also STUK’s safety assess-
ment which provided a summary of the reviews, 
inspections and continuous oversight carried out 
by STUK.
The issues addressed in the assessment and 
the related evaluation criteria are set forth in the 
nuclear energy and radiation safety legislation and 
the regulations issued thereunder. Based on the 
assessment, STUK considered that the Olkiluoto 
Nuclear Power Plant units 1 and 2 meet the set 
safety requirements for operational nuclear power 
plants, the emergency preparedness arrangements 
are sufficient and the necessary control to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been 
appropriately arranged. The physical protection 
of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was not yet 
completely in compliance with the requirements 
of Government Decree 734/2008, which came into 
force in December 2008. Further requirements 
concerning this issue based also on the principle of 
continuous improvement were included in the deci-
sion relating to the periodic safety review.
The safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
was assessed in compliance with the Government 
Decree on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 
(733/2008), which came into force in 2008. The 
decree notes that existing nuclear power plants 
need not meet all the requirements set out for new 
plants. Most of the design bases pertaining to the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units were 
set in the 1970s. Substantial modernisations have 
been carried out at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units since their commissioning to 
improve safety. This is in line with the principle 
of continuous improvement of safety provided in 
section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act. The safety 
of the plant will be further improved during the 
current operating licence period. Based on the peri-
odic safety review, TVO submitted to STUK action 
plans for the observed points requiring improve-
ment. STUK included also some additional require-
ments in the decision relating to the periodic safety 
review. Systematic assessment and development 
of the diversity principle was required, including 
investigation of possibilities for residual heat re-
moval independent of seawater. TVO shall present 
a report regarding the adequacy of the diversifica-
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tion at the plants and an action plan for developing 
the plants as a whole by the end of 2010. Another 
requirement considered plant modifications to im-
prove safety in situations involving spurious open-
ing of the turbine bypass valves.
As a summary of the review of the issues and 
documentation pertaining to the periodic safety 
review and the continuous oversight results, STUK 
noted that the safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plant units 1 and 2 is sufficient and the licensee 
utilises the necessary arrangements to continue 
the safe operation of the plants.
Planned and ongoing activities to 
improve safety at the Olkiluoto NPP
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment and 
enhancement approach is presented in the nuclear 
legislation. Actions for safety enhancement are to 
be taken whenever they can be regarded as justi-
fied, considering operating experience, the results 
of safety research and the advancement of science 
and technology. The implementation of safety im-
provements has been a continuing process at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units 1 and 2 since 
their commissioning and there exists no urgent 
need to upgrade the safety of these plant units in 
the context of the Convention.
There are several ongoing and planned safety 
upgrading measures at the Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plant. For example diversification of reactor wa-
ter level measurements, reactor I&C system mod-
ernisation as well as construction of an emergency 
control room are under design. In addition, in the 
last periodic safety review, STUK requested TVO to 
perform a comprehensive survey on the sufficiency 
of diversification at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 and 
a plan on measures to develop diversification by 
the end of 2010.
The reactor water level measurement system 
consists of four parallel subsystems, two of which 
are sufficient for implementing the protection func-
tion (from high and low level). The subsystems are 
based on differential pressure measurement. TVO 
has studied possibilities to supplement the cur-
rently used low level measurement system with 
another system based on a different measuring 
principle. TVO has plans to implement the modi-
fication in annual outages in 2012. STUK has also 
required TVO to study diversification needs of the 
high reactor water level measurement pertaining 
to water level swelling by the end of 2010.
Current capacity of the spent fuel storage at 
the Olkiluoto site is adequate until 2014. TVO 
has plans to enlarge the interim storage by three 
new pools. Enlargement has been included in the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 operating licence and the 
plant modification will be reviewed by STUK. 
Extension is planned to be ready in 2013.
